Files
ihasmail-inbuxa/server/src/app.test.ts
T
jcoffey-dev bb25355c23 AGPL source offer and name cleanup
Every build writes the exact source it was built from, uncommitted work and
new files included, as source.tar.gz next to the app, named after that tree.
Docker builds, which have no git, pack the build context and name it by a
hash of its files. The sign-in page and Settings > About link to it instead of
a repository that can drift.

What users, operators and packagers see no longer names the upstream server:
- interface text, in all nine catalogues, with a token-session line for
  Security;
- server messages;
- the settings, now MAIL_SERVER_URL, MAIL_SERVERS_FILE, ADMIN_URL and
  MAIL_SERVER_FOLLOW_ADVERTISED_URLS, and mail-servers.example.json;
- the Tenants notice, which is gone;
- the README, CONTRIBUTING and SECURITY.

ihasmail's own FEATURES, KNOWN-ISSUES and ROADMAP stay with public ihasmail,
and INBUXA.md is folded into the README.
2026-09-19 00:13:12 -07:00

147 lines
6.7 KiB
TypeScript

import { test } from "node:test";
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
process.env.MAIL_SERVER_URL = "http://127.0.0.1:1";
const { createApp } = await import("./app.js");
test("CSRF guard rejects API POSTs without the custom header", async () => {
const app = createApp();
const res = await app.request("/api/auth/login", { method: "POST", headers: { "content-type": "application/json" }, body: "{}" });
assert.equal(res.status, 403);
});
test("unauthenticated JMAP calls are rejected", async () => {
const app = createApp();
const res = await app.request("/api/jmap", { method: "POST", headers: { "content-type": "application/json", "x-requested-with": "ihasmail" }, body: "{}" });
assert.equal(res.status, 401);
});
test("cross-site fetches are rejected", async () => {
const app = createApp();
const res = await app.request("/api/health", { headers: { "sec-fetch-site": "cross-site" } });
assert.equal(res.status, 403);
});
test("health and security headers", async () => {
const app = createApp();
const res = await app.request("/api/health");
assert.equal(res.status, 200);
assert.equal(res.headers.get("x-content-type-options"), "nosniff");
assert.equal(res.headers.get("x-frame-options"), "DENY");
});
test("image proxy refuses private targets", async () => {
const app = createApp();
// no session -> 401 first; so exercise the handler directly via a logged-in-less path is not possible; check the URL validation ordering instead
const res = await app.request("/api/image?url=http://127.0.0.1/x");
assert.equal(res.status, 401);
});
test("a compressed upstream blob is not forwarded with the compressed length", async () => {
const { forwardedContentLength } = await import("./app.js");
// gzip: the body we forward has already been decompressed, so the length on
// the wire describes different bytes and must not be copied (issue #76).
const gz = new Headers({ "content-encoding": "gzip", "content-length": "384" });
assert.equal(forwardedContentLength(gz), null);
// identity, spelled out or absent: the length describes the body we send.
assert.equal(forwardedContentLength(new Headers({ "content-encoding": "identity", "content-length": "1157" })), "1157");
assert.equal(forwardedContentLength(new Headers({ "content-length": "1157" })), "1157");
assert.equal(forwardedContentLength(new Headers({ "content-encoding": "BR", "content-length": "384" })), null);
// Nothing to forward is not an error.
assert.equal(forwardedContentLength(new Headers()), null);
});
test("a Sieve script larger than a compressing hop's threshold survives the proxy", async () => {
const http = await import("node:http");
const zlib = await import("node:zlib");
const { forwardedContentLength } = await import("./app.js");
const script =
"# ihasmail filters v1 - edit with care; rules are stored in the `# rule:` comments\nrequire [\"fileinto\"];\n\n" +
["a", "b", "c"]
.map(
(k) =>
`# rule:{"id":"r${k}","name":"From ${k}@example.com","enabled":true,"join":"allof","tests":[{"type":"header","header":"from","op":"contains","value":"${k}@example.com"}],"actions":[{"type":"fileinto","mailbox":"INBOX/${k}"}]}\n` +
`if header :contains "from" "${k}@example.com"\n{\n fileinto "INBOX/${k}";\n}\n\n`,
)
.join("");
const gz = zlib.gzipSync(Buffer.from(script));
assert.ok(gz.length < Buffer.byteLength(script), "the script has to compress for this test to mean anything");
// A hop that compresses regardless of what we asked for.
const origin = http.createServer((_req, res) => {
res.writeHead(200, { "content-type": "application/sieve", "content-encoding": "gzip", "content-length": String(gz.length) });
res.end(gz);
});
await new Promise<void>((r) => origin.listen(0, () => r()));
const port = (origin.address() as { port: number }).port;
try {
const up = await fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/`);
// What the blob route forwards.
const headers = new Headers({ "content-type": "application/sieve; charset=utf-8" });
const cl = forwardedContentLength(up.headers);
if (cl) headers.set("Content-Length", cl);
const out = new Response(await up.arrayBuffer(), { status: 200, headers });
assert.equal(out.headers.get("content-length"), null);
assert.equal(await out.text(), script);
} finally {
origin.close();
}
});
test("only a PDF blob may be framed, and only by us", async () => {
/*
* The PDF preview is an iframe, and the blanket X-Frame-Options: DENY on
* every response blocked it -- the dialog showed Chrome's "refused to
* connect" where the file should have been. The middleware now leaves a
* header a route has already set, so this pins both halves: the exception
* exists, and it did not become the rule.
*/
const app = createApp();
const health = await app.request("/api/health");
assert.equal(health.headers.get("x-frame-options"), "DENY");
const { securityHeadersFor } = await import("./app.js");
assert.equal(securityHeadersFor("application/pdf", true), "SAMEORIGIN");
assert.equal(securityHeadersFor("application/pdf", false), "DENY");
assert.equal(securityHeadersFor("image/png", true), "DENY");
assert.equal(securityHeadersFor("text/html", true), "DENY");
});
/*
* #239: retrying through an outage must not lock somebody out of the recovery.
*
* MAIL_SERVER_URL at the top of this file is 127.0.0.1:1 — nothing listens there,
* so every sign-in here is the outage case. Before the fix, the eleventh of
* these came back 429 and stayed 429 for fifteen minutes, outliving whatever
* had actually been wrong.
*/
test("an unreachable upstream does not spend login attempts", async () => {
const app = createApp();
const login = () =>
app.request("/api/auth/login", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "content-type": "application/json", "x-requested-with": "ihasmail" },
body: JSON.stringify({ username: "[email protected]", password: "hunter2" }),
});
// Comfortably past LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT, which defaults to 10.
for (let i = 0; i < 25; i++) {
const res = await login();
assert.notEqual(res.status, 429, `attempt ${i + 1} was rate limited`);
assert.ok(res.status === 502 || res.status === 504, `attempt ${i + 1} said ${res.status}`);
}
});
test("an unreachable upstream says it is not the password", async () => {
const app = createApp();
const res = await app.request("/api/auth/login", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "content-type": "application/json", "x-requested-with": "ihasmail" },
body: JSON.stringify({ username: "[email protected]", password: "hunter2" }),
});
const body = (await res.json()) as { error: string; message: string };
assert.notEqual(body.error, "invalid_credentials");
assert.match(body.message, /not a problem with your password/i);
});