Files
ihasmail-inbuxa/server/src/account.test.ts
T
jcoffey-dev 94bf42cfda Drop Stalwart 0.15 support
ihasmail spoke to two generations of Stalwart that are less alike than
their version numbers suggest: 0.16 replaced the REST management API with
JMAP registry objects, changed the shape of FileNode, split its rights
up, and moved configuration into the store. Carrying both meant 34 branch
points across nine files, a 92-line compatibility shim whose only job was
telling them apart, a parallel REST implementation of every credential
operation, and a mock that had to model both.

The branches were not the real cost. The cost was that a wrong answer
about which generation had answered always had somewhere to fall back to,
so it failed quietly rather than loudly: one capability looked for in the
wrong place downgraded every real 0.16 server onto the 0.15 path, which
posted the current password to an endpoint 0.16 had removed, reported the
wrong generation on About, and ran Files on the older code. It reached
production and was recorded as verified when it was not. The mock
mirrored the same wrong placement, which is why the tests agreed.

Removed: the filenode compatibility shim, the dual "registry" | "legacy"
backend in account.ts, the pre-0.16 generation in AccountInfo and
everything that read it, the mock's LEGACY mode and dev:mock:legacy, and
the three test files that existed only to pin 0.15 behaviour.

Sign-in now refuses an older server by name, once, rather than letting
Files, the account locale and credentials each fail in their own way with
nothing connecting them. It says the credentials were fine -- someone
hitting this has typed a correct password, and telling them otherwise
sends them round in circles -- and names the tag to build from. Four
tests cover it, including that no session cookie is minted and that bad
credentials on such a server are still a plain 401.

Two fallbacks went that were not strictly about 0.15, and both for the
same reason the removal is happening. Files no longer answers a refused
filter or sort by fetching every node in the account, which would hide a
real fault behind a performance cliff nobody would notice. And the app
folder lookups now filter on parentId/isTopLevel alone and match names
client-side, since `name` is not a filter Stalwart is known to implement
and one it does not know fails the whole query rather than being ignored.

The last release that runs on 0.15 is tagged stalwart-0.15-support.

Verified against the mock end to end: sign-in, the Files tree on the 0.16
path with the app folder hidden, and self-service credentials over the
registry. 226 web + 75 server tests pass; typecheck and build clean.
2026-08-26 09:51:03 -07:00

177 lines
7.9 KiB
TypeScript

import { test, before, after } from "node:test";
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
/**
* End-to-end self-service credential flows against the mock, which enforces
* the same rules a real 0.16 server does: the current password is checked,
* password policy is applied, and once 2FA is on every request wants a fresh
* TOTP code — except one authenticating with an app password.
*/
const PORT = 18797;
process.env.MOCK_PORT = String(PORT);
process.env.MOCK_USER = "[email protected]";
process.env.MOCK_PASS = "demo-password";
process.env.STALWART_URL = `http://127.0.0.1:${PORT}`;
process.env.APP_SECRET = "test-secret-for-account-flows";
const mock = await import("./mock/index.js");
const { createApp } = await import("./app.js");
const { parseOtpauthUrl, totpCode } = await import("./totp.js");
const app = createApp();
let cookie = "";
const HEADERS = { "content-type": "application/json", "x-requested-with": "ihasmail" };
async function call(path: string, init: RequestInit = {}): Promise<{ status: number; body: any }> {
const res = await app.request(path, {
...init,
headers: { ...HEADERS, ...(init.headers as Record<string, string>), ...(cookie ? { cookie } : {}) },
});
const setCookie = res.headers.get("set-cookie");
if (setCookie) cookie = setCookie.split(";")[0]!;
const text = await res.text();
return { status: res.status, body: text ? JSON.parse(text) : null };
}
const post = (path: string, body: unknown) => call(path, { method: "POST", body: JSON.stringify(body) });
before(async () => {
const res = await post("/api/auth/login", { username: "[email protected]", password: "demo-password" });
assert.equal(res.status, 200, "login should succeed against the mock");
});
after(() => {
(mock as { server?: { close(): void } }).server?.close();
});
/**
* Stalwart advertises `urn:stalwart:jmap` only per-account, never in the
* session-level capabilities. Looking for it at the top level alone reported
* every real 0.16 server as older than 0.16 — and now that the same check
* decides whether a sign-in is allowed at all, that mistake would lock
* everyone out rather than merely misroute credentials.
*/
test("the session is accepted on a server that advertises the registry per-account", async () => {
const res = await call("/api/auth/session");
assert.equal(res.status, 200);
assert.equal(res.body.ihasmail.server.edition, "oss");
assert.equal(res.body.capabilities["urn:stalwart:jmap"], undefined, "not where a client would first look");
assert.ok("urn:stalwart:jmap" in res.body.primaryAccounts, "but here, as on a real server");
});
test("the registry reports an account with nothing set up yet", async () => {
const res = await call("/api/account/security");
assert.equal(res.status, 200);
assert.equal(res.body.otpEnabled, false);
assert.deepEqual(res.body.appPasswords, []);
});
test("app passwords are created, listed once with their secret, and revoked", async () => {
const created = await post("/api/account/app-passwords", { description: "Thunderbird" });
assert.equal(created.status, 200);
assert.match(created.body.secret, /^\$app\$/, "the server's generated secret is returned");
assert.ok(created.body.id);
const list = await call("/api/account/security");
assert.equal(list.body.appPasswords.length, 1);
assert.equal(list.body.appPasswords[0].description, "Thunderbird");
assert.equal(list.body.appPasswords[0].secret, undefined, "the secret is never listed again");
const revoked = await post("/api/account/app-passwords/revoke", { id: created.body.id });
assert.equal(revoked.status, 200);
assert.deepEqual((await call("/api/account/security")).body.appPasswords, []);
});
test("an app password needs a name", async () => {
const res = await post("/api/account/app-passwords", { description: " " });
assert.equal(res.status, 400);
assert.equal(res.body.error, "missing_fields");
});
test("the wrong current password is refused with the server's reason", async () => {
const res = await post("/api/account/password", { current: "not-my-password", next: "a-much-longer-password" });
assert.equal(res.status, 403);
assert.match(res.body.message, /Current secret is incorrect/);
});
test("the server's password policy is surfaced verbatim", async () => {
const res = await post("/api/account/password", { current: "demo-password", next: "short" });
assert.equal(res.status, 400);
assert.match(res.body.message, /at least 8 characters/);
});
test("a password unchanged from the old one is rejected before we ask upstream", async () => {
const res = await post("/api/account/password", { current: "demo-password", next: "demo-password" });
assert.equal(res.status, 400);
assert.equal(res.body.error, "unchanged");
});
test("changing the password keeps this session working", async () => {
const res = await post("/api/account/password", { current: "demo-password", next: "a-brand-new-password" });
assert.equal(res.status, 200);
// The stored credential was re-sealed, so the next proxied call still passes
// upstream authentication with the new password.
assert.equal((await call("/api/auth/session")).status, 200);
assert.equal((await call("/api/account/security")).status, 200);
});
test("enabling 2FA rejects a code the new secret did not produce", async () => {
const begin = await post("/api/account/2fa/begin", {});
assert.equal(begin.status, 200);
assert.match(begin.body.url, /^otpauth:\/\/totp\//);
const res = await post("/api/account/2fa/enable", { url: begin.body.url, code: "000000", current: "a-brand-new-password" });
assert.equal(res.status, 400);
assert.equal(res.body.code, undefined);
assert.match(res.body.message, /doesn't match/);
assert.equal((await call("/api/account/security")).body.otpEnabled, false, "nothing was stored");
});
test("enabling 2FA switches the session onto an app password so it survives", async () => {
const begin = await post("/api/account/2fa/begin", {});
const params = parseOtpauthUrl(begin.body.url);
assert.ok(params);
const res = await post("/api/account/2fa/enable", {
url: begin.body.url,
code: totpCode(params),
current: "a-brand-new-password",
});
assert.equal(res.status, 200);
assert.equal(res.body.sessionKept, true);
const state = await call("/api/account/security");
assert.equal(state.status, 200, "the session still authenticates upstream");
assert.equal(state.body.otpEnabled, true);
assert.equal(state.body.appPasswords.length, 1, "one app password was minted for this browser");
assert.match(state.body.appPasswords[0].description, /\(/, "it is named after the browser");
});
test("with 2FA on, a password change needs the current code too", async () => {
const withoutCode = await post("/api/account/password", { current: "a-brand-new-password", next: "yet-another-password" });
assert.equal(withoutCode.status, 403);
assert.match(withoutCode.body.message, /OTP code is required/);
});
test("2FA is switched off with the password and a current code", async () => {
const state = await call("/api/account/security");
assert.equal(state.body.otpEnabled, true);
// The enrolment secret is known only to the client, so disabling uses a code
// from the authenticator - here, the one the mock stored.
const stored = (mock as { account: { otpUrl: string | null } }).account.otpUrl;
const params = parseOtpauthUrl(stored!);
assert.ok(params);
const res = await post("/api/account/2fa/disable", { current: "a-brand-new-password", code: totpCode(params) });
assert.equal(res.status, 200);
assert.equal((await call("/api/account/security")).body.otpEnabled, false);
});
test("credential endpoints reject unauthenticated callers", async () => {
const saved = cookie;
cookie = "";
assert.equal((await call("/api/account/security")).status, 401);
assert.equal((await post("/api/account/password", { current: "a", next: "b" })).status, 401);
assert.equal((await post("/api/account/2fa/begin", {})).status, 401);
cookie = saved;
});