Groundwork for un-shelving translations. Chrome's translator rewrites the
rendered DOM directly, wrapping text nodes in <font> elements React has never
heard of, and the next update can then call removeChild against a parent whose
children have moved (facebook/react#11538). This is the structural defence
against that, plus the setting the served language will read from.
The language setting is `uiLanguage`, and it is deliberately not the `locale`
field that already exists. That one is a formatting choice -- what calendar,
clock and numerals to use -- and folding the two together would silently
rewrite everybody's date format the first time they picked a language. German
dates with an English interface is a real preference, and so is the reverse.
It defaults to English when absent, which covers both a new account and every
settings file written before this, and Accept-Language is not consulted: a
served locale should be something the reader chose rather than something
guessed and then written down as though they had. Only languages with strings
shipped are offered, which today means English alone -- a picker entry without
a catalogue behind it would leave the page claiming a language it is not in,
which stops a reader translating a page they cannot read.
`<html lang>` is set where applyTheme is set: at store module load, from the
localStorage cache, before createRoot() has rendered anything. Not in an
effect -- a lang that is briefly wrong is enough to raise the translate prompt
on a page that needed none. There is no server-rendered alternative to reach
for here: ihasmail serves a static shell and holds no account state, and the
settings file lives in the reader's own JMAP Files, so reading it before the
page existed would mean authenticating to Stalwart on every page load. The
static lang="en" in index.html covers the first bytes; the store only ever
corrects a reader who chose otherwise. Both halves are tested.
translate="no" and class="notranslate" go on the narrow boundaries only:
rendered email bodies, raw message source, attachment text, the generated and
hand-edited Sieve, the brand and the login name. Not on <body> -- someone
whose language ihasmail does not speak yet should still be able to translate
the parts that are ours. Email bodies turn out to live in a shadow root, so
React never reconciles them and they were never a crash risk; the marker there
is about not rewriting what a sender actually wrote.
Twenty-four fragile interpolation points were found with the TypeScript
parser rather than grep, and fifteen refactored. Pluralisation and
"count + label" pairs are collapsed into a single expression so the text is a
lone child React updates with textContent, rather than a text node with
conditional siblings to insert around. One of them -- InviteCard's
{method === "REPLY" && organizer ? "" : ""} -- rendered an empty string either
way and is simply gone.
The boundary is scoped to the main content, so the header, folder tree and any
open composer sit outside it and survive independently. It recovers by
remounting the subtree, which costs nothing because everything inside
re-derives from the stores, and it logs at info rather than error: a reader
translating a page is expected and recovered from, and filing it as an error
would put an entry in every console-reading reporter for behaviour that
worked. It re-raises anything that is not a DOM mutation error, so a real bug
still surfaces as one, and it gives up after three attempts rather than
looping invisibly.
Worth recording: the crash could not be reproduced on React 19.2.8. Wrapping
207-249 React-managed text nodes in <font>, exactly as the translator does,
then driving in-place conditional toggles and navigations, left the app intact
with the boundary never firing. The original issue is from React 16 and the
reconciler has changed a great deal since. So this lands as defence whose
premise is weaker than assumed rather than as a fix for something observed
here, and the boundary is insurance rather than a load-bearing part. The
notranslate markers and the collapsed interpolations stand on their own merits
either way.
Sign-out never cleared local storage. It stopped push, flushed settings and
removed the subscription -- that last one reasoned explicitly that a browser
left holding someone's mail becomes somebody else's next -- and then left the
settings cache and the recently-addressed list on disk. That list is other
people's addresses, and nothing ever removed it.
Clearing it on sign-out is now unconditional, because lending a laptop is the
same exposure as a public machine, only quieter. The keep-list is short and
deliberate: lastUser, which only a trusted device writes; the trust flag; and
the random push device id. Everything else goes, so a key added later is
forgotten by default rather than by nobody having thought about it.
"Keep me signed in on this device" defaulted to true, which assumed the answer
most costly to get wrong -- someone on a library machine got a thirty-day
cookie unless they noticed a ticked box. It now asks whose computer this is,
defaults to not yours, and says what each answer does. Untrusted means a
session cookie, nothing written locally, no push subscription, and a five
minute idle sign-out.
The idle timer is there because the alternative does not work: custom
beforeunload text was removed from browsers years ago, and no event fires at
all for walking away from a signed-in screen, which is the case that matters.
A timer needs nobody's cooperation.
Reads are gated as well as writes, since a machine trusted once still has the
residue; an untrusted sign-in purges it outright. The wire keeps calling this
`remember` -- it is persisted in SESSION_FILE, and renaming it would invalidate
every session file on upgrade for a change of vocabulary.
Verified in a browser against the mock, not only in tests: untrusted sign-in
leaves localStorage empty through a full session including folder expansion;
trusted writes settings, recent and lastUser as before; sign-out clears recent
and settings while keeping lastUser; an untrusted sign-in afterwards clears
even that.
The field never worked here: Stalwart takes a TOTP code only through an
OAuth flow, so a client posting a username and password had nothing to
send it to. Offering the button advertised a feature the login path
cannot honour, so it comes out until the flow works end to end.
The login store still takes a totp argument and the server still accepts
one; the form now passes an empty string, which the server reads as no
code given. A failed sign-in no longer reveals the field, and the
invalid-credentials message drops its mention of a verification code.
Signing in with a two-factor code failed with a bare 401 and "Invalid
credentials", which sent the user off to check a password that was
perfectly good (#75). It cannot work, and the app already knew.
Stalwart accepts a TOTP code only through an OAuth flow -- its own web
interface is an OAuth client, which is why signing in *there* succeeds --
and it offers only the authorization-code and device flows. There is no
password grant, so a client holding a username and password has nowhere
to exchange them plus a code for a token. The concatenated
`password$code` form this README claimed was accepted is not a route the
server has, and appears never to have been. What was verified live on
0.16.19 was enabling and disabling 2FA, never signing in with a code.
The contradiction was already in the codebase: turning 2FA *on* mints an
app password and reseals the session onto it, precisely because a plain
password stops working from that moment. The sign-in page was the one
place still assuming otherwise.
Three changes, no new capability:
- A 401 on a sign-in that carried a code now says what is happening
and where to go instead, and says the password is probably fine.
A sign-in without a code is untouched, so an ordinary typo still
reads as an ordinary typo.
- The field stays, and is honest about itself. Removing it would leave
someone with 2FA finding nothing at all, which is worse than finding
a field that explains the situation and points at app passwords.
- The README's claim is corrected rather than quietly dropped, and
real 2FA support is written into the roadmap as what it is: an OAuth
implementation, handing sign-in to Stalwart and holding a refresh
token instead of a sealed password.
The build and where to find it were running together on one line. The
name and version now stand on their own, with the two links beneath:
ihasmail v2.16.61
ihasmail.org · AGPL-3.0 source
"by" is gone with the restructuring. It was doing attribution work that
the line no longer needs -- ihasmail.org is a LINUXexpert.org project
site, so pointing at it says the same thing without the preposition, and
the README badge is where the credit properly lives.
One <p> with a break rather than two paragraphs: .foot carries a 20px
margin-top, which a second one would repeat as a gap under the button.
The link went to linuxexpert.org, which is the organisation rather than
the project. Someone reading a sign-in page and following it wants the
software's own site, not its publisher's.
Checked that https://ihasmail.org answers 200 before putting it in front
of everyone who reaches the instance -- a dead link on a sign-in page is
worse than none.
The README badge still credits LINUXexpert.org, which is the right place
for attribution and was not part of this.
It was only on the About page, which is behind a sign-in -- so the one
place a version is most often wanted, when something is wrong and nobody
can get in, was the one place it could not be read.
It sits next to the AGPL source link deliberately. Section 13's offer is
for the source of *this* build, and naming the build is what turns that
into something a person can act on rather than a link to whatever main
happens to be. A bug report can name the build without signing in, too.
Worth being deliberate about: this is pre-authentication, so anyone who
can reach the instance can read it. That is a real disclosure -- it tells
an unauthenticated visitor exactly which build to look up. It is being
accepted rather than overlooked: ihasmail is AGPL with its source already
linked from that same line, so the version narrows nothing that reading
the source would not, and the sign-in page already names the software.
The logo baked "ihasmail.com" into the artwork, which is the wrong
identity for a project that is not the hosted instance -- and at the
34px the topbar renders it at, the wordmark was an illegible smudge
under a squashed cat.
logo.png, icon-512.png, icon-192.png and apple-touch-icon.png are now
the mark alone. favicon-64.png, icon-maskable.png and favicon.ico
already were, and are untouched.
Cropping needed a threshold: both source files carry a band of
near-invisible pixels (alpha 1-10) roughly 40px wide down the left
side, so a plain getbbox() crop leaves the mark sitting off-centre.
The bounding box is taken at alpha > 8 instead.
The login page had no name of its own -- it relied on the wordmark --
so it gets one as text, styled like the topbar's. Its screenshot is
retaken; the rest still show the old mark in the topbar.
Three things a licence audit turned up. None of them is a conflict --
every one of the 182 installed packages is permissive, and the relicence
was within the copyright holder's gift -- but all three are ways the
AGPL fails to stick.
The offer was hard-coded to this repository. Section 13 asks whoever
runs a modified version to offer *that* version's source, so every
deployment with a patch in it was pointing at the wrong tree, and would
have gone on doing so unless its operator noticed and edited the About
page. SOURCE_URL now sets it, alongside APP_NAME, and both the sign-in
page and About read it.
The offer was also only visible after signing in. Whoever is looking at
the sign-in form is interacting with the program over a network too, so
the footer carries it now.
And the two workspace packages declared no licence at all. Private, so
npm never minded, but anything reading the tree saw a blank where the
rest of the project says AGPL-3.0-or-later.
Checked both ways round: with SOURCE_URL set to a fork, the sign-in page
and About both point at the fork; with it unset, both fall back to this
repository.
jcoffey-dev