Three things a licence audit turned up. None of them is a conflict --
every one of the 182 installed packages is permissive, and the relicence
was within the copyright holder's gift -- but all three are ways the
AGPL fails to stick.
The offer was hard-coded to this repository. Section 13 asks whoever
runs a modified version to offer *that* version's source, so every
deployment with a patch in it was pointing at the wrong tree, and would
have gone on doing so unless its operator noticed and edited the About
page. SOURCE_URL now sets it, alongside APP_NAME, and both the sign-in
page and About read it.
The offer was also only visible after signing in. Whoever is looking at
the sign-in form is interacting with the program over a network too, so
the footer carries it now.
And the two workspace packages declared no licence at all. Private, so
npm never minded, but anything reading the tree saw a blank where the
rest of the project says AGPL-3.0-or-later.
Checked both ways round: with SOURCE_URL set to a fork, the sign-in page
and About both point at the fork; with it unset, both fall back to this
repository.
Settings › Security grows three working sections instead of a note telling
people to use Stalwart's own portal.
Stalwart moved this API between releases, so ihasmail speaks both: 0.16+ has
the x:AccountPassword singleton and x:AppPassword registry objects over JMAP,
while 0.15.x has the /api/account/auth REST endpoint. Which one answers the
probe is the only reliable way to tell them apart, and the result is cached
per session. The built-in `user` role already grants sysAccountPassword* and
sysAppPassword*, so no administrator setup is needed.
Two problems are worth calling out, because both would bite a user hard:
Stalwart validates the credentials already on the account when 2FA is turned
on and never checks the new secret, so an authenticator that was mistyped or
out of step would lock someone out of their mailbox at the next sign-in. We
verify a code against the new secret ourselves first (RFC 6238, tested against
the spec's vectors) and only then ask the server to store anything.
Every proxied call re-authenticates with the credential sealed into the
session, and from the moment 2FA is on Stalwart wants a fresh TOTP code with
it — which we cannot produce between requests. Turning 2FA on would therefore
sign the user out of the browser they just turned it on in. App passwords
authenticate without a second factor, so the session is moved onto one minted
for this browser, and the session cookie is re-sealed with it. The order
matters: it is minted while the old credential still works, and revoked again
if enabling then fails.
Password changes re-seal this session too and drop the others, whose sealed
copies of the old password would fail on their next call.
The mock now enforces what a real server does — current password, password
policy, a TOTP code on every request once 2FA is on, app passwords exempt —
so the whole flow is exercised in tests rather than only by hand.
jcoffey-dev