The web build now writes a Brotli and a gzip copy of each compressible
file, and the static handler serves the best one the browser accepts.
The bundle was gzipped again for every request and Brotli was never
offered; the main chunk is 122 KB with Brotli against 144 KB gzipped.
index.html and every static file carry an ETag, and a matching
If-None-Match gets a 304. The shell and the worker are revalidated on
every load and were downloaded whole each time.
Attachment downloads pass a plain byte Range to Stalwart and relay a 206,
so a PDF viewer or a video element can read in pieces where the server
allows it. On the reader's own device a blob is cached as immutable,
since its id names its content.
The upstream session and account-info caches drop entries past their age
on a timer; they lost an entry only on sign-out or refusal, not when a
session expired. The mock answers byte ranges.
@vitejs/plugin-react 6 peers on vite ^8 and nothing lower, so the build
had to move before the plugin could. vite 8 bundles with rolldown rather
than rollup, which is most of what is here.
The object form of `manualChunks` -- a chunk name against the list of
packages in it -- is gone; rolldown takes groups tested against module
paths instead. Same two chunks come out, `vendor` and `icons`, with the
same contents; `icons` is tried first because the first matching group
wins. `rollupOptions` is now a deprecated alias, so it is spelled
`rolldownOptions`.
The lockfile is regenerated rather than patched. vitest depends on vite
itself, and an incremental install was happy to leave 6.4.3 hoisted for
vitest while web built against 8.3.0 -- two majors in one tree, which is
not a state to ship. A clean install collapses to one.
vite 8 wants Node ^20.19 || >=22.12, above the >=20.10 the README and
engines promised, so both say 20.19 now. CI and the image are on 22 and
were never affected.
Rolldown reports two modules that are imported both statically and
dynamically, so the dynamic import cannot split them out. That is true
of the source either way -- store/sieve.ts has three static importers
and one dynamic -- and is left alone here.
GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9 -- arbitrary file read through @vitest/mocker's
redirect mock -- has no fix in the 3.x line. The patched versions are
4.1.11 and 5.0.0-rc.2, so clearing it means the major. vite stays at
6.4.3: vitest 4 accepts ^6, and nothing outside devDependencies moves.
The bump surfaced a bug of ours rather than one of vitest's. vi.spyOn
now hands back the spy already installed on a method instead of wrapping
it in a fresh one, so a spy installed in beforeEach keeps its call count
across tests. compose-from-share expected two uploads and saw three: its
own two, plus the one from the test before it. The assertion was only
ever passing because each test happened to get a new spy.
Both suites now restore between tests, which is what the other five
spying suites already do. webpush had the same leak with no assertion
close enough to catch it.
A .md previewed as its own source, which is reading the punctuation
rather than the notes. It now opens rendered, with Rendered | Source in
the dialog footer for anyone who wants what the file actually says.
Markdown only; a .txt has nothing to toggle between.
Rendering is `marked`, sanitised by DOMPurify -- the one the app already
carries for mail. Markdown is not a safe subset of anything: raw HTML
passes through it by design, so a <script> in a file somebody uploaded or
shared into the account is a script tag unless something takes it out.
Images become links rather than pictures. An image in a Markdown file is
either a relative path, which has no base to resolve against here, or a
URL somewhere else, which fetches on open and tells that server the file
was read -- the tracking pixel this app blocks in mail. The link keeps
the alt text and the address, so nothing vanishes silently.
Fixes the PDF preview while here, which never worked: securityHeaders
put X-Frame-Options: DENY on every response including the blob route, so
the iframe showed Chrome's "refused to connect" where the file should
have been -- in Files today and in mail attachments long before that.
The middleware now leaves a header the route has set, and a PDF served
inline says SAMEORIGIN. Nothing else on the server is framable.
The middle field was the Stalwart generation a build targeted -- 16 for
0.16 -- which leaves nowhere to go when Stalwart reaches 1.0. There is no
honest value for it: 2.1 sorts below the 2.16 already deployed, so every
image and About screen would have read as a downgrade. Tying our
numbering to somebody else's was the mistake, and which Stalwart a build
needs is said properly in the README badge and KNOWN-ISSUES, where it can
be precise rather than one digit.
The version is now the date of the commit it was built from, and the pull
request moves after the + as build metadata. It is provenance rather than
a rank: at the rate they merge here it climbs without bound and says
nothing about how new a build is. Everything after the + is ignored when
versions are compared, which reads correctly -- two builds from the same
day differ in where they came from, not in age -- and nothing depends on
that comparison anyway, since images are pruned by creation time and a
rollback names a git ref.
The date is the commit's own, so rebuilding an old commit gives the
version it had the first time. package.json is no longer the source of
anything and sits at 0.0.0, which is what an unversioned build reports
and is meant to look wrong.
The formatting is a pure function now, so the rules have tests. They had
none while the version was the thing naming every image we ship.
ihasmail called itself "2.0" on the About page and "2.0.0" from
/api/health, both hardcoded, in four places that had drifted from each
other and from anything meaningful. A build now says what it is:
ihasmail v2.16.57
| | |
| | the pull request the commit came from
| the Stalwart generation this build targets -- 0.16
ihasmail's own major
The first two are the version in the root package.json, so there is a
single place to bump them, and 16 becomes 17 when ihasmail moves to
Stalwart 0.17. Dropping 0.15 is what makes that middle number honest:
while two generations were supported it could not have been either.
The pull request number comes from git at build time and is never
written back into the tree. It cannot be: it does not exist until the
pull request has merged, so a committed version would always describe a
merge that had not happened yet, and every open branch would collide on
the same line. A commit that did not come through a pull request carries
the last number plus its own short SHA -- 2.16.57+g1fa6578 -- which says
it is past that pull request rather than quietly claiming to be it.
.dockerignore excludes .git on purpose, so an image build cannot work
any of this out. It takes --build-arg IHASMAIL_VERSION instead, which
the build stage bakes into the bundle and the runtime stage keeps as an
environment variable for the server. Left out, it falls back to the base
version from package.json rather than failing -- so a version with no PR
number on it means whoever built the image did not pass one.
scripts/ is copied into the runtime image because the server resolves
its version through it. There is no git in there to ask, which is the
fallback's whole purpose.
Verified: 2.16.57 in the bundle and from /api/health on a dev checkout;
the same after a real docker build --build-arg, from inside the
container; and 2.16.0 rather than a crash when the arg is left off.
Note for deploying: ihasmail-deploy.sh on the host builds without the
argument and will produce 2.16.0 until it passes
--build-arg IHASMAIL_VERSION="$(node scripts/version.mjs)".
Three things a licence audit turned up. None of them is a conflict --
every one of the 182 installed packages is permissive, and the relicence
was within the copyright holder's gift -- but all three are ways the
AGPL fails to stick.
The offer was hard-coded to this repository. Section 13 asks whoever
runs a modified version to offer *that* version's source, so every
deployment with a patch in it was pointing at the wrong tree, and would
have gone on doing so unless its operator noticed and edited the About
page. SOURCE_URL now sets it, alongside APP_NAME, and both the sign-in
page and About read it.
The offer was also only visible after signing in. Whoever is looking at
the sign-in form is interacting with the program over a network too, so
the footer carries it now.
And the two workspace packages declared no licence at all. Private, so
npm never minded, but anything reading the tree saw a blank where the
rest of the project says AGPL-3.0-or-later.
Checked both ways round: with SOURCE_URL set to a fork, the sign-in page
and About both point at the fork; with it unset, both fall back to this
repository.
Settings › Security grows three working sections instead of a note telling
people to use Stalwart's own portal.
Stalwart moved this API between releases, so ihasmail speaks both: 0.16+ has
the x:AccountPassword singleton and x:AppPassword registry objects over JMAP,
while 0.15.x has the /api/account/auth REST endpoint. Which one answers the
probe is the only reliable way to tell them apart, and the result is cached
per session. The built-in `user` role already grants sysAccountPassword* and
sysAppPassword*, so no administrator setup is needed.
Two problems are worth calling out, because both would bite a user hard:
Stalwart validates the credentials already on the account when 2FA is turned
on and never checks the new secret, so an authenticator that was mistyped or
out of step would lock someone out of their mailbox at the next sign-in. We
verify a code against the new secret ourselves first (RFC 6238, tested against
the spec's vectors) and only then ask the server to store anything.
Every proxied call re-authenticates with the credential sealed into the
session, and from the moment 2FA is on Stalwart wants a fresh TOTP code with
it — which we cannot produce between requests. Turning 2FA on would therefore
sign the user out of the browser they just turned it on in. App passwords
authenticate without a second factor, so the session is moved onto one minted
for this browser, and the session cookie is re-sealed with it. The order
matters: it is minted while the old credential still works, and revoked again
if enabling then fails.
Password changes re-seal this session too and drop the others, whose sealed
copies of the old password would fail on their next call.
The mock now enforces what a real server does — current password, password
policy, a TOTP code on every request once 2FA is on, app passwords exempt —
so the whole flow is exercised in tests rather than only by hand.
jcoffey-dev
dependabot[bot]