Ask for the account password before minting an app password, and keep sessions the proxy checks from writing the account's own registry objects, so a session left open on someone else's machine cannot take a credential away from it. The password is compared with what the session holds; Stalwart is asked only when 2FA moved the session onto an app password. Serve attachments and proxied images with no-store on a device that is not the person's own. Give files from a winmail.dat only the types the server would show inline. Strip direction controls from sender and attachment names and from saved filenames. On signing out, send what is inside its undo window, then close every composer, so the next person to sign in does not find the last one's draft. Group sessions by the account Stalwart names and its server, so "sign out other sessions" also reaches a session opened as a bare or differently cased username.
313 lines
11 KiB
TypeScript
313 lines
11 KiB
TypeScript
import { mkdir, readFile, writeFile, rename } from "node:fs/promises";
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import { dirname } from "node:path";
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import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
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import { config } from "./config.js";
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import { deriveKey, open, randomToken, safeEqual, seal, sha256 } from "./crypto.js";
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export interface StoredSession {
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id: string;
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/** sha256 of the cookie secret; used to validate presented cookies. */
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secretHash: string;
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/** base64 random salt for key derivation */
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salt: string;
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/** sealed JSON {username, password} */
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sealedCredentials: string;
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username: string;
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/** Which account this is; see `accountKey`. Absent on sessions saved before it existed. */
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account?: string;
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createdAt: number;
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lastSeenAt: number;
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expiresAt: number;
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remember: boolean;
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userAgent: string;
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ip: string;
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}
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export interface LiveSession {
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id: string;
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username: string;
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/** See `accountKey`. */
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account: string;
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/** Basic Authorization header value for upstream calls. */
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authorization: string;
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remember: boolean;
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createdAt: number;
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lastSeenAt: number;
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expiresAt: number;
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userAgent: string;
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ip: string;
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}
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/** What `/api/auth/sessions` reports about a session, with nothing secret in it. */
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export interface SessionSummary {
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id: string;
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username: string;
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createdAt: number;
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lastSeenAt: number;
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expiresAt: number;
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remember: boolean;
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userAgent: string;
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ip: string;
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}
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/**
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* The key sessions are grouped by for "sign out everywhere else".
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*
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* Not the username as typed: Stalwart takes `[email protected]` and a bare
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* `alice` as the same account, and a session opened either way was missing
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* from the list and survived the sign-out. The server's own name for the
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* account, lower-cased, and the server it lives on -- the same name on two
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* configured servers is two accounts.
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*/
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export function accountKey(upstream: string, canonicalUsername: string): string {
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return `${upstream}|${canonicalUsername.trim().toLowerCase()}`;
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}
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function accountOf(s: StoredSession): string {
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return s.account ?? s.username.trim().toLowerCase();
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}
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export interface CreateSessionParams {
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username: string;
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/** From `accountKey`; defaults to the lower-cased username. */
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account?: string;
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password: string;
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remember: boolean;
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userAgent: string;
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ip: string;
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}
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/**
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* Everything the rest of the server asks of a session store.
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*
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* There is one implementation today -- `SessionStore` below, which keeps the
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* records in memory and optionally mirrors them to `SESSION_FILE`. The reason
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* it is named as an interface anyway is that a second one is planned: a
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* stateless backend that carries the whole record in the cookie, so that a
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* replica can serve a session it never issued and `/data` can go away. Callers
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* written against the concrete class would all have to be revisited then.
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*
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* Five of these are already stateless in shape -- `create`, `resolve`,
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* `reseal` and `destroy` each touch exactly one session, and the sealing key is
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* derived from the cookie secret (see `crypto.ts`), so the record can move into
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* the cookie without the server keeping a map.
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*
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* The other two cannot be. `listForUser` and `destroyAllForUser` have to reach
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* sessions other than the one presenting itself, which means something has to
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* be enumerable somewhere. `destroyAllForUser` is not only the "sign out my
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* other sessions" button: `app.ts` also calls it when the password or the app
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* password changes, so it carries the guarantee that changing a credential
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* invalidates the sessions still holding the old one. A stateless backend
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* cannot honor that alone; the plan is for OAuth to hand the job to
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* Stalwart's own token registry, which can already answer both questions.
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*/
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export interface SessionBackend {
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init(): Promise<void>;
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close(): Promise<void>;
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create(params: CreateSessionParams): { cookie: string; session: LiveSession };
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resolve(cookie: string | undefined): LiveSession | null;
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reseal(cookie: string | undefined, password: string): boolean;
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destroy(id: string): void;
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/** `account` is an `accountKey`, as carried on `LiveSession.account`. */
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destroyAllForUser(account: string, exceptId?: string): number;
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listForUser(account: string): SessionSummary[];
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}
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const COOKIE_SEP = ".";
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export class SessionStore implements SessionBackend {
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private sessions = new Map<string, StoredSession>();
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private dirty = false;
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private saveTimer: NodeJS.Timeout | null = null;
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private sweepTimer: NodeJS.Timeout | null = null;
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constructor(private readonly file: string) {}
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async init(): Promise<void> {
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if (this.file) {
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try {
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const raw = await readFile(this.file, "utf8");
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const arr = JSON.parse(raw) as StoredSession[];
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const now = Date.now();
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for (const s of arr) if (s.expiresAt > now) this.sessions.set(s.id, s);
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console.log(`[ihasmail] restored ${this.sessions.size} session(s)`);
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} catch (err: unknown) {
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if ((err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code !== "ENOENT") {
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console.warn("[ihasmail] could not read session file:", (err as Error).message);
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}
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}
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}
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this.sweepTimer = setInterval(() => this.sweep(), 60_000);
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this.sweepTimer.unref();
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}
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async close(): Promise<void> {
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if (this.sweepTimer) clearInterval(this.sweepTimer);
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if (this.saveTimer) clearTimeout(this.saveTimer);
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await this.flush();
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}
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private sweep(): void {
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const now = Date.now();
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let removed = 0;
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for (const [id, s] of this.sessions) {
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if (s.expiresAt <= now) {
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this.sessions.delete(id);
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removed++;
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}
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}
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if (removed) this.scheduleSave();
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}
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private scheduleSave(): void {
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this.dirty = true;
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if (!this.file || this.saveTimer) return;
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this.saveTimer = setTimeout(() => {
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this.saveTimer = null;
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void this.flush();
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}, 1000);
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this.saveTimer.unref();
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}
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private async flush(): Promise<void> {
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if (!this.file || !this.dirty) return;
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this.dirty = false;
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try {
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await mkdir(dirname(this.file), { recursive: true });
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const tmp = `${this.file}.tmp`;
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await writeFile(tmp, JSON.stringify([...this.sessions.values()]), { mode: 0o600 });
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await rename(tmp, this.file);
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} catch (err) {
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console.warn("[ihasmail] could not persist sessions:", (err as Error).message);
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}
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}
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/** Create a session; returns the cookie value to hand to the client. */
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create(params: CreateSessionParams): { cookie: string; session: LiveSession } {
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const id = randomToken(18);
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const secret = randomToken(32);
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const salt = randomBytes(16);
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const key = deriveKey(secret, config.appSecret, salt);
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const now = Date.now();
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const ttl = (params.remember ? config.sessionRememberTtl : config.sessionTtl) * 1000;
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const stored: StoredSession = {
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id,
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secretHash: sha256(secret),
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salt: salt.toString("base64"),
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sealedCredentials: seal(JSON.stringify({ u: params.username, p: params.password }), key),
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username: params.username,
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account: params.account ?? params.username.trim().toLowerCase(),
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createdAt: now,
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lastSeenAt: now,
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expiresAt: now + ttl,
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remember: params.remember,
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userAgent: params.userAgent.slice(0, 200),
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ip: params.ip,
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};
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this.sessions.set(id, stored);
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this.scheduleSave();
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const cookie = `${id}${COOKIE_SEP}${secret}`;
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return { cookie, session: this.toLive(stored, params.username, params.password) };
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}
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/** Resolve a cookie to a live session (with decrypted upstream credentials). */
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resolve(cookie: string | undefined): LiveSession | null {
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if (!cookie) return null;
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const idx = cookie.indexOf(COOKIE_SEP);
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if (idx <= 0) return null;
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const id = cookie.slice(0, idx);
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const secret = cookie.slice(idx + 1);
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const stored = this.sessions.get(id);
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if (!stored) return null;
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const now = Date.now();
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if (stored.expiresAt <= now) {
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this.sessions.delete(id);
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this.scheduleSave();
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return null;
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}
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if (!safeEqual(stored.secretHash, sha256(secret))) return null;
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const key = deriveKey(secret, config.appSecret, Buffer.from(stored.salt, "base64"));
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const json = open(stored.sealedCredentials, key);
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if (!json) return null;
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let creds: { u: string; p: string };
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try {
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creds = JSON.parse(json) as { u: string; p: string };
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} catch {
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return null;
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}
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// Sliding expiry: bump every few minutes, not on every request.
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if (now - stored.lastSeenAt > 60_000) {
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stored.lastSeenAt = now;
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const ttl = (stored.remember ? config.sessionRememberTtl : config.sessionTtl) * 1000;
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stored.expiresAt = now + ttl;
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this.scheduleSave();
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}
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return this.toLive(stored, creds.u, creds.p);
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}
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/**
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* Re-seal this session's stored credentials.
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*
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* The upstream password is what every proxied call authenticates with, so a
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* password change (or swapping in an app password when 2FA is switched on)
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* would otherwise leave the session holding a credential the server no
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* longer accepts. Needs the cookie: the sealing key is derived from the
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* secret half of it, which the server never keeps.
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*/
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reseal(cookie: string | undefined, password: string): boolean {
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if (!cookie) return false;
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const idx = cookie.indexOf(COOKIE_SEP);
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if (idx <= 0) return false;
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const id = cookie.slice(0, idx);
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const secret = cookie.slice(idx + 1);
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const stored = this.sessions.get(id);
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if (!stored) return false;
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if (!safeEqual(stored.secretHash, sha256(secret))) return false;
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const key = deriveKey(secret, config.appSecret, Buffer.from(stored.salt, "base64"));
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stored.sealedCredentials = seal(JSON.stringify({ u: stored.username, p: password }), key);
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this.scheduleSave();
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return true;
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}
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destroy(id: string): void {
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if (this.sessions.delete(id)) this.scheduleSave();
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}
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destroyAllForUser(account: string, exceptId?: string): number {
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let n = 0;
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for (const [id, s] of this.sessions) {
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if (accountOf(s) === account && id !== exceptId) {
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this.sessions.delete(id);
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n++;
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}
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}
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if (n) this.scheduleSave();
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return n;
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}
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listForUser(account: string): SessionSummary[] {
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const out = [];
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for (const s of this.sessions.values()) {
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if (accountOf(s) !== account) continue;
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const { secretHash: _h, salt: _s, sealedCredentials: _c, account: _a, ...rest } = s;
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out.push(rest);
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}
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return out;
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}
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private toLive(s: StoredSession, username: string, password: string): LiveSession {
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return {
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id: s.id,
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username,
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account: accountOf(s),
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authorization: `Basic ${Buffer.from(`${username}:${password}`, "utf8").toString("base64")}`,
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remember: s.remember,
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createdAt: s.createdAt,
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lastSeenAt: s.lastSeenAt,
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expiresAt: s.expiresAt,
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userAgent: s.userAgent,
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ip: s.ip,
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};
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}
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}
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