The server writes to one path and no other: SESSION_FILE, from sessions.ts. Everything else it touches on disk it only reads. So a container with a read-only root filesystem already works -- except that `VOLUME ["/data"]` quietly undid it. Docker acts on that directive: a container started without `-v` gets an anonymous volume mounted there anyway, writable even under `--read-only`. It persisted nothing across a redeploy, since each new container got a fresh empty volume, and it left an orphan behind every time one was replaced. Deployments that want the sessions to survive already say so themselves -- docker-compose.yml and deploy.example.sh both mount a named volume -- so removing the line changes nothing for them. IMMUTABLE=1 asserts that this is how the instance is running. It is checked rather than believed: the server refuses to start if SESSION_FILE is still set, or if the filesystem it is installed on turns out to be writable. Left unchecked the misconfiguration is silent, because persisting sessions is best-effort -- a read-only /data costs one warning at the first sign-in and nothing more until the instance is replaced and everyone is signed out. SessionBackend names what the rest of the server asks of a session store, and `sessions` in app.ts is typed as it. Nothing changes today; SessionStore is still the only implementation. It is there so the OAuth work is written against the interface rather than the class, and so the interface can record which of its methods a stateless backend could satisfy alone: create, resolve, reseal and destroy each touch one session, while listForUser and destroyAllForUser have to reach sessions other than the caller's. The second of those carries the guarantee that changing a password invalidates the sessions still holding the old one, which is why it needs a registry -- Stalwart's token registry, once sign-in goes through OAuth.
287 lines
9.6 KiB
TypeScript
287 lines
9.6 KiB
TypeScript
import { mkdir, readFile, writeFile, rename } from "node:fs/promises";
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import { dirname } from "node:path";
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import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
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import { config } from "./config.js";
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import { deriveKey, open, randomToken, safeEqual, seal, sha256 } from "./crypto.js";
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export interface StoredSession {
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id: string;
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/** sha256 of the cookie secret; used to validate presented cookies. */
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secretHash: string;
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/** base64 random salt for key derivation */
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salt: string;
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/** sealed JSON {username, password} */
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sealedCredentials: string;
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username: string;
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createdAt: number;
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lastSeenAt: number;
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expiresAt: number;
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remember: boolean;
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userAgent: string;
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ip: string;
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}
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export interface LiveSession {
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id: string;
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username: string;
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/** Basic Authorization header value for upstream calls. */
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authorization: string;
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remember: boolean;
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createdAt: number;
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lastSeenAt: number;
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expiresAt: number;
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userAgent: string;
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ip: string;
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}
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/** What `/api/auth/sessions` reports about a session, with nothing secret in it. */
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export interface SessionSummary {
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id: string;
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username: string;
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createdAt: number;
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lastSeenAt: number;
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expiresAt: number;
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remember: boolean;
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userAgent: string;
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ip: string;
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}
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export interface CreateSessionParams {
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username: string;
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password: string;
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remember: boolean;
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userAgent: string;
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ip: string;
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}
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/**
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* Everything the rest of the server asks of a session store.
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*
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* There is one implementation today -- `SessionStore` below, which keeps the
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* records in memory and optionally mirrors them to `SESSION_FILE`. The reason
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* it is named as an interface anyway is that a second one is planned: a
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* stateless backend that carries the whole record in the cookie, so that a
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* replica can serve a session it never issued and `/data` can go away. Callers
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* written against the concrete class would all have to be revisited then.
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*
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* Five of these are already stateless in shape -- `create`, `resolve`,
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* `reseal` and `destroy` each touch exactly one session, and the sealing key is
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* derived from the cookie secret (see `crypto.ts`), so the record can move into
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* the cookie without the server keeping a map.
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*
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* The other two cannot be. `listForUser` and `destroyAllForUser` have to reach
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* sessions other than the one presenting itself, which means something has to
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* be enumerable somewhere. `destroyAllForUser` is not only the "sign out my
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* other sessions" button: `app.ts` also calls it when the password or the app
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* password changes, so it carries the guarantee that changing a credential
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* invalidates the sessions still holding the old one. A stateless backend
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* cannot honour that alone; the plan is for OAuth to hand the job to
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* Stalwart's own token registry, which can already answer both questions.
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*/
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export interface SessionBackend {
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init(): Promise<void>;
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close(): Promise<void>;
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create(params: CreateSessionParams): { cookie: string; session: LiveSession };
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resolve(cookie: string | undefined): LiveSession | null;
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reseal(cookie: string | undefined, password: string): boolean;
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destroy(id: string): void;
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destroyAllForUser(username: string, exceptId?: string): number;
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listForUser(username: string): SessionSummary[];
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}
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const COOKIE_SEP = ".";
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export class SessionStore implements SessionBackend {
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private sessions = new Map<string, StoredSession>();
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private dirty = false;
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private saveTimer: NodeJS.Timeout | null = null;
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private sweepTimer: NodeJS.Timeout | null = null;
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constructor(private readonly file: string) {}
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async init(): Promise<void> {
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if (this.file) {
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try {
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const raw = await readFile(this.file, "utf8");
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const arr = JSON.parse(raw) as StoredSession[];
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const now = Date.now();
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for (const s of arr) if (s.expiresAt > now) this.sessions.set(s.id, s);
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console.log(`[ihasmail] restored ${this.sessions.size} session(s)`);
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} catch (err: unknown) {
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if ((err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code !== "ENOENT") {
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console.warn("[ihasmail] could not read session file:", (err as Error).message);
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}
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}
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}
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this.sweepTimer = setInterval(() => this.sweep(), 60_000);
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this.sweepTimer.unref();
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}
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async close(): Promise<void> {
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if (this.sweepTimer) clearInterval(this.sweepTimer);
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if (this.saveTimer) clearTimeout(this.saveTimer);
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await this.flush();
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}
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private sweep(): void {
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const now = Date.now();
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let removed = 0;
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for (const [id, s] of this.sessions) {
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if (s.expiresAt <= now) {
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this.sessions.delete(id);
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removed++;
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}
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}
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if (removed) this.scheduleSave();
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}
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private scheduleSave(): void {
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this.dirty = true;
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if (!this.file || this.saveTimer) return;
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this.saveTimer = setTimeout(() => {
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this.saveTimer = null;
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void this.flush();
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}, 1000);
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this.saveTimer.unref();
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}
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private async flush(): Promise<void> {
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if (!this.file || !this.dirty) return;
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this.dirty = false;
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try {
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await mkdir(dirname(this.file), { recursive: true });
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const tmp = `${this.file}.tmp`;
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await writeFile(tmp, JSON.stringify([...this.sessions.values()]), { mode: 0o600 });
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await rename(tmp, this.file);
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} catch (err) {
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console.warn("[ihasmail] could not persist sessions:", (err as Error).message);
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}
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}
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/** Create a session; returns the cookie value to hand to the client. */
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create(params: CreateSessionParams): { cookie: string; session: LiveSession } {
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const id = randomToken(18);
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const secret = randomToken(32);
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const salt = randomBytes(16);
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const key = deriveKey(secret, config.appSecret, salt);
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const now = Date.now();
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const ttl = (params.remember ? config.sessionRememberTtl : config.sessionTtl) * 1000;
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const stored: StoredSession = {
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id,
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secretHash: sha256(secret),
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salt: salt.toString("base64"),
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sealedCredentials: seal(JSON.stringify({ u: params.username, p: params.password }), key),
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username: params.username,
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createdAt: now,
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lastSeenAt: now,
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expiresAt: now + ttl,
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remember: params.remember,
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userAgent: params.userAgent.slice(0, 200),
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ip: params.ip,
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};
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this.sessions.set(id, stored);
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this.scheduleSave();
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const cookie = `${id}${COOKIE_SEP}${secret}`;
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return { cookie, session: this.toLive(stored, params.username, params.password) };
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}
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/** Resolve a cookie to a live session (with decrypted upstream credentials). */
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resolve(cookie: string | undefined): LiveSession | null {
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if (!cookie) return null;
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const idx = cookie.indexOf(COOKIE_SEP);
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if (idx <= 0) return null;
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const id = cookie.slice(0, idx);
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const secret = cookie.slice(idx + 1);
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const stored = this.sessions.get(id);
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if (!stored) return null;
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const now = Date.now();
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if (stored.expiresAt <= now) {
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this.sessions.delete(id);
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this.scheduleSave();
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return null;
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}
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if (!safeEqual(stored.secretHash, sha256(secret))) return null;
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const key = deriveKey(secret, config.appSecret, Buffer.from(stored.salt, "base64"));
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const json = open(stored.sealedCredentials, key);
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if (!json) return null;
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let creds: { u: string; p: string };
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try {
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creds = JSON.parse(json) as { u: string; p: string };
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} catch {
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return null;
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}
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// Sliding expiry: bump every few minutes, not on every request.
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if (now - stored.lastSeenAt > 60_000) {
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stored.lastSeenAt = now;
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const ttl = (stored.remember ? config.sessionRememberTtl : config.sessionTtl) * 1000;
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stored.expiresAt = now + ttl;
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this.scheduleSave();
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}
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return this.toLive(stored, creds.u, creds.p);
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}
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/**
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* Re-seal this session's stored credentials.
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*
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* The upstream password is what every proxied call authenticates with, so a
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* password change (or swapping in an app password when 2FA is switched on)
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* would otherwise leave the session holding a credential the server no
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* longer accepts. Needs the cookie: the sealing key is derived from the
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* secret half of it, which the server never keeps.
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*/
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reseal(cookie: string | undefined, password: string): boolean {
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if (!cookie) return false;
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const idx = cookie.indexOf(COOKIE_SEP);
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if (idx <= 0) return false;
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const id = cookie.slice(0, idx);
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const secret = cookie.slice(idx + 1);
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const stored = this.sessions.get(id);
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if (!stored) return false;
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if (!safeEqual(stored.secretHash, sha256(secret))) return false;
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const key = deriveKey(secret, config.appSecret, Buffer.from(stored.salt, "base64"));
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stored.sealedCredentials = seal(JSON.stringify({ u: stored.username, p: password }), key);
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this.scheduleSave();
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return true;
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}
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destroy(id: string): void {
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if (this.sessions.delete(id)) this.scheduleSave();
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}
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destroyAllForUser(username: string, exceptId?: string): number {
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let n = 0;
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for (const [id, s] of this.sessions) {
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if (s.username === username && id !== exceptId) {
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this.sessions.delete(id);
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n++;
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}
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}
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if (n) this.scheduleSave();
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return n;
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}
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listForUser(username: string): SessionSummary[] {
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const out = [];
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for (const s of this.sessions.values()) {
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if (s.username !== username) continue;
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const { secretHash: _h, salt: _s, sealedCredentials: _c, ...rest } = s;
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out.push(rest);
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}
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return out;
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}
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private toLive(s: StoredSession, username: string, password: string): LiveSession {
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return {
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id: s.id,
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username,
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authorization: `Basic ${Buffer.from(`${username}:${password}`, "utf8").toString("base64")}`,
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remember: s.remember,
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createdAt: s.createdAt,
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lastSeenAt: s.lastSeenAt,
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expiresAt: s.expiresAt,
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userAgent: s.userAgent,
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ip: s.ip,
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};
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}
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}
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