A timetable, a rota, a public holiday list: the calendars people are given
as a link, which ihasmail could not show at all.
Nothing is stored. The document is fetched when the calendar is opened and
parsed in the browser; the server keeps no copy, no cache and no schedule,
which is what lets an immutable container serve this. There is no timer
either -- there is nowhere to run one -- so the guarantee is that a
subscription is as current as the last time somebody looked, which is also
when it matters. That is said plainly rather than implied.
The fetch has to happen on the server: a calendar URL belongs to whoever
published it and almost none of them send CORS headers. That makes it the
second place this app knocks on a door somebody else chose, so the guard
the image proxy has always had was lifted out and both now call it. A
second SSRF implementation is how one of them ends up missing a case; this
way there is one, and the extraction is covered by the image proxy's own
tests still passing unchanged.
webcal: is understood, because that is how these are published, and it is
read as https: rather than waved past the checks -- a webcal URL pointing
at loopback is refused exactly like an http one.
Recurrence is deliberately not expanded. RRULE is a small language with a
lot of edge cases, and a subscription quietly showing the wrong dates would
be worse than one showing the first occurrence and saying so.
The parser is a subscription parser rather than an importer: a subscribed
calendar is read-only and redrawn from scratch each refresh, so nothing has
to round-trip or survive an edit, which is most of what makes a full
iCalendar implementation large. What it does have to do is never mis-state
a time -- a DATE is built in local time rather than at UTC midnight, which
would land on the day before for anyone west of Greenwich -- and never hang
on a document somebody else wrote.
Events go through instancesIn like the birthdays, so no view has to know
they are not real calendars, and the calendar they hang off reports no
write rights, so everything that asks before offering an edit declines on
its own. A subscription that cannot be read says so in the sidebar rather
than drawing an empty calendar, which looks like a calendar with nothing
in it.
The proxy resolved a hostname, refused it if any answer pointed somewhere
private, and then handed the *hostname* to fetch — which resolved it again when
the socket opened. An attacker who controls the zone answers with a public
address the first time and 127.0.0.1 the second, and the check has been walked
straight past. It is the standard way an SSRF guard gets bypassed.
Resolve once and connect to that address: a `lookup` that returns what we
already approved, on `node:http`/`node:https` rather than fetch, since fetch
gives no say in how the socket is opened. Every redirect hop is re-checked and
re-pinned. TLS is unaffected — the certificate is still validated against the
hostname, which `servername` and the Host header carry.
Pooling had to go with it: sockets are keyed by host and port, not by the
address we pinned, so a connection opened earlier would be reused and the pin
never consulted. Found by a test, not by reading it back.
Also refuse two ranges the old check let through: IPv6 multicast, and the NAT64
prefix, which is a route into IPv4 space.
jcoffey-dev