Ask for the account password before minting an app password, and keep
sessions the proxy checks from writing the account's own registry objects,
so a session left open on someone else's machine cannot take a credential
away from it. The password is compared with what the session holds; Stalwart
is asked only when 2FA moved the session onto an app password.
Serve attachments and proxied images with no-store on a device that is not
the person's own. Give files from a winmail.dat only the types the server
would show inline. Strip direction controls from sender and attachment
names and from saved filenames.
On signing out, send what is inside its undo window, then close every
composer, so the next person to sign in does not find the last one's draft.
Group sessions by the account Stalwart names and its server, so "sign out
other sessions" also reaches a session opened as a bare or differently
cased username.
Signing in with a two-factor code failed with a bare 401 and "Invalid
credentials", which sent the user off to check a password that was
perfectly good (#75). It cannot work, and the app already knew.
Stalwart accepts a TOTP code only through an OAuth flow -- its own web
interface is an OAuth client, which is why signing in *there* succeeds --
and it offers only the authorization-code and device flows. There is no
password grant, so a client holding a username and password has nowhere
to exchange them plus a code for a token. The concatenated
`password$code` form this README claimed was accepted is not a route the
server has, and appears never to have been. What was verified live on
0.16.19 was enabling and disabling 2FA, never signing in with a code.
The contradiction was already in the codebase: turning 2FA *on* mints an
app password and reseals the session onto it, precisely because a plain
password stops working from that moment. The sign-in page was the one
place still assuming otherwise.
Three changes, no new capability:
- A 401 on a sign-in that carried a code now says what is happening
and where to go instead, and says the password is probably fine.
A sign-in without a code is untouched, so an ordinary typo still
reads as an ordinary typo.
- The field stays, and is honest about itself. Removing it would leave
someone with 2FA finding nothing at all, which is worse than finding
a field that explains the situation and points at app passwords.
- The README's claim is corrected rather than quietly dropped, and
real 2FA support is written into the roadmap as what it is: an OAuth
implementation, handing sign-in to Stalwart and holding a refresh
token instead of a sealed password.
ihasmail spoke to two generations of Stalwart that are less alike than
their version numbers suggest: 0.16 replaced the REST management API with
JMAP registry objects, changed the shape of FileNode, split its rights
up, and moved configuration into the store. Carrying both meant 34 branch
points across nine files, a 92-line compatibility shim whose only job was
telling them apart, a parallel REST implementation of every credential
operation, and a mock that had to model both.
The branches were not the real cost. The cost was that a wrong answer
about which generation had answered always had somewhere to fall back to,
so it failed quietly rather than loudly: one capability looked for in the
wrong place downgraded every real 0.16 server onto the 0.15 path, which
posted the current password to an endpoint 0.16 had removed, reported the
wrong generation on About, and ran Files on the older code. It reached
production and was recorded as verified when it was not. The mock
mirrored the same wrong placement, which is why the tests agreed.
Removed: the filenode compatibility shim, the dual "registry" | "legacy"
backend in account.ts, the pre-0.16 generation in AccountInfo and
everything that read it, the mock's LEGACY mode and dev:mock:legacy, and
the three test files that existed only to pin 0.15 behaviour.
Sign-in now refuses an older server by name, once, rather than letting
Files, the account locale and credentials each fail in their own way with
nothing connecting them. It says the credentials were fine -- someone
hitting this has typed a correct password, and telling them otherwise
sends them round in circles -- and names the tag to build from. Four
tests cover it, including that no session cookie is minted and that bad
credentials on such a server are still a plain 401.
Two fallbacks went that were not strictly about 0.15, and both for the
same reason the removal is happening. Files no longer answers a refused
filter or sort by fetching every node in the account, which would hide a
real fault behind a performance cliff nobody would notice. And the app
folder lookups now filter on parentId/isTopLevel alone and match names
client-side, since `name` is not a filter Stalwart is known to implement
and one it does not know fails the whole query rather than being ignored.
The last release that runs on 0.15 is tagged stalwart-0.15-support.
Verified against the mock end to end: sign-in, the Files tree on the 0.16
path with the app folder hidden, and self-service credentials over the
registry. 226 web + 75 server tests pass; typecheck and build clean.
Self-service credentials, the About page and Files all keyed off
`urn:stalwart:jmap`, and all three looked for it in the session-level
`capabilities`. Stalwart has never put it there. `Session::new` builds that
list from a fixed set the capability is not part of, in any 0.16.x from
0.16.0 to 0.16.19; it is handed out per-account instead, so it arrives in
`primaryAccounts` and in each account's `accountCapabilities`.
So every real 0.16 server read as pre-0.16. Password changes, 2FA and app
passwords fell back to `POST /api/account/auth`, which 0.16 removed, and
reported that the server offers no self-service credential management. About
named the wrong generation. Files ran the pre-0.16 path, omitting `nodeType`
and listing the tree through get.
Look in all three places, on both sides. Two nearby soft spots go with it: a
transport error while probing the registry no longer downgrades a server to
the legacy path -- which would have posted the current password to an
endpoint that is not there -- and a locale request that is merely refused no
longer discards a generation the capability had already settled.
The mock advertised the capability in the session, which is why no test ever
caught this; it now advertises it where the real server does, and validates
`using` by the urn rather than by the session, as Stalwart does. Put the old
lookup back and nine tests fail.
Stalwart still publishes no version number to clients -- VERSION_PUBLIC is a
fixed "1.0.0" -- so About continues to report the generation and edition,
which are now the right ones.
Settings › Security grows three working sections instead of a note telling
people to use Stalwart's own portal.
Stalwart moved this API between releases, so ihasmail speaks both: 0.16+ has
the x:AccountPassword singleton and x:AppPassword registry objects over JMAP,
while 0.15.x has the /api/account/auth REST endpoint. Which one answers the
probe is the only reliable way to tell them apart, and the result is cached
per session. The built-in `user` role already grants sysAccountPassword* and
sysAppPassword*, so no administrator setup is needed.
Two problems are worth calling out, because both would bite a user hard:
Stalwart validates the credentials already on the account when 2FA is turned
on and never checks the new secret, so an authenticator that was mistyped or
out of step would lock someone out of their mailbox at the next sign-in. We
verify a code against the new secret ourselves first (RFC 6238, tested against
the spec's vectors) and only then ask the server to store anything.
Every proxied call re-authenticates with the credential sealed into the
session, and from the moment 2FA is on Stalwart wants a fresh TOTP code with
it — which we cannot produce between requests. Turning 2FA on would therefore
sign the user out of the browser they just turned it on in. App passwords
authenticate without a second factor, so the session is moved onto one minted
for this browser, and the session cookie is re-sealed with it. The order
matters: it is minted while the old credential still works, and revoked again
if enabling then fails.
Password changes re-seal this session too and drop the others, whose sealed
copies of the old password would fail on their next call.
The mock now enforces what a real server does — current password, password
policy, a TOTP code on every request once 2FA is on, app passwords exempt —
so the whole flow is exercised in tests rather than only by hand.
jcoffey-dev