@vitejs/plugin-react 6 peers on vite ^8 and nothing lower, so the build
had to move before the plugin could. vite 8 bundles with rolldown rather
than rollup, which is most of what is here.
The object form of `manualChunks` -- a chunk name against the list of
packages in it -- is gone; rolldown takes groups tested against module
paths instead. Same two chunks come out, `vendor` and `icons`, with the
same contents; `icons` is tried first because the first matching group
wins. `rollupOptions` is now a deprecated alias, so it is spelled
`rolldownOptions`.
The lockfile is regenerated rather than patched. vitest depends on vite
itself, and an incremental install was happy to leave 6.4.3 hoisted for
vitest while web built against 8.3.0 -- two majors in one tree, which is
not a state to ship. A clean install collapses to one.
vite 8 wants Node ^20.19 || >=22.12, above the >=20.10 the README and
engines promised, so both say 20.19 now. CI and the image are on 22 and
were never affected.
Rolldown reports two modules that are imported both statically and
dynamically, so the dynamic import cannot split them out. That is true
of the source either way -- store/sieve.ts has three static importers
and one dynamic -- and is left alone here.
GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9 -- arbitrary file read through @vitest/mocker's
redirect mock -- has no fix in the 3.x line. The patched versions are
4.1.11 and 5.0.0-rc.2, so clearing it means the major. vite stays at
6.4.3: vitest 4 accepts ^6, and nothing outside devDependencies moves.
The bump surfaced a bug of ours rather than one of vitest's. vi.spyOn
now hands back the spy already installed on a method instead of wrapping
it in a fresh one, so a spy installed in beforeEach keeps its call count
across tests. compose-from-share expected two uploads and saw three: its
own two, plus the one from the test before it. The assertion was only
ever passing because each test happened to get a new spy.
Both suites now restore between tests, which is what the other five
spying suites already do. webpush had the same leak with no assertion
close enough to catch it.
Three medium advisories land on hono before 4.13.5: a toSSG() path
escape, a query parser that reads parameters past the URL fragment, and
unbounded dot-notation nesting in parseBody(). Only the second one
touches this server -- c.req.query() is read in imageproxy, icsproxy and
app -- and even there safeFetch validates the value it actually fetches
rather than a separate pre-check, so there was nothing to desync. toSSG
and parseBody are never called. The bump is still worth taking on its
own: it is a patch release with no API change.
The declared range moves with it, from ^4.7.4 to ^4.13.7, so the
security floor is recorded in server/package.json and not only in the
lockfile.
The dependabot.yml is the actual fix for how these were found. There was
no config, so nothing opened a PR and the alerts sat on a dashboard
until someone thought to look. Routine updates now group into one PR a
week; majors stay separate, because they are migrations.
A .md previewed as its own source, which is reading the punctuation
rather than the notes. It now opens rendered, with Rendered | Source in
the dialog footer for anyone who wants what the file actually says.
Markdown only; a .txt has nothing to toggle between.
Rendering is `marked`, sanitised by DOMPurify -- the one the app already
carries for mail. Markdown is not a safe subset of anything: raw HTML
passes through it by design, so a <script> in a file somebody uploaded or
shared into the account is a script tag unless something takes it out.
Images become links rather than pictures. An image in a Markdown file is
either a relative path, which has no base to resolve against here, or a
URL somewhere else, which fetches on open and tells that server the file
was read -- the tracking pixel this app blocks in mail. The link keeps
the alt text and the address, so nothing vanishes silently.
Fixes the PDF preview while here, which never worked: securityHeaders
put X-Frame-Options: DENY on every response including the blob route, so
the iframe showed Chrome's "refused to connect" where the file should
have been -- in Files today and in mail attachments long before that.
The middleware now leaves a header the route has set, and a PDF served
inline says SAMEORIGIN. Nothing else on the server is framable.
ihasmail is webmail: it is nearly always run as a network service rather
than handed to anyone as a binary, which is the case the plain GPL does
not reach. The AGPL's section 13 does — anyone running a modified
ihasmail for other people has to offer them its source.
LICENSE is the full AGPL-3.0 text from gnu.org. The SPDX identifier
changes from GPL-3.0-or-later to AGPL-3.0-or-later in package.json, the
lockfile's own entry for it, and the About screen. Old commits and tags
are left exactly as they were; this is the license from here on.
Settings › Security grows three working sections instead of a note telling
people to use Stalwart's own portal.
Stalwart moved this API between releases, so ihasmail speaks both: 0.16+ has
the x:AccountPassword singleton and x:AppPassword registry objects over JMAP,
while 0.15.x has the /api/account/auth REST endpoint. Which one answers the
probe is the only reliable way to tell them apart, and the result is cached
per session. The built-in `user` role already grants sysAccountPassword* and
sysAppPassword*, so no administrator setup is needed.
Two problems are worth calling out, because both would bite a user hard:
Stalwart validates the credentials already on the account when 2FA is turned
on and never checks the new secret, so an authenticator that was mistyped or
out of step would lock someone out of their mailbox at the next sign-in. We
verify a code against the new secret ourselves first (RFC 6238, tested against
the spec's vectors) and only then ask the server to store anything.
Every proxied call re-authenticates with the credential sealed into the
session, and from the moment 2FA is on Stalwart wants a fresh TOTP code with
it — which we cannot produce between requests. Turning 2FA on would therefore
sign the user out of the browser they just turned it on in. App passwords
authenticate without a second factor, so the session is moved onto one minted
for this browser, and the session cookie is re-sealed with it. The order
matters: it is minted while the old credential still works, and revoked again
if enabling then fails.
Password changes re-seal this session too and drop the others, whose sealed
copies of the old password would fail on their next call.
The mock now enforces what a real server does — current password, password
policy, a TOTP code on every request once 2FA is on, app passwords exempt —
so the whole flow is exercised in tests rather than only by hand.
dependabot[bot]
jcoffey-dev