Files
cairnobs/api/authz/middleware_test.go
T
jcoffey-dev 1d57e697b1 Phase 4: real per-tenant ClickHouse isolation via a new enterprise-api binary
Closes the threat model's headline finding for the SQL query path:
enterprise/internal/tenantprovision does real CREATE DATABASE/USER/GRANT
against ClickHouse, and enterprise/internal/chrunner is a per-tenant
connection registry implementing api's SQLRunner interface, resolving
the tenant from the authenticated request identity -- never a
caller-suppliable parameter. Both are wired into a new binary,
enterprise/cmd/enterprise-api, alongside the unchanged single-tenant
api/cmd/api, since AGPL core can never import enterprise/ and Go's own
internal/ package visibility rules meant enterprise/ couldn't implement
core's SQLRunner interface without importing the package that defines
it. That required moving api/internal/{authz,queryapi,dashboards,
querylang/executor,searchclient,httpserver} out of internal/ -- the
minimal set enterprise-api needs to import; querylang's compiler
internals (planner/lexer/parser/ast/ir) and api's own config stay
internal, since nothing outside api needs them directly.

Also finally wires enterprise/internal/audit into queryapi.AuditLogger
(nil since Phase 4 task 4) via a new adapter, and adds live-ClickHouse
integration tests for two of the four adversarial probes named in
docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md's verification plan.

Corrected several overclaims in the docs while writing this up: an
earlier claim that rbacstore's CRUD was "verified against a live
Postgres" was never actually true in this environment (only
internal/audit was, earlier in this phase, before Docker access was
lost) -- threat-model.md, phase-4-runbook.md, CLAUDE.md, and
enterprise/README.md all now distinguish "a real integration test
exists" from "this was confirmed against a live database."

Still not built: Tantivy/free-text tenant isolation
(enterprise/internal/searchclient), and any deployment-topology
mechanism that actually routes traffic to enterprise-api instead of
plain api -- both binaries exist side by side today with nothing
enforcing or flagging which one a deployment runs.
2026-08-13 22:48:38 -07:00

97 lines
3.5 KiB
Go

package authz
import (
"errors"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
)
type fakeAuthorizer struct {
identity Identity
err error
}
func (f *fakeAuthorizer) Authorize(_ *http.Request) (Identity, error) {
return f.identity, f.err
}
func okHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
id, ok := IdentityFromContext(r.Context())
if ok {
w.Header().Set("X-Test-Tenant", id.TenantID)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}
func TestRequireRoleNilAuthorizerIsNoOp(t *testing.T) {
h := RequireRole(nil, RoleAdmin, okHandler)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
h(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil))
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 200 (nil authorizer must be a no-op, matching single-tenant Phase 0-3 behavior)", rec.Code)
}
}
func TestRequireRoleRejectsUnauthenticated(t *testing.T) {
h := RequireRole(&fakeAuthorizer{err: errors.New("no session")}, RoleViewer, okHandler)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
h(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil))
if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 401", rec.Code)
}
}
func TestRequireRoleRejectsInsufficientRole(t *testing.T) {
h := RequireRole(&fakeAuthorizer{identity: Identity{Role: RoleViewer}}, RoleAdmin, okHandler)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
h(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil))
if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 403", rec.Code)
}
}
func TestRequireRoleAllowsSufficientRoleAndAttachesIdentity(t *testing.T) {
h := RequireRole(&fakeAuthorizer{identity: Identity{TenantID: "acme", Role: RoleAdmin}}, RoleEditor, okHandler)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
h(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil))
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 200", rec.Code)
}
if got := rec.Header().Get("X-Test-Tenant"); got != "acme" {
t.Fatalf("expected the resolved identity to be attached to the request context, got tenant=%q", got)
}
}
func TestRequireRoleOrServiceAllowsServiceIdentity(t *testing.T) {
h := RequireRoleOrService(&fakeAuthorizer{identity: Identity{Role: RoleService}}, RoleAdmin, okHandler)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
h(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil))
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 200 -- RoleService must satisfy RequireRoleOrService regardless of minRole", rec.Code)
}
}
func TestRequireRoleOrServiceStillRejectsInsufficientHumanRole(t *testing.T) {
h := RequireRoleOrService(&fakeAuthorizer{identity: Identity{Role: RoleViewer}}, RoleAdmin, okHandler)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
h(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil))
if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 403 -- allowing RoleService must not loosen the human-role check", rec.Code)
}
}
// TestRequireRolePlainDoesNotAllowService pins down the narrow-by-default
// property middleware.go's doc comment claims: an endpoint using plain
// RequireRole (not RequireRoleOrService) must reject a RoleService
// identity even if the minRole would technically be satisfiable on the
// human scale -- RoleService never satisfies anything but itself.
func TestRequireRolePlainDoesNotAllowService(t *testing.T) {
h := RequireRole(&fakeAuthorizer{identity: Identity{Role: RoleService}}, RoleViewer, okHandler)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
h(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil))
if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 403 -- plain RequireRole must never admit a service identity", rec.Code)
}
}