RBAC (api/internal/authz) is live on /query and /dashboards, backed by a new enterprise/ module (session issuance, audit logging, RBAC storage, OIDC/SAML protocol wiring) that core never imports -- only calls over HTTP. Found and fixed a real cross-tenant vulnerability in dashboards (no tenant_id filtering at all) while writing the threat model doc. Two things are explicitly NOT done, documented rather than hidden: tenant isolation for log data itself (/query still shares one ClickHouse connection and Tantivy index across every tenant -- RBAC controls who can query, not what a query can see), and human SSO login (protocol wiring exists, no HTTP handler calls it yet). See docs/security/threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md. Also adds deploy/ (Go Operator + Helm chart, validated offline only -- no cluster was reachable in this environment).
13 lines
544 B
Docker
13 lines
544 B
Docker
# Commercial-license module, built the same way as every other Go
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# service here -- no /proto dependency, context is enterprise/ itself,
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# same shape as cli/Dockerfile and alerting/Dockerfile.
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# docker build -f enterprise/Dockerfile -t sentry-enterprise-auth enterprise/
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FROM golang:1.25-alpine AS builder
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WORKDIR /src
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COPY . .
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RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=linux go build -o /out/enterprise-auth ./cmd/enterprise-auth
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FROM gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12
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COPY --from=builder /out/enterprise-auth /enterprise-auth
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ENTRYPOINT ["/enterprise-auth"]
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