jcoffey-dev
3eb0f4c589
RBAC (api/internal/authz) is live on /query and /dashboards, backed by a new enterprise/ module (session issuance, audit logging, RBAC storage, OIDC/SAML protocol wiring) that core never imports -- only calls over HTTP. Found and fixed a real cross-tenant vulnerability in dashboards (no tenant_id filtering at all) while writing the threat model doc. Two things are explicitly NOT done, documented rather than hidden: tenant isolation for log data itself (/query still shares one ClickHouse connection and Tantivy index across every tenant -- RBAC controls who can query, not what a query can see), and human SSO login (protocol wiring exists, no HTTP handler calls it yet). See docs/security/threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md. Also adds deploy/ (Go Operator + Helm chart, validated offline only -- no cluster was reachable in this environment).
6 lines
185 B
PL/PgSQL
6 lines
185 B
PL/PgSQL
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION audit_log_deny_update_delete() RETURNS TRIGGER AS $$
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BEGIN
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RAISE EXCEPTION 'audit_log is append-only: % is not permitted', TG_OP;
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END
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$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql
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