RBAC (api/internal/authz) is live on /query and /dashboards, backed by a new enterprise/ module (session issuance, audit logging, RBAC storage, OIDC/SAML protocol wiring) that core never imports -- only calls over HTTP. Found and fixed a real cross-tenant vulnerability in dashboards (no tenant_id filtering at all) while writing the threat model doc. Two things are explicitly NOT done, documented rather than hidden: tenant isolation for log data itself (/query still shares one ClickHouse connection and Tantivy index across every tenant -- RBAC controls who can query, not what a query can see), and human SSO login (protocol wiring exists, no HTTP handler calls it yet). See docs/security/threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md. Also adds deploy/ (Go Operator + Helm chart, validated offline only -- no cluster was reachable in this environment).
95 lines
2.8 KiB
Go
95 lines
2.8 KiB
Go
package main
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import (
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"bytes"
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"net/http"
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"os"
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"time"
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)
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var httpClient = &http.Client{Timeout: 30 * time.Second}
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// setAuth attaches SENTRYCTL_TOKEN (see resolveToken) as a Bearer
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// credential, a no-op when token is empty -- matches every backend's
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// nil-authorizer no-op default (see api/internal/authz.RequireRole*).
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func setAuth(req *http.Request, token string) {
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if token != "" {
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
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}
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}
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// httpGetJSON GETs path and prints the pretty-printed JSON response to
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// stdout, or the error body/status to stderr. Shared by dashboards/alerts
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// list and get, which otherwise differ only in path and resource name.
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func httpGetJSON(baseURL, path, token string, stdout, stderr io.Writer) int {
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req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, baseURL+path, nil)
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if err != nil {
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fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "building request: %v\n", err)
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return 1
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}
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setAuth(req, token)
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resp, err := httpClient.Do(req)
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if err != nil {
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fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "request failed: %v\n", err)
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return 1
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}
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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return printJSONResponse(resp, stdout, stderr)
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}
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// httpPostFileJSON reads file (a JSON document, e.g. an exported
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// dashboard or a rule definition) and POSTs it to path as-is -- no
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// reshaping, since the file's shape already matches what the endpoint
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// expects (the same JSON the web UI's export button and POST /rules
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// produce/accept respectively). This is what makes "apply" the seed of a
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// future Terraform provider: one JSON contract, multiple callers.
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func httpPostFileJSON(baseURL, path, token, file string, stdout, stderr io.Writer) int {
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body, err := os.ReadFile(file)
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if err != nil {
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fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "reading %s: %v\n", file, err)
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return 1
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}
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req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, baseURL+path, bytes.NewReader(body))
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if err != nil {
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fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "building request: %v\n", err)
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return 1
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}
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req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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setAuth(req, token)
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resp, err := httpClient.Do(req)
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if err != nil {
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fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "request failed: %v\n", err)
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return 1
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}
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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return printJSONResponse(resp, stdout, stderr)
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}
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func printJSONResponse(resp *http.Response, stdout, stderr io.Writer) int {
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body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
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if err != nil {
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fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "reading response: %v\n", err)
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return 1
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}
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if resp.StatusCode < 200 || resp.StatusCode >= 300 {
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var errResp errorResponseBody
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if json.Unmarshal(body, &errResp) == nil && errResp.Error != "" {
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fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "request failed: %s\n", errResp.Error)
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} else {
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fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "request failed: status %d\n", resp.StatusCode)
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}
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return 1
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}
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var pretty bytes.Buffer
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if json.Indent(&pretty, body, "", " ") == nil {
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stdout.Write(pretty.Bytes())
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} else {
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stdout.Write(body)
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}
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fmt.Fprintln(stdout)
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return 0
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}
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