jcoffey-dev
17fdc212c2
Ingest tenant-awareness was named "undesigned, not just unbuilt" across CLAUDE.md/threat-model.md/the runbook since early Phase 4 -- the last major standing gap. Scoping was agreed via AskUserQuestion: a config-supplied tenant_id + shared-secret token ingest validates (smaller real implementation, no new PKI), over per-tenant mTLS certs. This change builds that identity mechanism end to end and attaches it to every record at the point it enters the system; it deliberately does NOT build per-tenant write-routing for ClickHouse or Tantivy -- that's real, separately-scoped follow-up work, disclosed explicitly everywhere this was previously called undesigned, not silently left half-done. New pieces: - metadata/migrations/0034 + enterprise/internal/rbacstore/ ingest_credentials.go: a per-tenant bearer credential, only its SHA-256 hash ever persisted (same reasoning a password gets hashed, not stored raw) -- CreateIngestCredential returns the plaintext exactly once, ValidateIngestCredential/RevokeIngestCredential/ ListIngestCredentialsForTenant round it out. - enterprise-auth gains -create-ingest-credential-tenant/ -list-ingest-credentials-tenant/-revoke-ingest-credential (same offline-operator-flag shape as every other credential-minting flag in this binary) and a new POST /internal/authorize-ingest endpoint (internal/authhandler) validating a presented token and resolving its tenant -- a genuinely different credential type from session-backed /internal/authorize, so it doesn't touch session.Manager at all. - ingest (AGPL core) gains an optional TenantResolver (internal/grpcserver, nil by default) and its HTTP client implementation (internal/tenantresolver.HTTPResolver) -- a plain HTTP call to enterprise-auth's new endpoint, never an enterprise/ import, same "network boundary, not import boundary" shape api/authz.HTTPAuthorizer already uses for the query path. PushBatch now requires an `authorization: Bearer <token>` gRPC metadata entry once a resolver is configured, fails the whole batch closed on a missing/invalid credential (never falls back to "no tenant"), and attaches the resolved tenant ID to every record as a `tenant_id` Kafka message header before producing it. Verified with real round trips at every layer, no Docker needed: rbacstore's credential CRUD (skip-gated on live Postgres, same as every other rbacstore integration test this phase), authhandler's new endpoint (real HTTP via httptest, including the regression test that a session token must not validate as an ingest credential), tenantresolver (real HTTP client against httptest, same pattern as authz.HTTPAuthorizer's own tests), and grpcserver's PushBatch (fake resolver/producer -- no resolver leaves messages unchanged, a configured resolver attaches the right header or fails closed on a bad/missing token). Helm: ingest.requireTenantCredential (default false) is a deliberate, separate opt-in from enterprise.enabled -- turning ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL on for ingest requires every agent to already hold a credential or be refused outright, so it must not default on just because enterprise.enabled does (same reasoning api.yaml's ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL isn't tied to enterprise.enabled directly either). docker-compose.yml leaves it unset, same as ever. Docs updated everywhere this was called "undesigned": CLAUDE.md, docs/architecture.md, docs/security/threat-model.md (including its summary table, now split into "identity: built" vs "write-routing: not yet"), docs/phase-4-runbook.md (new §13), enterprise/README.md.
57 lines
1.7 KiB
Go
57 lines
1.7 KiB
Go
package tenantresolver
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"testing"
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)
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func TestResolveTenantForwardsTokenAndParsesTenantID(t *testing.T) {
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var gotAuth string
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srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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gotAuth = r.Header.Get("Authorization")
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(authorizeIngestResponse{TenantID: "acme"})
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}))
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defer srv.Close()
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res := New(srv.URL)
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tenantID, err := res.ResolveTenant(context.Background(), "real-token")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("ResolveTenant: %v", err)
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}
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if tenantID != "acme" {
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t.Fatalf("tenantID = %q, want acme", tenantID)
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}
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if gotAuth != "Bearer real-token" {
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t.Fatalf("Authorization header = %q, want Bearer real-token", gotAuth)
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}
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}
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func TestResolveTenantNon2xxIsAnError(t *testing.T) {
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srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
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}))
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defer srv.Close()
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res := New(srv.URL)
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if _, err := res.ResolveTenant(context.Background(), "bad-token"); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("expected an error for a 401 response from enterprise-auth")
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}
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}
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func TestResolveTenantRejectsEmptyTenantID(t *testing.T) {
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srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(authorizeIngestResponse{})
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}))
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defer srv.Close()
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res := New(srv.URL)
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if _, err := res.ResolveTenant(context.Background(), "some-token"); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("expected an error when enterprise-auth returns an empty tenant_id despite a 200")
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}
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}
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