This is a large squashed commit covering two batches of prior uncommitted work plus a full security-audit remediation pass, kept together because go.mod/go.sum and several shared files (main.go, handler.go) were touched by both and splitting risked non-building intermediate commits. Features (built earlier, previously uncommitted): - Local username/password login for single-tenant deployments with no SSO configured (api/localauth, alerting/internal/sessioncheck, sentryctl users, web/src/routes/login, metadata migrations 0040/0041). - Remotely-editable additional log file paths for agents, on top of their existing primary source (api/agents, agent/sentry-agent extra-file-path diffing, web agent config UI). - IPv4/IPv6 addresses reported alongside other host system metrics. Security audit remediation (this pass, all live-verified in production): - Critical: block ClickHouse SSRF table functions (url/remote/file/s3/...) in the raw-SQL query escape hatch. - High: deny sensitive paths and require Admin to add agent extra_file_paths (Editor could previously point an agent at /etc/shadow or an SSH key); alerting webhook targets now validate against internal/metadata/loopback addresses, both at creation and send time; alerting's session middleware now enforces an Editor+ floor on mutating requests instead of "any authenticated session"; bumped goxmldsig to close a SAML signature-verification bypass (GO-2026-4753). - Medium: per-IP login rate limiting; security response headers (HSTS/CSP/nosniff/X-Frame-Options/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy) on web/nginx.conf; a DevCredentialWarnings check in every Go service's config loader, logging loudly at startup if a deployment is still on docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only credentials; dependency bumps (golang.org/x/text, grpc, x/net, quick-xml, h2) across every affected Go module and both Rust crates, including a previously-uncovered x/net vulnerability in deploy/operator; a new security-scan.yml CI workflow running cargo-deny/govulncheck/npm-audit, mirroring the existing license-compliance.yml matrix shape. - Low: removed sentryctl's plaintext --password flag (shell history/`ps` exposure) in favor of stdin and a --password-stdin flag for reset-password's optional specific-password path; a dummy bcrypt comparison closes a login response-time username-enumeration side-channel.
windows-fixture
Sends synthetic Windows Event Log-shaped PushBatchRequests directly to
ingest's gRPC endpoint, bypassing the actual Windows agent entirely.
What this does and doesn't test
Tests: can the pipeline (ingest → ClickHouse → search → api → web)
correctly handle Windows-shaped data — the winevt.* attributes, the
record_id join between SQL and full-text search, Windows severity
levels mapping onto the right column values? This is exactly what's
automatable without a Windows host, and it's genuinely exercised: five
realistic, well-known Windows events (failed/successful logon, a service
state change, an application crash, an unexpected reboot) with real
EventIDs and providers.
Does not test: whether the real Windows agent's EvtSubscribe/ETW
integration actually works, whether Windows service registration
succeeds, whether ETW session creation/provider enabling works. Those are
fundamentally different questions — they need a real or virtualized
Windows host, and nothing here pretends otherwise. See
/docs/phase-1-runbook.md for exactly which is which.
Running
Requires the docker-compose stack up (ingest reachable, dev certs
generated):
cd hack/windows-fixture
go run . --count 5
sent 5 synthetic Windows-shaped records, ingest accepted 5
[SEVERITY_WARN] An account failed to log on. (event_id=4625 provider=Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing)
...
Then confirm both query paths see it:
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/query -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"sql": "SELECT host, severity, message, attributes['"'"'winevt.event_id'"'"'] AS event_id FROM logs WHERE host = '"'"'WIN-FIXTURE-01'"'"' ORDER BY timestamp DESC"}'
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/search -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"query": "notepad"}'
Flags: --addr (default localhost:4317), --ca/--cert/--key
(default to ../dev-certs/out/{ca,client,client-key}.pem), --count
(default 5, cycles through the fixed event list if higher).