Closes the threat model's headline finding for the SQL query path:
enterprise/internal/tenantprovision does real CREATE DATABASE/USER/GRANT
against ClickHouse, and enterprise/internal/chrunner is a per-tenant
connection registry implementing api's SQLRunner interface, resolving
the tenant from the authenticated request identity -- never a
caller-suppliable parameter. Both are wired into a new binary,
enterprise/cmd/enterprise-api, alongside the unchanged single-tenant
api/cmd/api, since AGPL core can never import enterprise/ and Go's own
internal/ package visibility rules meant enterprise/ couldn't implement
core's SQLRunner interface without importing the package that defines
it. That required moving api/internal/{authz,queryapi,dashboards,
querylang/executor,searchclient,httpserver} out of internal/ -- the
minimal set enterprise-api needs to import; querylang's compiler
internals (planner/lexer/parser/ast/ir) and api's own config stay
internal, since nothing outside api needs them directly.
Also finally wires enterprise/internal/audit into queryapi.AuditLogger
(nil since Phase 4 task 4) via a new adapter, and adds live-ClickHouse
integration tests for two of the four adversarial probes named in
docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md's verification plan.
Corrected several overclaims in the docs while writing this up: an
earlier claim that rbacstore's CRUD was "verified against a live
Postgres" was never actually true in this environment (only
internal/audit was, earlier in this phase, before Docker access was
lost) -- threat-model.md, phase-4-runbook.md, CLAUDE.md, and
enterprise/README.md all now distinguish "a real integration test
exists" from "this was confirmed against a live database."
Still not built: Tantivy/free-text tenant isolation
(enterprise/internal/searchclient), and any deployment-topology
mechanism that actually routes traffic to enterprise-api instead of
plain api -- both binaries exist side by side today with nothing
enforcing or flagging which one a deployment runs.
144 lines
6.2 KiB
Go
144 lines
6.2 KiB
Go
// Package tenantprovision does the ClickHouse-side half of tenant
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// provisioning /docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md describes: one
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// dedicated database + one narrowly-granted user per tenant, ordered
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// and idempotent (CREATE DATABASE -> CREATE USER -> GRANT). This is the
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// piece that was missing before -- deploy/operator's Tenant controller
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// only manages the K8s-side credential Secret; nothing called
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// ClickHouse's DDL to make that Secret's credentials actually work
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// until this package.
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//
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// What this package does NOT do: Tantivy index provisioning (still
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// unbuilt -- see /docs/security/threat-model.md), and it does not
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// itself decide when a tenant becomes 'active' in rbacstore.tenants --
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// the caller (enterprise-api's -provision-tenant flag) does that only
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// after ProvisionClickHouse returns success, matching the ordered gate
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// /docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md specifies: CREATE USER -> GRANT ->
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// only then mark active.
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package tenantprovision
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/rand"
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"encoding/base64"
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"fmt"
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"regexp"
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"github.com/ClickHouse/clickhouse-go/v2/lib/driver"
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)
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// tenantIdentifierPattern is deliberately strict: tenant IDs become
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// literal ClickHouse database/user names, interpolated directly into
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// DDL statements below (ClickHouse's driver has no parameterized-query
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// support for identifiers, only values -- this is the real reason
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// rbacstore.Tenant.ID and every K8s Tenant CRD name are constrained to
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// look like a DNS-safe slug already; this regexp is the enforcement
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// point specific to this package's SQL construction, not a general
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// tenant-ID validator).
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var tenantIdentifierPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-z][a-z0-9_-]{0,62}$`)
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// Credentials is what ProvisionClickHouse hands back for the caller to
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// persist (rbacstore.Store.SetDataSourceClickHouseCredentials) --
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// Password is returned exactly once; ClickHouse itself doesn't store it
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// recoverably, so losing this return value means re-provisioning
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// (dropping and recreating the user) is the only recovery path.
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type Credentials struct {
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Username string
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Password string
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}
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// Provisioner wraps an admin ClickHouse connection -- one with
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// access_management enabled, the same credential docker-compose.yml's
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// CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD/the Helm chart's clickhouse Secret already is.
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// Never the per-tenant connections enterprise/internal/chrunner opens.
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type Provisioner struct {
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admin driver.Conn
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}
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func New(admin driver.Conn) *Provisioner {
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return &Provisioner{admin: admin}
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}
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// ProvisionClickHouse creates tenantID's database and a fresh user for
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// it, granted SELECT on exactly that database and nothing else.
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// Database creation is idempotent (CREATE DATABASE IF NOT EXISTS --
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// harmless to repeat). User creation deliberately is NOT idempotent
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// (plain CREATE USER, no IF NOT EXISTS): ClickHouse has no way to read
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// back an existing user's password, so silently succeeding on a second
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// call would either mean returning stale/wrong credentials or silently
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// rotating a live tenant's password out from under it -- the same
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// "never rotate a live credential without coordinating the consumer
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// side" reasoning as deploy/operator/internal/controller/
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// tenant_controller.go's reconcileSecret. A second call for an
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// already-provisioned tenant fails loudly instead, which is the correct
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// outcome: the caller (enterprise-api's -provision-tenant flag) must
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// check rbacstore for existing credentials before ever calling this,
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// not rely on this function to be safely re-callable.
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//
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// system.* access: intentionally not explicitly granted anywhere here,
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// relying on ClickHouse RBAC's default-deny for a freshly created user
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// once access_management is enabled on the admin connection (required
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// for CREATE USER/GRANT to work at all). This is exactly the assumption
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// /docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md's task 2 finding says must be
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// verified live per ClickHouse version, not trusted from documentation
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// -- see /docs/security/threat-model.md's "system.query_log metadata
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// leakage" section; that verification has not happened yet.
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func (p *Provisioner) ProvisionClickHouse(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) (Credentials, error) {
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if !tenantIdentifierPattern.MatchString(tenantID) {
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return Credentials{}, fmt.Errorf("tenantprovision: tenant id %q is not a safe ClickHouse identifier", tenantID)
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}
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database := tenantID
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username := "tenant_" + tenantID
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if err := p.admin.Exec(ctx, fmt.Sprintf("CREATE DATABASE IF NOT EXISTS `%s`", database)); err != nil {
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return Credentials{}, fmt.Errorf("tenantprovision: creating database: %w", err)
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}
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password, err := generatePassword()
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if err != nil {
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return Credentials{}, err
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}
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// No IF NOT EXISTS -- see this function's doc comment for why a
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// second call must fail, not silently succeed.
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if err := p.admin.Exec(ctx, fmt.Sprintf(
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"CREATE USER `%s` IDENTIFIED WITH plaintext_password BY '%s'",
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username, escapeSingleQuotes(password),
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)); err != nil {
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return Credentials{}, fmt.Errorf("tenantprovision: creating user (already provisioned? this call is not safe to retry): %w", err)
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}
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if err := p.admin.Exec(ctx, fmt.Sprintf("GRANT SELECT ON `%s`.* TO `%s`", database, username)); err != nil {
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return Credentials{}, fmt.Errorf("tenantprovision: granting select: %w", err)
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}
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return Credentials{Username: username, Password: password}, nil
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}
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func generatePassword() (string, error) {
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buf := make([]byte, 24)
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if _, err := rand.Read(buf); err != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("tenantprovision: generating password: %w", err)
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}
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return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(buf), nil
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}
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// escapeSingleQuotes guards against a generated password (base64
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// RawURLEncoding, so alphanumeric plus '-'/'_' only, never a literal
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// quote) accidentally breaking out of the SQL string literal -- belt
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// and suspenders given generatePassword's actual alphabet can't produce
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// one, since this function's output gets interpolated directly into DDL
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// (see tenantIdentifierPattern's doc comment on why: ClickHouse's driver
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// has no parameterized identifiers/literals for DDL).
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func escapeSingleQuotes(s string) string {
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out := make([]byte, 0, len(s))
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for i := 0; i < len(s); i++ {
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if s[i] == '\'' {
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out = append(out, '\'', '\'')
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continue
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}
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out = append(out, s[i])
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}
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return string(out)
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}
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