cairnobs/docs/phase-4-runbook.md

Phase 4 runbook

Extends /docs/phase-0-runbook.md through /docs/phase-3-runbook.md with SSO plumbing, RBAC enforcement, tenant-scoped dashboards, audit logging, and a Kubernetes deployment path. Read those first.

Verification status — read this before the rest of this doc

Every prior phase's runbook documents claims checked against the live stack, not asserted. This one is different, and says so plainly rather than papering over it: for the great majority of this phase's work, there was no working Docker daemon access and no reachable Kubernetes cluster, so most of what follows is a procedure to run, not a report of what was already run and passed. Two genuine exceptions:

• enterprise/internal/audit's hash-chain, tamper-detection, and concurrent-write guarantees (task 4) -- verified live against a real Postgres earlier in this phase's work (see its own doc comments for the exact docker run invocations), before the environment lost Docker access.
• enterprise/internal/loginhandler's full OIDC login flow (§3a) -- verified with real cryptography (a fake IdP that signs and verifies genuine RS256 tokens) without needing Docker or a live database at all, so this one was actually run in this runbook's own session, not just an earlier one. What's still unverified is wiring it into a real running enterprise-auth container against a real external IdP.
• enterprise/internal/loginhandler's full SAML login flow (§3b) -- same bar as OIDC above, verified against a real fake SAML IdP (crewjam/saml/samlidp: genuine XML signing and signature verification, a real AuthnRequest/Response round trip), no Docker needed. Writing this test caught two real bugs in enterprise/internal/saml, now fixed: ParseResponse never called r.ParseForm() before reading the POSTed SAMLResponse field (every real ACS POST would have silently decoded to nothing), and the email- attribute matching didn't recognize urn:oid:0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.3 (the standard LDAP "mail" OID), which is what an IdP sends by default when the SP doesn't explicitly request an attribute literally named "email" -- crewjam's own fake IdP hit this path. Same remaining gap as OIDC: not yet tried against a real external IdP or a running enterprise-auth container.

Everything else — internal/rbacstore's CRUD, the auth-enforcement walkthrough, the dashboards tenant-scoping fix, the Helm chart, the tenant-operator, and (newest) internal/tenantprovision/ internal/chrunner's live-ClickHouse tests — has unit/fake-client/ helm template coverage (all passing, see each component's own go test/helm lint output, including every Skip*-gated integration test confirmed to skip cleanly offline) but has not been exercised against a real running stack. Be specific when citing this runbook: "the tests exist and pass structurally" is a true, verified claim; "isolation was confirmed against real ClickHouse" is not, yet. If you're reading this to decide whether Phase 4 is production-ready: it isn't yet, independent of this gap — see /docs/security/threat-model.md's headline finding. This runbook exists so the first person with real Docker/K8s access can actually close the loop, not to claim that already happened.

1. Bring up the stack

docker compose build enterprise-auth api alerting web
docker compose up -d
docker compose ps

New service beyond Phase 3: enterprise-auth (port 8082) — see enterprise/README.md. Not wired into api/alerting's enforcement by default (docker-compose.yml's comment on why: no OIDC/SAML login flow exists yet, so turning on enforcement by default would break the web UI and sentryctl with no way to log in).

2. Confirm Phase 0-3 behavior is unchanged

Every existing single-tenant flow must still work exactly as before — this is the regression check for the nil-authorizer no-op design running through every piece of Phase 4 auth wiring:

curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/query -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"query":"stats count"}'
sentryctl dashboards list
curl -s http://localhost:8081/healthz

All three should behave exactly as in the Phase 3 runbook — no auth required, since ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL/API_SERVICE_TOKEN aren't set.

3. enterprise-auth: mint and validate a service token

curl -s http://localhost:8082/healthz && echo " <- OK"

TOKEN=$(docker compose run --rm enterprise-auth -mint-service-token=alerting)
echo "$TOKEN"

curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8082/internal/authorize -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
# expect: {"tenant_id":"","user_id":"","role":"service"}

curl -s -o /dev/null -w "invalid token -> %{http_code}\n" \
  -X POST http://localhost:8082/internal/authorize -H "Authorization: Bearer garbage"
# expect: 401

curl -s http://localhost:8082/auth/features
# expect: {"sso_configured":false,"oidc_enabled":false,"saml_enabled":false}
# (no OIDC_ISSUER_URL/SAML_IDP_METADATA_URL set in this compose file)

3a. enterprise-auth: human login via OIDC (new -- unlike everything

else in this runbook, the underlying flow was verified live in this session, just not against a real running enterprise-auth container or a real external IdP)

enterprise/internal/loginhandler's tests already prove the mechanism works end to end against a real fake IdP (go test ./internal/loginhandler/... -v from enterprise/, no Docker needed -- see enterprise/README.md). What's still unverified is wiring it into this actual running stack. To try that for real, point docker-compose.yml's enterprise-auth service at a real OIDC IdP (a free Auth0/Okta developer tenant, or any IdP you control):

# Add to enterprise-auth's environment in docker-compose.yml (or a
# docker-compose.override.yml):
#   OIDC_ISSUER_URL: "https://your-tenant.example.com/"
#   OIDC_CLIENT_ID: "..."
#   OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET: "..."
#   OIDC_REDIRECT_URL: "http://localhost:8082/auth/oidc/callback"
# Register that same redirect URL with the IdP's application config.

docker compose up -d --build enterprise-auth
curl -s http://localhost:8082/auth/features
# expect: {"sso_configured":true,"oidc_enabled":true,"saml_enabled":false}

Before a login can succeed, the logging-in identity needs a tenant_memberships row. There's still no admin UI for this, but as of this runbook revision there's no manual SQL either -- enterprise-auth's -create-tenant/-grant-membership-* operator flags replace the old psql dance:

docker compose run --rm enterprise-auth -create-tenant=acme -display-name="Acme Corp"
# Log in once at http://localhost:8082/auth/oidc/login -- it'll fail
# with "no tenant membership" (403), but UpsertUserBySSO already created
# the users row by that point, which -grant-membership-user-email needs.
docker compose run --rm enterprise-auth \
  -grant-membership-tenant=acme -grant-membership-user-email=<the email you logged in with> -grant-membership-role=viewer

Then visit http://localhost:8082/auth/oidc/login again in a real browser, complete the IdP's login, and confirm you land on POST_LOGIN_REDIRECT_URL (http://localhost:3000 by default) with a sentry_session cookie set. -create-tenant only touches rbacstore (control-plane/RBAC) -- it's independent of enterprise-api -provision-tenant's ClickHouse/Tantivy data-plane provisioning (§8), so a tenant created this way can log users in immediately but can't yet serve their queries until that's run too, the same "two separate operator actions" gap named in "Known gaps" below. Not yet built: an equivalent for revoking/listing memberships, or anything for dashboard_permissions grants (§5a) beyond calling the HTTP endpoints directly.

3b. enterprise-auth: human login via SAML (new -- same "verified

live in this session, not against a real running container or a real external IdP" caveat as §3a)

enterprise/internal/loginhandler's SAML tests already prove the mechanism works end to end against a real fake SAML IdP (go test ./internal/loginhandler/... -run SAML -v from enterprise/, no Docker needed). What's still unverified is wiring it into this actual running stack. To try that for real, point docker-compose.yml's enterprise-auth service at a real SAML IdP (many identity providers offer a free developer/trial tenant with SAML app support):

# Add to enterprise-auth's environment in docker-compose.yml (or a
# docker-compose.override.yml):
#   SAML_ENTITY_ID: "http://localhost:8082/saml/metadata"
#   SAML_ACS_URL: "http://localhost:8082/auth/saml/acs"
#   SAML_IDP_METADATA_URL: "https://your-idp.example.com/metadata"
# Register SAML_ENTITY_ID/SAML_ACS_URL with the IdP's application config
# -- the IdP needs Sentry's ACS URL to know where to POST the assertion.

docker compose up -d --build enterprise-auth
curl -s http://localhost:8082/auth/features
# expect: {"sso_configured":true,"oidc_enabled":false,"saml_enabled":true}

Bootstrapping the first tenant_memberships row uses the same -create-tenant/-grant-membership-* flags as §3a (log in once, it fails with 403, grant the membership using the email you logged in with, log in again). Then visit http://localhost:8082/auth/saml/login in a real browser, complete the IdP's login, and confirm a sentry_session cookie lands after redirect to POST_LOGIN_REDIRECT_URL. Note SAML's sentry_saml_request cookie is SameSite=None, which requires Secure -- i.e. this only works over HTTPS in a real deployment, unlike OIDC's redirect-based callback which tolerates plain HTTP for local dev (see enterprise/internal/loginhandler/loginhandler.go's handleSAMLLogin doc comment for why).

4. Turn on RBAC enforcement and prove it actually blocks/allows

Without touching the main stack's api container (so step 2's baseline keeps working):

docker compose run --rm -d --name sentry-api-enforced -p 8090:8080 \
  -e ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL=http://enterprise-auth:8082 api

curl -s -o /dev/null -w "no auth -> %{http_code} (want 401)\n" \
  -X POST http://localhost:8090/query -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"query":"stats count"}'
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "with service token -> %{http_code} (want 200)\n" \
  -X POST http://localhost:8090/query -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"query":"stats count"}'

docker stop sentry-api-enforced

GET /dashboards on the same enforced instance should return 401 without a token — this section only demonstrates the service-token path (§3/§3a/§3b cover minting a real human session via OIDC or SAML); walking that session cookie through this same enforced instance to get a 200 is left as the natural next verification step once real Docker/K8s access exists, not yet done in this runbook.

5. Dashboards tenant scoping

This is the fix from Phase 4 task 7/8 (see /docs/security/threat-model.md) — every dashboards query is now scoped to the authenticated identity's tenant. Verify the real SQL, not just the fake-store unit tests:

docker run --rm --network sentry_default -v $(pwd)/api:/src -w /src \
  -e DASHBOARDS_TEST_POSTGRES_ADDR=metadata-postgres:5432 \
  -e DASHBOARDS_TEST_POSTGRES_PASSWORD=sentry-dev-only \
  golang:1.25-alpine go test ./dashboards/... -run Integration -v

(Path fixed from an earlier ./internal/dashboards/... -- stale since dashboards moved from api/internal/dashboards to api/dashboards earlier in Phase 4, once enterprise/cmd/enterprise-api needed to import it: Go's compiler-enforced internal/ visibility rule meant a separate module like enterprise/ could never import anything under api/internal/..., regardless of the AGPL/commercial licensing boundary, which only forbids the reverse direction.)

Expect all TestIntegration* tests to pass, including TestIntegrationDashboardTenantForeignKeyRejectsUnknownTenant (the tenant_id foreign key added in metadata/migrations/0027_add_dashboards_tenant_fk.sql rejecting a dashboard for a tenant that doesn't exist).

5a. Per-resource dashboard grants (new -- built and unit-tested, not yet run live)

enterprise/internal/rbacstore's dashboard_permissions CRUD and its DashboardPermissions adapter (implementing api/dashboards. PermissionStore) have real integration tests, same skip-gated shape as §6 below:

docker run --rm --network sentry_default -v $(pwd)/enterprise:/src -w /src \
  -e RBACSTORE_TEST_POSTGRES_ADDR=metadata-postgres:5432 \
  -e RBACSTORE_TEST_POSTGRES_PASSWORD=sentry-dev-only \
  golang:1.25-alpine go test ./internal/rbacstore/... -run DashboardPermission -v

Expect all TestDashboardPermission*/TestSetDashboardPermission*/ TestGetDashboardPermission*/TestRevokeDashboardPermission*/ TestListDashboardPermissions tests to pass. This only takes effect when enterprise-api (not plain api) is serving traffic -- see §8/§10.

6. enterprise/internal/rbacstore and internal/audit (already verified — reconfirm here)

docker run --rm --network sentry_default -v $(pwd)/enterprise:/src -w /src \
  -e RBACSTORE_TEST_POSTGRES_ADDR=metadata-postgres:5432 \
  -e RBACSTORE_TEST_POSTGRES_PASSWORD=sentry-dev-only \
  golang:1.25-alpine go test ./internal/rbacstore/... -v

docker run --rm --network sentry_default -v $(pwd)/enterprise:/src -w /src \
  -e AUDIT_TEST_POSTGRES_ADDR=metadata-postgres:5432 \
  -e AUDIT_TEST_POSTGRES_PASSWORD=audit-writer-dev-only \
  -e AUDIT_TEST_ADMIN_PASSWORD=sentry-dev-only \
  golang:1.25-alpine go test ./internal/audit/... -v

7. deploy: Helm chart and Operator (offline-only so far — see /deploy/README.md)

No live cluster was available to kubectl apply any of this. What can be checked without one:

cd deploy/operator && go build ./... && go vet ./... && go test ./...

cd ../helm/sentry
helm lint .
helm template sentry . --include-crds > /tmp/default.yaml
helm template sentry . --include-crds \
  --set enterprise.enabled=true --set tenantOperator.enabled=true \
  --set 'tenants[0].name=acme' --set 'tenants[0].displayName=Acme Corp' \
  --set 'tenants[1].name=globex' --set 'tenants[1].displayName=Globex Corporation' \
  > /tmp/multitenant.yaml

With a real cluster reachable (kind create cluster, or similar):

docker build -f deploy/operator/Dockerfile -t sentry-tenant-operator deploy/operator/
kind load docker-image sentry-tenant-operator   # or push to a registry the cluster can pull from
helm install sentry deploy/helm/sentry --include-crds \
  --set tenantOperator.enabled=true --set enterprise.enabled=true \
  --set 'tenants[0].name=acme' --set 'tenants[0].displayName=Acme Corp'
kubectl get tenants
kubectl get secret sentry-tenant-acme-clickhouse -o yaml

Expect kubectl get tenants to show acme reach status.phase: Active and the Secret to contain a generated username/password/database. This proves the K8s-side half of a real two-tenant deployment — it does not provision a working ClickHouse database itself (the Operator manages the K8s Secret only); §8 below is the piece that actually provisions ClickHouse.

8. enterprise-api: real per-tenant ClickHouse isolation

enterprise/internal/tenantprovision and enterprise/internal/chrunner close the ClickHouse half of the headline gap §"Known gaps" below used to describe as completely unbuilt. It's still a second binary you have to choose to run, though — see /docs/security/threat-model.md's "Read this first" section. With OIDC login now built (§3a), a real curl -X POST http://localhost:8080/query walkthrough as a logged-in tenant is possible now, but still needs the manual tenant_memberships bootstrap from §3a — a full end-to-end curl walkthrough isn't included here yet.

api/enterprise-api are now mutually exclusive via COMPOSE_PROFILES (checked in as single-tenant in .env, i.e. plain api runs by default) — see §10a below for why, and confirmation that it actually holds. -provision-tenant itself doesn't bind a port, so it runs fine regardless of the active profile; actually serving traffic on enterprise-api needs the enterprise profile active, since it now binds the same host port (8080) plain api does:

COMPOSE_PROFILES=enterprise docker compose build enterprise-api
COMPOSE_PROFILES=enterprise docker compose run --rm enterprise-api -provision-tenant=acme -display-name="Acme Corp"
COMPOSE_PROFILES=enterprise docker compose run --rm enterprise-api -provision-tenant=globex -display-name="Globex Corporation"
COMPOSE_PROFILES=enterprise docker compose up -d enterprise-api
curl -s http://localhost:8080/healthz

Confirm isolation end to end against the live stack (this is the same assertion enterprise/internal/chrunner/chrunner_test.go's TestRegistryTenantCannotReadOtherTenantEvenViaRawSQL makes, run here as an integration test instead of a curl walkthrough since a full login walkthrough isn't scripted yet):

docker run --rm --network sentry_default -v $(pwd)/enterprise:/src -w /src \
  -e CHRUNNER_TEST_CLICKHOUSE_ADDR=clickhouse:9000 \
  -e CHRUNNER_TEST_CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD=sentry-dev-only \
  golang:1.25-alpine go test ./internal/chrunner/... -v

docker run --rm --network sentry_default -v $(pwd)/enterprise:/src -w /src \
  -e TENANTPROVISION_TEST_CLICKHOUSE_ADDR=clickhouse:9000 \
  -e TENANTPROVISION_TEST_CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD=sentry-dev-only \
  golang:1.25-alpine go test ./internal/tenantprovision/... -v

Expect all tests to pass, including TestProvisionedUserCannotReadSystemTables (item 2 of /docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md's verification plan, closed this pass) and TestRegistryTenantCannotReadOtherTenantEvenViaRawSQL (item 1, closed through the actual production code path, not just tenantprovision's raw grants).

9. Tantivy per-tenant isolation — no Docker needed, actually run this one

Unlike everything above, this one doesn't need a live stack at all — Tantivy is an embedded library, not a networked service, so both halves (the Rust index registry and the Go client that talks to it) can be verified with nothing but a local toolchain:

cd search
cargo build
cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings
cargo test
# expect 14 tests passing, including
# registry::tests::tenant_index_is_isolated_from_default_and_other_tenants
# -- item 3 of /docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md's verification plan.

cd ../enterprise
go test ./internal/searchclient/... -v
# real in-process gRPC server, confirms SearchRequest.tenant_id is set
# correctly, that a request with no/invalid tenant identity is refused,
# and (since TenantChecker was added to close verification-plan item 4)
# that a tenant which exists but isn't active yet -- e.g. right after
# enterprise-auth -create-tenant but before enterprise-api
# -provision-tenant -- is refused too, not silently searched against a
# freshly-created empty index.

go test ./internal/chrunner/... -run MidProvisioning -v
# the ClickHouse half of the same item-4 probe -- also Docker-free,
# since an empty DataSource list never dials out.

This is the one piece of Phase 4's tenant isolation work that has actually been run and confirmed passing in an environment without Docker access, alongside enterprise/internal/loginhandler's OIDC/SAML tests (§3a/§3b) — both are unusually strong evidence precisely because they needed no infrastructure this environment lacked. Writing the TenantChecker test here is also what found the Tantivy mid- provisioning gap in the first place, not just what closed it after the fact -- see api/queryapi/tenant_isolation_gap_test.go's item 4 for the full story.

10. Confirm the Helm chart actually enforces the binary swap

No live cluster needed for this either — helm template's output is plain YAML, parseable without a cluster:

cd deploy/helm/sentry
helm template sentry . --include-crds > /tmp/default.yaml
helm template sentry . --include-crds --set enterprise.enabled=true \
  --set 'tenants[0].name=acme' --set 'tenants[0].displayName=Acme Corp' \
  > /tmp/enterprise.yaml

python3 -c "
import yaml
for f in ['/tmp/default.yaml', '/tmp/enterprise.yaml']:
    docs = list(yaml.safe_load_all(open(f)))
    deploys = [d for d in docs if d and d.get('kind')=='Deployment' and d.get('metadata',{}).get('name')=='sentry-api']
    print(f, '->', [d['spec']['template']['spec']['containers'][0]['image'] for d in deploys])
"
# expect: default.yaml -> ['sentry-api:latest'], enterprise.yaml -> ['sentry-enterprise-api:latest']
# and exactly one Deployment named sentry-api in each file.

Real cluster (kind create cluster, or similar): helm install with each set of values and confirm kubectl get deploy sentry-api -o jsonpath='{.spec.template.spec.containers[0].image}' matches, and that kubectl get svc sentry-api routes to whichever one is actually running.

10a. Confirm docker-compose.yml now enforces the same binary swap

Local/dev parity with §10 above was a named gap ("docker-compose.yml still runs plain api unconditionally") -- closed via COMPOSE_PROFILES (api/enterprise-api are each gated behind a profile, .env checks in single-tenant as the zero-config default) plus the same "same host port, enterprise-api gets a default.aliases: [api] network alias" trick §10's Helm chart uses at the Service-name level. Verified in this environment via docker compose config (no daemon needed -- it renders and validates the merged YAML without starting anything):

docker compose config --quiet && echo "config is valid"

# exactly one of api/enterprise-api per profile, never both or neither:
docker compose config --services
# expect: ... api ... (no enterprise-api)
COMPOSE_PROFILES=enterprise docker compose config --services
# expect: ... enterprise-api ... (no api)

# enterprise-api really does take over api's name/port when active:
COMPOSE_PROFILES=enterprise docker compose config \
  | python3 -c "import yaml,sys,json; d=yaml.safe_load(sys.stdin)['services']['enterprise-api']; print(json.dumps({'ports': d['ports'], 'aliases': d['networks']['default']['aliases'], 'HTTP_LISTEN_ADDR': d['environment']['HTTP_LISTEN_ADDR']}, indent=2))"
# expect port 8080 (not enterprise-api's own default 8083), alias
# ["api"], and HTTP_LISTEN_ADDR ":8080"

docker compose run/build enterprise-api (§8's provisioning steps) work regardless of the active profile -- explicit service references on the command line bypass profile filtering, confirmed in this environment (the commands got past client-side profile resolution and failed only on permission denied ... docker.sock, this environment's already-disclosed no-Docker-daemon-access limitation, not a profile-related error). Not verified: an actual docker compose up against a real daemon in this environment — the config rendering above proves the compose file's shape is correct, not that containers actually start and route traffic correctly end to end.

Known gaps (do not treat this phase as done without reading these)

Full accounting: /docs/security/threat-model.md. Headline items:

• Both storage engines' isolation exists, and both Helm and docker-compose now enforce which binary runs. deploy/helm/sentry/templates/api.yaml/enterprise-api.yaml are mutually exclusive on enterprise.enabled (§10) -- a Helm-deployed cluster can't accidentally run the non-isolated binary once that flag is set. docker-compose.yml's api/enterprise-api services are now the same mutually-exclusive choice via COMPOSE_PROFILES (§8, §10a), closing the local/dev parity gap this bullet used to name.
• The Tenant CRD (deploy/operator) and enterprise-api -provision-tenant are still two independent provisioning mechanisms -- running both for the same tenant ID today takes two separate operator actions, not one.
• Ingest has no tenant concept for either storage engine. Every record ingest produces lands in the one shared ClickHouse database and the one shared Tantivy index no matter what. A newly-provisioned tenant's storage is real, isolated at query time, and permanently empty until this changes — undesigned, not just unbuilt.
• Human SSO login now works for both OIDC (§3a) and SAML (§3b) -- each verified with a real fake IdP (genuine cryptographic signing and verification), not yet a real external IdP or a running enterprise-auth container. No tenant-picker UI for a multi-membership identity either (refused outright) for either protocol.
• No admin UI to create a tenant_memberships row, but §3a/§3b's manual SQL bootstrap is gone -- enterprise-auth -create-tenant/ -grant-membership-* (offline operator flags, same shape as -mint-service-token) replace it. Nothing yet for revoking a membership, listing a tenant's members, or changing a role after the fact (SetMembership's upsert supports it at the storage layer; there's just no flag exposing it).
• Per-resource dashboard grants are now enforced (api/dashboards' handler reads dashboard_permissions via enterprise/internal/rbacstore.DashboardPermissions, only when enterprise-api -- not plain api -- serves traffic), but there's still no UI or sentryctl command to create a grant -- PUT /dashboards/{id}/permissions/{userId} has to be called directly. Verified against a fake store; the real-Postgres integration tests (enterprise/internal/rbacstore/rbacstore_test.go) haven't run against a live database in this environment, same gap as the rest of this phase's Postgres-backed pieces.
• All four adversarial ClickHouse/Tantivy probes named in /docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md's verification plan are now closed -- see api/queryapi/tenant_isolation_gap_test.go for the full accounting. The fourth (mid-provisioning-race handling) turned out to need a real code fix on the Tantivy side, not just a test: search/ src/registry.rs's IndexRegistry opened-or-created an index for any syntactically-valid tenant_id, so a mid-provisioning tenant's query would have silently succeeded with zero results instead of being refused. Fixed via enterprise/internal/searchclient.TenantChecker (backed by rbacstore.TenantIsActive). Both the ClickHouse and Tantivy halves of this probe run genuinely, without Docker, in this environment (chrunner_test.go's TestRegistryRefusesMidProvisioningTenant, searchclient_test.go's TestSearchRefusesMidProvisioningTenant) -- rbacstore.TenantIsActive itself has skip-gated live-Postgres tests that haven't run here, same disclosed gap as the rest of this phase's Postgres-backed pieces.

Tearing down

docker compose down -v
helm uninstall sentry   # if installed against a real cluster

Troubleshooting

enterprise-auth fails to start with "ENTERPRISE_SESSION_SIGNING_KEY must be set to at least 32 bytes". Required, unlike OIDC/SAML config — see enterprise/internal/config.Load. docker-compose.yml's dev value is long enough; a custom override must be too.

POST /query returns 401 even though ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL isn't set. Check api/cmd/api/main.go actually left authorizer nil when cfg.EnterpriseAuthURL == "" — a nil Authorizer must be a no-op (api/authz.RequireRole's doc comment). If this regresses, it breaks every existing Phase 0-3 deployment silently.

A dashboard created by one tenant is visible to another. This is the exact bug found and fixed in task 7 — see /docs/security/threat-model.md's "application-layer tenant scoping" section and api/dashboards/handler_test.go's TestCrossTenant* tests. If this regresses, Handler.tenantID or store.go's WHERE tenant_id = ... filters have been bypassed somewhere — check every store method still takes and uses a tenantID parameter.

helm template fails with error calling include: ... can't evaluate field Release in type string. A call site is passing a bare string to sentry.selectorLabels instead of (list $ "name") — see templates/_helpers.tpl's doc comment for why the plain-string form doesn't work with include.