jcoffey-dev
3eb0f4c589
RBAC (api/internal/authz) is live on /query and /dashboards, backed by a new enterprise/ module (session issuance, audit logging, RBAC storage, OIDC/SAML protocol wiring) that core never imports -- only calls over HTTP. Found and fixed a real cross-tenant vulnerability in dashboards (no tenant_id filtering at all) while writing the threat model doc. Two things are explicitly NOT done, documented rather than hidden: tenant isolation for log data itself (/query still shares one ClickHouse connection and Tantivy index across every tenant -- RBAC controls who can query, not what a query can see), and human SSO login (protocol wiring exists, no HTTP handler calls it yet). See docs/security/threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md. Also adds deploy/ (Go Operator + Helm chart, validated offline only -- no cluster was reachable in this environment).
15 lines
335 B
YAML
15 lines
335 B
YAML
{{- if .Values.enterprise.enabled }}
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{{- range .Values.tenants }}
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---
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apiVersion: sentry.io/v1alpha1
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kind: Tenant
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metadata:
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name: {{ .name }}
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labels:
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{{- include "sentry.labels" $ | nindent 4 }}
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spec:
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displayName: {{ .displayName | default .name | quote }}
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suspended: {{ .suspended | default false }}
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{{- end }}
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{{- end }}
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