jcoffey-dev
4b5dae5879
This is a large squashed commit covering two batches of prior uncommitted work plus a full security-audit remediation pass, kept together because go.mod/go.sum and several shared files (main.go, handler.go) were touched by both and splitting risked non-building intermediate commits. Features (built earlier, previously uncommitted): - Local username/password login for single-tenant deployments with no SSO configured (api/localauth, alerting/internal/sessioncheck, sentryctl users, web/src/routes/login, metadata migrations 0040/0041). - Remotely-editable additional log file paths for agents, on top of their existing primary source (api/agents, agent/sentry-agent extra-file-path diffing, web agent config UI). - IPv4/IPv6 addresses reported alongside other host system metrics. Security audit remediation (this pass, all live-verified in production): - Critical: block ClickHouse SSRF table functions (url/remote/file/s3/...) in the raw-SQL query escape hatch. - High: deny sensitive paths and require Admin to add agent extra_file_paths (Editor could previously point an agent at /etc/shadow or an SSH key); alerting webhook targets now validate against internal/metadata/loopback addresses, both at creation and send time; alerting's session middleware now enforces an Editor+ floor on mutating requests instead of "any authenticated session"; bumped goxmldsig to close a SAML signature-verification bypass (GO-2026-4753). - Medium: per-IP login rate limiting; security response headers (HSTS/CSP/nosniff/X-Frame-Options/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy) on web/nginx.conf; a DevCredentialWarnings check in every Go service's config loader, logging loudly at startup if a deployment is still on docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only credentials; dependency bumps (golang.org/x/text, grpc, x/net, quick-xml, h2) across every affected Go module and both Rust crates, including a previously-uncovered x/net vulnerability in deploy/operator; a new security-scan.yml CI workflow running cargo-deny/govulncheck/npm-audit, mirroring the existing license-compliance.yml matrix shape. - Low: removed sentryctl's plaintext --password flag (shell history/`ps` exposure) in favor of stdin and a --password-stdin flag for reset-password's optional specific-password path; a dummy bcrypt comparison closes a login response-time username-enumeration side-channel.
85 lines
2.4 KiB
Go
85 lines
2.4 KiB
Go
package localauth
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"net/http"
|
|
"net/http/httptest"
|
|
"testing"
|
|
"time"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/sentry/sentry/api/authz"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
func TestLoginLimiterAllowsUpToMax(t *testing.T) {
|
|
l := newLoginLimiter(3, time.Minute)
|
|
for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
|
|
if !l.allow("1.2.3.4") {
|
|
t.Fatalf("attempt %d: want allowed", i+1)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if l.allow("1.2.3.4") {
|
|
t.Fatal("4th attempt within the window: want denied")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestLoginLimiterIsPerKey(t *testing.T) {
|
|
l := newLoginLimiter(1, time.Minute)
|
|
if !l.allow("1.2.3.4") {
|
|
t.Fatal("first attempt from 1.2.3.4: want allowed")
|
|
}
|
|
if !l.allow("5.6.7.8") {
|
|
t.Fatal("a different IP must have its own budget")
|
|
}
|
|
if l.allow("1.2.3.4") {
|
|
t.Fatal("second attempt from 1.2.3.4: want denied")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestLoginLimiterResetsAfterWindow(t *testing.T) {
|
|
l := newLoginLimiter(1, 10*time.Millisecond)
|
|
if !l.allow("1.2.3.4") {
|
|
t.Fatal("first attempt: want allowed")
|
|
}
|
|
if l.allow("1.2.3.4") {
|
|
t.Fatal("second attempt within the window: want denied")
|
|
}
|
|
time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond)
|
|
if !l.allow("1.2.3.4") {
|
|
t.Fatal("attempt after the window elapsed: want allowed")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestClientIPPrefersForwardedFor(t *testing.T) {
|
|
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/auth/login", nil)
|
|
r.RemoteAddr = "10.0.0.1:5555"
|
|
r.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", "203.0.113.9, 10.0.0.1")
|
|
if got := clientIP(r); got != "203.0.113.9" {
|
|
t.Errorf("clientIP() = %q, want %q", got, "203.0.113.9")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestClientIPFallsBackToRemoteAddr(t *testing.T) {
|
|
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/auth/login", nil)
|
|
r.RemoteAddr = "198.51.100.7:5555"
|
|
if got := clientIP(r); got != "198.51.100.7" {
|
|
t.Errorf("clientIP() = %q, want %q", got, "198.51.100.7")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestHandleLoginRateLimited is the regression test for the
|
|
// security-audit finding that POST /auth/login had no rate limiting at
|
|
// all -- repeated attempts from the same client must eventually get a
|
|
// 429, not another 401.
|
|
func TestHandleLoginRateLimited(t *testing.T) {
|
|
fs := newFakeStore()
|
|
mustCreateUser(t, fs, "alice", "hunter22", authz.RoleEditor)
|
|
_, mux := newTestHandler(t, fs)
|
|
|
|
var last *httptest.ResponseRecorder
|
|
for i := 0; i < loginRateLimitMax+1; i++ {
|
|
last = doRequest(t, mux, http.MethodPost, "/auth/login", `{"username":"alice","password":"wrong-password"}`, nil)
|
|
}
|
|
if last.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
|
|
t.Fatalf("status after exceeding the limit = %d, want 429", last.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|