Files
cairnobs/ingest/internal/config/config.go
T
jcoffey-dev 4b5dae5879 Add local login, agent extra log paths, IPv4/IPv6 metrics; remediate security audit findings
This is a large squashed commit covering two batches of prior uncommitted
work plus a full security-audit remediation pass, kept together because
go.mod/go.sum and several shared files (main.go, handler.go) were touched
by both and splitting risked non-building intermediate commits.

Features (built earlier, previously uncommitted):
- Local username/password login for single-tenant deployments with no
  SSO configured (api/localauth, alerting/internal/sessioncheck,
  sentryctl users, web/src/routes/login, metadata migrations 0040/0041).
- Remotely-editable additional log file paths for agents, on top of
  their existing primary source (api/agents, agent/sentry-agent
  extra-file-path diffing, web agent config UI).
- IPv4/IPv6 addresses reported alongside other host system metrics.

Security audit remediation (this pass, all live-verified in production):
- Critical: block ClickHouse SSRF table functions (url/remote/file/s3/...)
  in the raw-SQL query escape hatch.
- High: deny sensitive paths and require Admin to add agent
  extra_file_paths (Editor could previously point an agent at /etc/shadow
  or an SSH key); alerting webhook targets now validate against
  internal/metadata/loopback addresses, both at creation and send time;
  alerting's session middleware now enforces an Editor+ floor on
  mutating requests instead of "any authenticated session"; bumped
  goxmldsig to close a SAML signature-verification bypass (GO-2026-4753).
- Medium: per-IP login rate limiting; security response headers
  (HSTS/CSP/nosniff/X-Frame-Options/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy)
  on web/nginx.conf; a DevCredentialWarnings check in every Go service's
  config loader, logging loudly at startup if a deployment is still on
  docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only credentials; dependency bumps
  (golang.org/x/text, grpc, x/net, quick-xml, h2) across every affected
  Go module and both Rust crates, including a previously-uncovered x/net
  vulnerability in deploy/operator; a new security-scan.yml CI workflow
  running cargo-deny/govulncheck/npm-audit, mirroring the existing
  license-compliance.yml matrix shape.
- Low: removed sentryctl's plaintext --password flag (shell
  history/`ps` exposure) in favor of stdin and a --password-stdin flag
  for reset-password's optional specific-password path; a dummy bcrypt
  comparison closes a login response-time username-enumeration
  side-channel.
2026-08-18 23:53:20 -07:00

154 lines
4.9 KiB
Go

// Package config loads ingest's configuration from environment variables.
// Phase 0 deliberately has no config file format of its own — env vars are
// enough for a docker-compose/k8s deployment and avoid pulling in a config
// library.
package config
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"strconv"
"strings"
)
type Config struct {
GRPC GRPCConfig
TLS TLSConfig
Redpanda RedpandaConfig
ClickHouse ClickHouseConfig
Batch BatchConfig
// EnterpriseAuthURL enables per-tenant ingest credential validation
// (internal/grpcserver.TenantResolver) when set -- empty (the
// default) is a documented no-op, same "off unless configured" shape
// as every other optional enterprise integration point in this
// codebase (e.g. api's own ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL).
EnterpriseAuthURL string
// AgentRegistry enables agent inventory/remote config
// (internal/agentregistry, internal/grpcserver.AgentRegistry) when
// Postgres.Addr is set -- same "off unless configured" shape as
// EnterpriseAuthURL above. Writes into the same sentry_metadata
// database api/web already use, via the same shared "sentry" role
// every other non-audit table in this schema uses (unlike
// audit_log's dedicated restricted role -- agent inventory carries
// no tamper-evidence requirement).
AgentRegistry AgentRegistryConfig
}
type AgentRegistryConfig struct {
Postgres PostgresConfig
}
type PostgresConfig struct {
Addr string
Database string
Username string
Password string
}
type GRPCConfig struct {
ListenAddr string
}
// TLSConfig is the server-side mTLS material: the ingest service's own
// cert/key, and the CA used to verify agent client certs.
type TLSConfig struct {
CertFile string
KeyFile string
ClientCAFile string
}
type RedpandaConfig struct {
Brokers []string
Topic string
ConsumerGroup string
}
type ClickHouseConfig struct {
Addr string
Database string
Username string
Password string
}
type BatchConfig struct {
MaxSize int
FlushIntervalMS int
}
// devOnlyCredential is docker-compose.yml's zero-config default for
// every Postgres/ClickHouse password in this repo -- see
// api/internal/config.Config.DevCredentialWarnings for the full
// reasoning (duplicated here per this repo's no-shared-code-between-
// services convention).
const devOnlyCredential = "sentry-dev-only"
// DevCredentialWarnings reports which configured credentials still
// equal the literal dev-only default -- cmd/ingest/main.go logs each
// one loudly at startup. A warning, not a startup-refusing error: local
// dev's zero-config docker-compose.yml path legitimately leaves every
// password at this value.
func (c Config) DevCredentialWarnings() []string {
var warnings []string
if c.ClickHouse.Password == devOnlyCredential {
warnings = append(warnings, "CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD is still the default dev-only value -- set a real password before this is reachable outside local dev")
}
if c.AgentRegistry.Postgres.Password == devOnlyCredential {
warnings = append(warnings, "AGENT_REGISTRY_POSTGRES_PASSWORD is still the default dev-only value -- set a real password before this is reachable outside local dev")
}
return warnings
}
func Load() (Config, error) {
cfg := Config{
GRPC: GRPCConfig{
ListenAddr: getenv("GRPC_LISTEN_ADDR", ":4317"),
},
TLS: TLSConfig{
CertFile: getenv("TLS_CERT_FILE", "/etc/sentry-ingest/server.pem"),
KeyFile: getenv("TLS_KEY_FILE", "/etc/sentry-ingest/server-key.pem"),
ClientCAFile: getenv("TLS_CLIENT_CA_FILE", "/etc/sentry-ingest/ca.pem"),
},
Redpanda: RedpandaConfig{
Brokers: strings.Split(getenv("REDPANDA_BROKERS", "localhost:9092"), ","),
Topic: getenv("REDPANDA_TOPIC", "sentry.logs.raw"),
ConsumerGroup: getenv("REDPANDA_CONSUMER_GROUP", "sentry-ingest"),
},
ClickHouse: ClickHouseConfig{
Addr: getenv("CLICKHOUSE_ADDR", "localhost:9000"),
Database: getenv("CLICKHOUSE_DATABASE", "sentry"),
Username: getenv("CLICKHOUSE_USERNAME", "default"),
Password: getenv("CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD", ""),
},
EnterpriseAuthURL: getenv("ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL", ""),
AgentRegistry: AgentRegistryConfig{
Postgres: PostgresConfig{
Addr: getenv("AGENT_REGISTRY_POSTGRES_ADDR", ""),
Database: getenv("AGENT_REGISTRY_POSTGRES_DATABASE", "sentry_metadata"),
Username: getenv("AGENT_REGISTRY_POSTGRES_USERNAME", "sentry"),
Password: getenv("AGENT_REGISTRY_POSTGRES_PASSWORD", ""),
},
},
}
maxSize, err := strconv.Atoi(getenv("CONSUMER_BATCH_MAX_SIZE", "500"))
if err != nil {
return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("CONSUMER_BATCH_MAX_SIZE: %w", err)
}
cfg.Batch.MaxSize = maxSize
flushMS, err := strconv.Atoi(getenv("CONSUMER_BATCH_FLUSH_INTERVAL_MS", "2000"))
if err != nil {
return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("CONSUMER_BATCH_FLUSH_INTERVAL_MS: %w", err)
}
cfg.Batch.FlushIntervalMS = flushMS
return cfg, nil
}
func getenv(key, fallback string) string {
if v := os.Getenv(key); v != "" {
return v
}
return fallback
}