This is a large squashed commit covering two batches of prior uncommitted work plus a full security-audit remediation pass, kept together because go.mod/go.sum and several shared files (main.go, handler.go) were touched by both and splitting risked non-building intermediate commits. Features (built earlier, previously uncommitted): - Local username/password login for single-tenant deployments with no SSO configured (api/localauth, alerting/internal/sessioncheck, sentryctl users, web/src/routes/login, metadata migrations 0040/0041). - Remotely-editable additional log file paths for agents, on top of their existing primary source (api/agents, agent/sentry-agent extra-file-path diffing, web agent config UI). - IPv4/IPv6 addresses reported alongside other host system metrics. Security audit remediation (this pass, all live-verified in production): - Critical: block ClickHouse SSRF table functions (url/remote/file/s3/...) in the raw-SQL query escape hatch. - High: deny sensitive paths and require Admin to add agent extra_file_paths (Editor could previously point an agent at /etc/shadow or an SSH key); alerting webhook targets now validate against internal/metadata/loopback addresses, both at creation and send time; alerting's session middleware now enforces an Editor+ floor on mutating requests instead of "any authenticated session"; bumped goxmldsig to close a SAML signature-verification bypass (GO-2026-4753). - Medium: per-IP login rate limiting; security response headers (HSTS/CSP/nosniff/X-Frame-Options/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy) on web/nginx.conf; a DevCredentialWarnings check in every Go service's config loader, logging loudly at startup if a deployment is still on docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only credentials; dependency bumps (golang.org/x/text, grpc, x/net, quick-xml, h2) across every affected Go module and both Rust crates, including a previously-uncovered x/net vulnerability in deploy/operator; a new security-scan.yml CI workflow running cargo-deny/govulncheck/npm-audit, mirroring the existing license-compliance.yml matrix shape. - Low: removed sentryctl's plaintext --password flag (shell history/`ps` exposure) in favor of stdin and a --password-stdin flag for reset-password's optional specific-password path; a dummy bcrypt comparison closes a login response-time username-enumeration side-channel.
154 lines
4.9 KiB
Go
154 lines
4.9 KiB
Go
// Package config loads ingest's configuration from environment variables.
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// Phase 0 deliberately has no config file format of its own — env vars are
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// enough for a docker-compose/k8s deployment and avoid pulling in a config
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// library.
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package config
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import (
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"fmt"
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"os"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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)
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type Config struct {
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GRPC GRPCConfig
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TLS TLSConfig
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Redpanda RedpandaConfig
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ClickHouse ClickHouseConfig
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Batch BatchConfig
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// EnterpriseAuthURL enables per-tenant ingest credential validation
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// (internal/grpcserver.TenantResolver) when set -- empty (the
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// default) is a documented no-op, same "off unless configured" shape
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// as every other optional enterprise integration point in this
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// codebase (e.g. api's own ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL).
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EnterpriseAuthURL string
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// AgentRegistry enables agent inventory/remote config
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// (internal/agentregistry, internal/grpcserver.AgentRegistry) when
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// Postgres.Addr is set -- same "off unless configured" shape as
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// EnterpriseAuthURL above. Writes into the same sentry_metadata
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// database api/web already use, via the same shared "sentry" role
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// every other non-audit table in this schema uses (unlike
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// audit_log's dedicated restricted role -- agent inventory carries
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// no tamper-evidence requirement).
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AgentRegistry AgentRegistryConfig
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}
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type AgentRegistryConfig struct {
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Postgres PostgresConfig
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}
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type PostgresConfig struct {
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Addr string
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Database string
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Username string
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Password string
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}
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type GRPCConfig struct {
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ListenAddr string
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}
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// TLSConfig is the server-side mTLS material: the ingest service's own
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// cert/key, and the CA used to verify agent client certs.
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type TLSConfig struct {
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CertFile string
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KeyFile string
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ClientCAFile string
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}
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type RedpandaConfig struct {
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Brokers []string
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Topic string
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ConsumerGroup string
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}
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type ClickHouseConfig struct {
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Addr string
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Database string
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Username string
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Password string
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}
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type BatchConfig struct {
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MaxSize int
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FlushIntervalMS int
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}
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// devOnlyCredential is docker-compose.yml's zero-config default for
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// every Postgres/ClickHouse password in this repo -- see
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// api/internal/config.Config.DevCredentialWarnings for the full
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// reasoning (duplicated here per this repo's no-shared-code-between-
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// services convention).
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const devOnlyCredential = "sentry-dev-only"
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// DevCredentialWarnings reports which configured credentials still
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// equal the literal dev-only default -- cmd/ingest/main.go logs each
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// one loudly at startup. A warning, not a startup-refusing error: local
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// dev's zero-config docker-compose.yml path legitimately leaves every
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// password at this value.
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func (c Config) DevCredentialWarnings() []string {
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var warnings []string
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if c.ClickHouse.Password == devOnlyCredential {
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warnings = append(warnings, "CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD is still the default dev-only value -- set a real password before this is reachable outside local dev")
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}
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if c.AgentRegistry.Postgres.Password == devOnlyCredential {
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warnings = append(warnings, "AGENT_REGISTRY_POSTGRES_PASSWORD is still the default dev-only value -- set a real password before this is reachable outside local dev")
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}
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return warnings
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}
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func Load() (Config, error) {
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cfg := Config{
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GRPC: GRPCConfig{
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ListenAddr: getenv("GRPC_LISTEN_ADDR", ":4317"),
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},
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TLS: TLSConfig{
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CertFile: getenv("TLS_CERT_FILE", "/etc/sentry-ingest/server.pem"),
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KeyFile: getenv("TLS_KEY_FILE", "/etc/sentry-ingest/server-key.pem"),
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ClientCAFile: getenv("TLS_CLIENT_CA_FILE", "/etc/sentry-ingest/ca.pem"),
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},
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Redpanda: RedpandaConfig{
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Brokers: strings.Split(getenv("REDPANDA_BROKERS", "localhost:9092"), ","),
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Topic: getenv("REDPANDA_TOPIC", "sentry.logs.raw"),
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ConsumerGroup: getenv("REDPANDA_CONSUMER_GROUP", "sentry-ingest"),
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},
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ClickHouse: ClickHouseConfig{
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Addr: getenv("CLICKHOUSE_ADDR", "localhost:9000"),
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Database: getenv("CLICKHOUSE_DATABASE", "sentry"),
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Username: getenv("CLICKHOUSE_USERNAME", "default"),
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Password: getenv("CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD", ""),
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},
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EnterpriseAuthURL: getenv("ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL", ""),
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AgentRegistry: AgentRegistryConfig{
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Postgres: PostgresConfig{
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Addr: getenv("AGENT_REGISTRY_POSTGRES_ADDR", ""),
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Database: getenv("AGENT_REGISTRY_POSTGRES_DATABASE", "sentry_metadata"),
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Username: getenv("AGENT_REGISTRY_POSTGRES_USERNAME", "sentry"),
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Password: getenv("AGENT_REGISTRY_POSTGRES_PASSWORD", ""),
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},
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},
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}
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maxSize, err := strconv.Atoi(getenv("CONSUMER_BATCH_MAX_SIZE", "500"))
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if err != nil {
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return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("CONSUMER_BATCH_MAX_SIZE: %w", err)
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}
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cfg.Batch.MaxSize = maxSize
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flushMS, err := strconv.Atoi(getenv("CONSUMER_BATCH_FLUSH_INTERVAL_MS", "2000"))
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if err != nil {
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return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("CONSUMER_BATCH_FLUSH_INTERVAL_MS: %w", err)
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}
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cfg.Batch.FlushIntervalMS = flushMS
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return cfg, nil
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}
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func getenv(key, fallback string) string {
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if v := os.Getenv(key); v != "" {
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return v
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}
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return fallback
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}
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