This is a large squashed commit covering two batches of prior uncommitted work plus a full security-audit remediation pass, kept together because go.mod/go.sum and several shared files (main.go, handler.go) were touched by both and splitting risked non-building intermediate commits. Features (built earlier, previously uncommitted): - Local username/password login for single-tenant deployments with no SSO configured (api/localauth, alerting/internal/sessioncheck, sentryctl users, web/src/routes/login, metadata migrations 0040/0041). - Remotely-editable additional log file paths for agents, on top of their existing primary source (api/agents, agent/sentry-agent extra-file-path diffing, web agent config UI). - IPv4/IPv6 addresses reported alongside other host system metrics. Security audit remediation (this pass, all live-verified in production): - Critical: block ClickHouse SSRF table functions (url/remote/file/s3/...) in the raw-SQL query escape hatch. - High: deny sensitive paths and require Admin to add agent extra_file_paths (Editor could previously point an agent at /etc/shadow or an SSH key); alerting webhook targets now validate against internal/metadata/loopback addresses, both at creation and send time; alerting's session middleware now enforces an Editor+ floor on mutating requests instead of "any authenticated session"; bumped goxmldsig to close a SAML signature-verification bypass (GO-2026-4753). - Medium: per-IP login rate limiting; security response headers (HSTS/CSP/nosniff/X-Frame-Options/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy) on web/nginx.conf; a DevCredentialWarnings check in every Go service's config loader, logging loudly at startup if a deployment is still on docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only credentials; dependency bumps (golang.org/x/text, grpc, x/net, quick-xml, h2) across every affected Go module and both Rust crates, including a previously-uncovered x/net vulnerability in deploy/operator; a new security-scan.yml CI workflow running cargo-deny/govulncheck/npm-audit, mirroring the existing license-compliance.yml matrix shape. - Low: removed sentryctl's plaintext --password flag (shell history/`ps` exposure) in favor of stdin and a --password-stdin flag for reset-password's optional specific-password path; a dummy bcrypt comparison closes a login response-time username-enumeration side-channel.
121 lines
4.2 KiB
Go
121 lines
4.2 KiB
Go
// Package ingestconfig loads enterprise-ingest's configuration from
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// environment variables -- same convention as every other Go service in
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// this repo. Named ingestconfig, not config, to avoid colliding with
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// enterprise/internal/config (enterprise-auth's own, differently-shaped
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// config) within the same module -- mirrors enterprise/internal/
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// apiconfig's own naming reasoning exactly.
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package ingestconfig
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import (
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"fmt"
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"os"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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)
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type Config struct {
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// HTTPListenAddr serves only /healthz -- this binary's actual job
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// (Redpanda -> per-tenant ClickHouse) has no other HTTP surface,
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// same "just enough for Docker's HEALTHCHECK" shape as every other
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// binary in this repo's -healthcheck self-check mode.
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HTTPListenAddr string
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// ClickHouseAddr is the shared physical ClickHouse server's native
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// address -- every tenant's connection (enterprise/internal/
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// chwriter.Registry) dials this same address, just with different
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// per-tenant credentials rbacstore already has on file from
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// enterprise-api -provision-tenant. Mirrors apiconfig.Config.
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// ClickHouseAddr's own doc comment.
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ClickHouseAddr string
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Postgres PostgresConfig
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Redpanda RedpandaConfig
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Batch BatchConfig
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}
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type PostgresConfig struct {
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Addr string
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Database string
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Username string
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Password string
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}
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type RedpandaConfig struct {
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Brokers []string
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Topic string
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ConsumerGroup string
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}
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type BatchConfig struct {
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MaxSize int
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FlushIntervalMS int
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}
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// devOnlyCredential is docker-compose.yml's zero-config default for
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// every Postgres/ClickHouse password in this repo -- see
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// api/internal/config.Config.DevCredentialWarnings for the full
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// reasoning (duplicated here per this repo's no-shared-code-between-
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// services convention).
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const devOnlyCredential = "sentry-dev-only"
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// DevCredentialWarnings reports whether the configured Postgres
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// credential still equals the literal dev-only default --
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// cmd/enterprise-ingest/main.go logs it loudly at startup. A warning,
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// not a startup-refusing error: local dev's zero-config
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// docker-compose.yml path legitimately leaves it at this value.
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func (c Config) DevCredentialWarnings() []string {
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if c.Postgres.Password == devOnlyCredential {
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return []string{"POSTGRES_PASSWORD is still the default dev-only value -- set a real password before this is reachable outside local dev"}
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}
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return nil
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}
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func Load() (Config, error) {
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cfg := Config{
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HTTPListenAddr: getenv("HTTP_LISTEN_ADDR", ":8084"),
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ClickHouseAddr: getenv("CLICKHOUSE_ADDR", "localhost:9000"),
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Postgres: PostgresConfig{
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Addr: getenv("POSTGRES_ADDR", "localhost:5432"),
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Database: getenv("POSTGRES_DATABASE", "sentry_metadata"),
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Username: getenv("POSTGRES_USERNAME", "sentry"),
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Password: getenv("POSTGRES_PASSWORD", ""),
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},
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Redpanda: RedpandaConfig{
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Brokers: strings.Split(getenv("REDPANDA_BROKERS", "localhost:9092"), ","),
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// Same default topic ingest/internal/config uses -- this
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// binary reads the identical shared sentry.logs.raw topic
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// ingest/cmd/ingest's server half (agent-facing PushBatch)
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// produces onto; there's no per-tenant topic, see
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// ingest/internal/grpcserver's doc comment.
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Topic: getenv("REDPANDA_TOPIC", "sentry.logs.raw"),
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// A distinct consumer group from ingest/cmd/ingest's own
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// default ("sentry-ingest") -- this binary and a
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// single-tenant `ingest -mode=consumer` must never share a
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// group (each message would only ever reach one of them,
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// silently splitting traffic) even though in practice a
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// real multi-tenant deployment runs this binary *instead
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// of*, not alongside, `ingest -mode=consumer`.
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ConsumerGroup: getenv("REDPANDA_CONSUMER_GROUP", "sentry-enterprise-ingest"),
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},
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}
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maxSize, err := strconv.Atoi(getenv("CONSUMER_BATCH_MAX_SIZE", "500"))
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if err != nil {
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return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("CONSUMER_BATCH_MAX_SIZE: %w", err)
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}
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cfg.Batch.MaxSize = maxSize
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flushMS, err := strconv.Atoi(getenv("CONSUMER_BATCH_FLUSH_INTERVAL_MS", "2000"))
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if err != nil {
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return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("CONSUMER_BATCH_FLUSH_INTERVAL_MS: %w", err)
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}
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cfg.Batch.FlushIntervalMS = flushMS
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return cfg, nil
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}
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func getenv(key, fallback string) string {
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if v := os.Getenv(key); v != "" {
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return v
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}
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return fallback
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}
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