Files
cairnobs/enterprise/internal/config/config.go
T
jcoffey-dev 4b5dae5879 Add local login, agent extra log paths, IPv4/IPv6 metrics; remediate security audit findings
This is a large squashed commit covering two batches of prior uncommitted
work plus a full security-audit remediation pass, kept together because
go.mod/go.sum and several shared files (main.go, handler.go) were touched
by both and splitting risked non-building intermediate commits.

Features (built earlier, previously uncommitted):
- Local username/password login for single-tenant deployments with no
  SSO configured (api/localauth, alerting/internal/sessioncheck,
  sentryctl users, web/src/routes/login, metadata migrations 0040/0041).
- Remotely-editable additional log file paths for agents, on top of
  their existing primary source (api/agents, agent/sentry-agent
  extra-file-path diffing, web agent config UI).
- IPv4/IPv6 addresses reported alongside other host system metrics.

Security audit remediation (this pass, all live-verified in production):
- Critical: block ClickHouse SSRF table functions (url/remote/file/s3/...)
  in the raw-SQL query escape hatch.
- High: deny sensitive paths and require Admin to add agent
  extra_file_paths (Editor could previously point an agent at /etc/shadow
  or an SSH key); alerting webhook targets now validate against
  internal/metadata/loopback addresses, both at creation and send time;
  alerting's session middleware now enforces an Editor+ floor on
  mutating requests instead of "any authenticated session"; bumped
  goxmldsig to close a SAML signature-verification bypass (GO-2026-4753).
- Medium: per-IP login rate limiting; security response headers
  (HSTS/CSP/nosniff/X-Frame-Options/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy)
  on web/nginx.conf; a DevCredentialWarnings check in every Go service's
  config loader, logging loudly at startup if a deployment is still on
  docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only credentials; dependency bumps
  (golang.org/x/text, grpc, x/net, quick-xml, h2) across every affected
  Go module and both Rust crates, including a previously-uncovered x/net
  vulnerability in deploy/operator; a new security-scan.yml CI workflow
  running cargo-deny/govulncheck/npm-audit, mirroring the existing
  license-compliance.yml matrix shape.
- Low: removed sentryctl's plaintext --password flag (shell
  history/`ps` exposure) in favor of stdin and a --password-stdin flag
  for reset-password's optional specific-password path; a dummy bcrypt
  comparison closes a login response-time username-enumeration
  side-channel.
2026-08-18 23:53:20 -07:00

152 lines
6.2 KiB
Go

// Package config loads enterprise-auth's configuration from environment
// variables, same convention as every other Go service in this repo.
package config
import (
"fmt"
"os"
)
type Config struct {
HTTPListenAddr string
Postgres PostgresConfig
OIDC OIDCConfig
SAML SAMLConfig
SessionSigningKey []byte
// PostLoginRedirectURL is where the browser lands after
// internal/loginhandler sets a session cookie -- web's base URL in
// a real deployment.
PostLoginRedirectURL string
// SelectTenantRedirectURL is where the browser lands after a login
// resolves to more than one tenant_memberships row --
// internal/loginhandler issues a pending-login cookie and sends the
// browser here. web/src/routes/select-tenant is the page that serves
// it (see that route's own comments) -- it calls GET
// /auth/memberships and POST /auth/select-tenant with
// `credentials: 'include'`, which is why CORSAllowedOrigin below has
// to be a literal origin, not WithCORS's zero-config "*" default.
SelectTenantRedirectURL string
// CORSAllowedOrigin is passed to httpserver.WithCredentialedCORS, not
// the plain httpserver.WithCORS every other service in this repo
// uses -- GET /auth/memberships / POST /auth/select-tenant are
// cookie-carrying requests (the pending-login cookie, then the real
// session cookie), and browsers categorically refuse to combine a
// credentialed fetch with an Access-Control-Allow-Origin: "*"
// response, so this can't default to the wildcard the way
// api/internal/config.CORSAllowedOrigin does.
CORSAllowedOrigin string
}
// devOnlyCredential is docker-compose.yml's zero-config default for
// every Postgres/ClickHouse password in this repo -- see
// api/internal/config.Config.DevCredentialWarnings for the full
// reasoning (duplicated here per this repo's no-shared-code-between-
// services convention). enterprise-auth also has its own dev-only
// literal for ENTERPRISE_SESSION_SIGNING_KEY, checked alongside it below
// -- per the threat model doc, this is "the single highest-value secret
// in the enterprise deployment," since compromising it lets an attacker
// forge any identity, including the RoleService credential.
const (
devOnlyCredential = "sentry-dev-only"
devOnlySigningKey = "sentry-dev-only-session-signing-key-32bytes+"
)
// DevCredentialWarnings reports which configured secrets still equal
// their literal dev-only defaults -- cmd/enterprise-*/main.go logs each
// one loudly at startup. A warning, not a startup-refusing error: local
// dev's zero-config docker-compose.yml path legitimately leaves these
// at their default values.
func (c Config) DevCredentialWarnings() []string {
var warnings []string
if c.Postgres.Password == devOnlyCredential {
warnings = append(warnings, "POSTGRES_PASSWORD is still the default dev-only value -- set a real password before this is reachable outside local dev")
}
if string(c.SessionSigningKey) == devOnlySigningKey {
warnings = append(warnings, "ENTERPRISE_SESSION_SIGNING_KEY is still the default dev-only value -- this is the single highest-value secret in an enterprise deployment (compromise lets an attacker forge any identity); set a real, random one before this is reachable outside local dev")
}
return warnings
}
type PostgresConfig struct {
Addr string
Database string
Username string
Password string
}
// OIDCConfig is optional -- a deployment might configure OIDC, SAML,
// both, or (during early rollout) neither yet. Load() doesn't fail if
// these are unset; internal/oidc.New is only called once IssuerURL is
// actually present.
type OIDCConfig struct {
IssuerURL string
ClientID string
ClientSecret string
RedirectURL string
}
// SAMLConfig is likewise optional. cmd/enterprise-auth/main.go fetches
// and parses IDPMetadataURL into the *saml.EntityDescriptor
// internal/saml.New requires at startup (crewjam/saml's
// samlsp.FetchMetadata) -- this struct just carries the raw config
// values this package's job (env-var loading) is scoped to.
type SAMLConfig struct {
EntityID string
ACSURL string
IDPMetadataURL string
}
func Load() (Config, error) {
cfg := Config{
HTTPListenAddr: getenv("HTTP_LISTEN_ADDR", ":8082"),
Postgres: PostgresConfig{
Addr: getenv("POSTGRES_ADDR", "localhost:5432"),
Database: getenv("POSTGRES_DATABASE", "sentry_metadata"),
Username: getenv("POSTGRES_USERNAME", "sentry"),
Password: getenv("POSTGRES_PASSWORD", ""),
},
OIDC: OIDCConfig{
IssuerURL: getenv("OIDC_ISSUER_URL", ""),
ClientID: getenv("OIDC_CLIENT_ID", ""),
ClientSecret: getenv("OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET", ""),
RedirectURL: getenv("OIDC_REDIRECT_URL", ""),
},
SAML: SAMLConfig{
EntityID: getenv("SAML_ENTITY_ID", ""),
ACSURL: getenv("SAML_ACS_URL", ""),
IDPMetadataURL: getenv("SAML_IDP_METADATA_URL", ""),
},
PostLoginRedirectURL: getenv("POST_LOGIN_REDIRECT_URL", "http://localhost:3000"),
}
// Defaults relative to PostLoginRedirectURL if not set explicitly --
// computed after cfg.PostLoginRedirectURL above so a caller
// overriding just POST_LOGIN_REDIRECT_URL still gets a sensible
// SelectTenantRedirectURL without also having to set the new
// variable. CORSAllowedOrigin defaults the same way: web's own
// origin is exactly what needs credentialed cross-origin access to
// this service.
cfg.SelectTenantRedirectURL = getenv("SELECT_TENANT_REDIRECT_URL", cfg.PostLoginRedirectURL+"/select-tenant")
cfg.CORSAllowedOrigin = getenv("CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGIN", cfg.PostLoginRedirectURL)
// Required, unlike OIDC/SAML above: every enterprise-auth deployment
// issues and validates session/service tokens (internal/session),
// even one that hasn't configured any IdP yet. 32 bytes matches
// internal/session.MinSigningKeyBytes -- not imported here to avoid
// a config->session dependency for one constant, but the two values
// must be kept in sync.
signingKey := getenv("ENTERPRISE_SESSION_SIGNING_KEY", "")
if len(signingKey) < 32 {
return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("ENTERPRISE_SESSION_SIGNING_KEY must be set to at least 32 bytes (got %d)", len(signingKey))
}
cfg.SessionSigningKey = []byte(signingKey)
return cfg, nil
}
func getenv(key, fallback string) string {
if v := os.Getenv(key); v != "" {
return v
}
return fallback
}