This is a large squashed commit covering two batches of prior uncommitted work plus a full security-audit remediation pass, kept together because go.mod/go.sum and several shared files (main.go, handler.go) were touched by both and splitting risked non-building intermediate commits. Features (built earlier, previously uncommitted): - Local username/password login for single-tenant deployments with no SSO configured (api/localauth, alerting/internal/sessioncheck, sentryctl users, web/src/routes/login, metadata migrations 0040/0041). - Remotely-editable additional log file paths for agents, on top of their existing primary source (api/agents, agent/sentry-agent extra-file-path diffing, web agent config UI). - IPv4/IPv6 addresses reported alongside other host system metrics. Security audit remediation (this pass, all live-verified in production): - Critical: block ClickHouse SSRF table functions (url/remote/file/s3/...) in the raw-SQL query escape hatch. - High: deny sensitive paths and require Admin to add agent extra_file_paths (Editor could previously point an agent at /etc/shadow or an SSH key); alerting webhook targets now validate against internal/metadata/loopback addresses, both at creation and send time; alerting's session middleware now enforces an Editor+ floor on mutating requests instead of "any authenticated session"; bumped goxmldsig to close a SAML signature-verification bypass (GO-2026-4753). - Medium: per-IP login rate limiting; security response headers (HSTS/CSP/nosniff/X-Frame-Options/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy) on web/nginx.conf; a DevCredentialWarnings check in every Go service's config loader, logging loudly at startup if a deployment is still on docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only credentials; dependency bumps (golang.org/x/text, grpc, x/net, quick-xml, h2) across every affected Go module and both Rust crates, including a previously-uncovered x/net vulnerability in deploy/operator; a new security-scan.yml CI workflow running cargo-deny/govulncheck/npm-audit, mirroring the existing license-compliance.yml matrix shape. - Low: removed sentryctl's plaintext --password flag (shell history/`ps` exposure) in favor of stdin and a --password-stdin flag for reset-password's optional specific-password path; a dummy bcrypt comparison closes a login response-time username-enumeration side-channel.
152 lines
6.2 KiB
Go
152 lines
6.2 KiB
Go
// Package config loads enterprise-auth's configuration from environment
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// variables, same convention as every other Go service in this repo.
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package config
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import (
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"fmt"
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"os"
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)
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type Config struct {
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HTTPListenAddr string
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Postgres PostgresConfig
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OIDC OIDCConfig
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SAML SAMLConfig
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SessionSigningKey []byte
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// PostLoginRedirectURL is where the browser lands after
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// internal/loginhandler sets a session cookie -- web's base URL in
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// a real deployment.
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PostLoginRedirectURL string
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// SelectTenantRedirectURL is where the browser lands after a login
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// resolves to more than one tenant_memberships row --
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// internal/loginhandler issues a pending-login cookie and sends the
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// browser here. web/src/routes/select-tenant is the page that serves
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// it (see that route's own comments) -- it calls GET
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// /auth/memberships and POST /auth/select-tenant with
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// `credentials: 'include'`, which is why CORSAllowedOrigin below has
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// to be a literal origin, not WithCORS's zero-config "*" default.
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SelectTenantRedirectURL string
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// CORSAllowedOrigin is passed to httpserver.WithCredentialedCORS, not
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// the plain httpserver.WithCORS every other service in this repo
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// uses -- GET /auth/memberships / POST /auth/select-tenant are
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// cookie-carrying requests (the pending-login cookie, then the real
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// session cookie), and browsers categorically refuse to combine a
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// credentialed fetch with an Access-Control-Allow-Origin: "*"
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// response, so this can't default to the wildcard the way
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// api/internal/config.CORSAllowedOrigin does.
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CORSAllowedOrigin string
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}
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// devOnlyCredential is docker-compose.yml's zero-config default for
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// every Postgres/ClickHouse password in this repo -- see
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// api/internal/config.Config.DevCredentialWarnings for the full
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// reasoning (duplicated here per this repo's no-shared-code-between-
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// services convention). enterprise-auth also has its own dev-only
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// literal for ENTERPRISE_SESSION_SIGNING_KEY, checked alongside it below
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// -- per the threat model doc, this is "the single highest-value secret
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// in the enterprise deployment," since compromising it lets an attacker
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// forge any identity, including the RoleService credential.
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const (
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devOnlyCredential = "sentry-dev-only"
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devOnlySigningKey = "sentry-dev-only-session-signing-key-32bytes+"
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)
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// DevCredentialWarnings reports which configured secrets still equal
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// their literal dev-only defaults -- cmd/enterprise-*/main.go logs each
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// one loudly at startup. A warning, not a startup-refusing error: local
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// dev's zero-config docker-compose.yml path legitimately leaves these
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// at their default values.
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func (c Config) DevCredentialWarnings() []string {
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var warnings []string
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if c.Postgres.Password == devOnlyCredential {
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warnings = append(warnings, "POSTGRES_PASSWORD is still the default dev-only value -- set a real password before this is reachable outside local dev")
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}
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if string(c.SessionSigningKey) == devOnlySigningKey {
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warnings = append(warnings, "ENTERPRISE_SESSION_SIGNING_KEY is still the default dev-only value -- this is the single highest-value secret in an enterprise deployment (compromise lets an attacker forge any identity); set a real, random one before this is reachable outside local dev")
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}
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return warnings
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}
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type PostgresConfig struct {
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Addr string
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Database string
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Username string
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Password string
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}
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// OIDCConfig is optional -- a deployment might configure OIDC, SAML,
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// both, or (during early rollout) neither yet. Load() doesn't fail if
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// these are unset; internal/oidc.New is only called once IssuerURL is
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// actually present.
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type OIDCConfig struct {
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IssuerURL string
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ClientID string
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ClientSecret string
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RedirectURL string
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}
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// SAMLConfig is likewise optional. cmd/enterprise-auth/main.go fetches
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// and parses IDPMetadataURL into the *saml.EntityDescriptor
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// internal/saml.New requires at startup (crewjam/saml's
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// samlsp.FetchMetadata) -- this struct just carries the raw config
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// values this package's job (env-var loading) is scoped to.
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type SAMLConfig struct {
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EntityID string
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ACSURL string
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IDPMetadataURL string
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}
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func Load() (Config, error) {
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cfg := Config{
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HTTPListenAddr: getenv("HTTP_LISTEN_ADDR", ":8082"),
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Postgres: PostgresConfig{
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Addr: getenv("POSTGRES_ADDR", "localhost:5432"),
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Database: getenv("POSTGRES_DATABASE", "sentry_metadata"),
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Username: getenv("POSTGRES_USERNAME", "sentry"),
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Password: getenv("POSTGRES_PASSWORD", ""),
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},
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OIDC: OIDCConfig{
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IssuerURL: getenv("OIDC_ISSUER_URL", ""),
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ClientID: getenv("OIDC_CLIENT_ID", ""),
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ClientSecret: getenv("OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET", ""),
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RedirectURL: getenv("OIDC_REDIRECT_URL", ""),
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},
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SAML: SAMLConfig{
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EntityID: getenv("SAML_ENTITY_ID", ""),
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ACSURL: getenv("SAML_ACS_URL", ""),
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IDPMetadataURL: getenv("SAML_IDP_METADATA_URL", ""),
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},
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PostLoginRedirectURL: getenv("POST_LOGIN_REDIRECT_URL", "http://localhost:3000"),
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}
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// Defaults relative to PostLoginRedirectURL if not set explicitly --
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// computed after cfg.PostLoginRedirectURL above so a caller
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// overriding just POST_LOGIN_REDIRECT_URL still gets a sensible
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// SelectTenantRedirectURL without also having to set the new
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// variable. CORSAllowedOrigin defaults the same way: web's own
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// origin is exactly what needs credentialed cross-origin access to
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// this service.
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cfg.SelectTenantRedirectURL = getenv("SELECT_TENANT_REDIRECT_URL", cfg.PostLoginRedirectURL+"/select-tenant")
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cfg.CORSAllowedOrigin = getenv("CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGIN", cfg.PostLoginRedirectURL)
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// Required, unlike OIDC/SAML above: every enterprise-auth deployment
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// issues and validates session/service tokens (internal/session),
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// even one that hasn't configured any IdP yet. 32 bytes matches
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// internal/session.MinSigningKeyBytes -- not imported here to avoid
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// a config->session dependency for one constant, but the two values
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// must be kept in sync.
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signingKey := getenv("ENTERPRISE_SESSION_SIGNING_KEY", "")
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if len(signingKey) < 32 {
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return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("ENTERPRISE_SESSION_SIGNING_KEY must be set to at least 32 bytes (got %d)", len(signingKey))
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}
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cfg.SessionSigningKey = []byte(signingKey)
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return cfg, nil
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}
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func getenv(key, fallback string) string {
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if v := os.Getenv(key); v != "" {
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return v
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}
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return fallback
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}
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