Files
cairnobs/enterprise/internal/chrunner/chrunner.go
T
jcoffey-dev 1d57e697b1 Phase 4: real per-tenant ClickHouse isolation via a new enterprise-api binary
Closes the threat model's headline finding for the SQL query path:
enterprise/internal/tenantprovision does real CREATE DATABASE/USER/GRANT
against ClickHouse, and enterprise/internal/chrunner is a per-tenant
connection registry implementing api's SQLRunner interface, resolving
the tenant from the authenticated request identity -- never a
caller-suppliable parameter. Both are wired into a new binary,
enterprise/cmd/enterprise-api, alongside the unchanged single-tenant
api/cmd/api, since AGPL core can never import enterprise/ and Go's own
internal/ package visibility rules meant enterprise/ couldn't implement
core's SQLRunner interface without importing the package that defines
it. That required moving api/internal/{authz,queryapi,dashboards,
querylang/executor,searchclient,httpserver} out of internal/ -- the
minimal set enterprise-api needs to import; querylang's compiler
internals (planner/lexer/parser/ast/ir) and api's own config stay
internal, since nothing outside api needs them directly.

Also finally wires enterprise/internal/audit into queryapi.AuditLogger
(nil since Phase 4 task 4) via a new adapter, and adds live-ClickHouse
integration tests for two of the four adversarial probes named in
docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md's verification plan.

Corrected several overclaims in the docs while writing this up: an
earlier claim that rbacstore's CRUD was "verified against a live
Postgres" was never actually true in this environment (only
internal/audit was, earlier in this phase, before Docker access was
lost) -- threat-model.md, phase-4-runbook.md, CLAUDE.md, and
enterprise/README.md all now distinguish "a real integration test
exists" from "this was confirmed against a live database."

Still not built: Tantivy/free-text tenant isolation
(enterprise/internal/searchclient), and any deployment-topology
mechanism that actually routes traffic to enterprise-api instead of
plain api -- both binaries exist side by side today with nothing
enforcing or flagging which one a deployment runs.
2026-08-13 22:48:38 -07:00

122 lines
5.1 KiB
Go

// Package chrunner is the tenant-scoped implementation of api's
// querylang/executor.SQLRunner interface -- the piece
// /docs/security/threat-model.md's headline finding says was missing:
// until this package, api/cmd/api/main.go opened exactly one shared
// ClickHouse connection for every tenant, no matter how many
// tenant_memberships/Tenant CRs existed. This package requires
// importing api/querylang/executor and api/authz directly (see
// enterprise/go.mod's replace directive) -- implementing
// executor.SQLRunner structurally requires it (its RunSQL method
// returns *executor.Result, a type only that package defines), and
// that's the allowed import direction: enterprise -> api, never the
// reverse (hack/check-tenant-boundary.sh enforces that direction only).
//
// Design, per /docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md's ClickHouse section:
// Registry holds one fully separate *executor.ChRunner (and the
// driver.Conn under it) per tenant, built once at construction from an
// immutable map -- never a shared pool with session-level `USE`, which
// is a classic concurrency bug (a connection recycled between tenants
// mid-flight can interleave one tenant's session state into another's
// query). RunSQL resolves which tenant's runner to use from the
// request's authz.Identity (attached to ctx by
// api/authz.RequireRole/RequireRoleOrService), never from any
// caller-suppliable parameter -- there is no code path in this package
// that accepts a tenant ID as an argument to a query-executing method.
package chrunner
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"github.com/ClickHouse/clickhouse-go/v2"
"github.com/sentry/sentry/api/authz"
"github.com/sentry/sentry/api/querylang/executor"
)
// DataSource is the minimal shape Registry needs to open one tenant's
// connection -- deliberately not enterprise/internal/rbacstore.DataSource
// itself, so this package doesn't need to import rbacstore just to
// describe "an address and a credential." Callers (enterprise-api's
// main.go) adapt rbacstore rows into this.
type DataSource struct {
TenantID string
Database string
Username string
Password string
}
// Registry implements executor.SQLRunner by routing each call to the
// caller's tenant-specific connection. Immutable after New returns --
// see this file's doc comment on why that's load-bearing, not just a
// style choice.
type Registry struct {
runners map[string]*executor.ChRunner
closers []func()
}
// New opens one real ClickHouse connection per DataSource (same native
// address for all of them -- tenants sharing a physical ClickHouse
// server today, per-tenant *pinning* to dedicated cluster nodes is
// named as later, non-schema-changing work in
// /docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md, not something this constructor
// does). Fails closed: if any one tenant's connection can't be opened
// or doesn't ping successfully, the whole Registry fails to construct
// rather than silently running with a partial tenant set -- a tenant
// missing from the map is a clear, loud "unknown tenant" error at query
// time (see RunSQL), not a connection nobody noticed never came up.
func New(ctx context.Context, addr string, sources []DataSource) (*Registry, error) {
reg := &Registry{runners: make(map[string]*executor.ChRunner, len(sources))}
for _, src := range sources {
conn, err := clickhouse.Open(&clickhouse.Options{
Addr: []string{addr},
Auth: clickhouse.Auth{
Database: src.Database,
Username: src.Username,
Password: src.Password,
},
})
if err != nil {
reg.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("chrunner: opening connection for tenant %q: %w", src.TenantID, err)
}
if err := conn.Ping(ctx); err != nil {
_ = conn.Close()
reg.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("chrunner: pinging connection for tenant %q: %w", src.TenantID, err)
}
reg.runners[src.TenantID] = executor.NewChRunner(conn)
reg.closers = append(reg.closers, func() { _ = conn.Close() })
}
return reg, nil
}
// Close releases every underlying connection -- call once at process
// shutdown, same lifecycle as the single conn.Close() api/cmd/api/main.go
// defers today, just fanned out over N connections.
func (r *Registry) Close() {
for _, c := range r.closers {
c()
}
}
// RunSQL implements executor.SQLRunner. Resolves the caller's tenant
// from ctx (never a parameter -- see this file's doc comment) and fails
// closed on every ambiguous case: no identity, an identity with no
// tenant (RoleService, or a misconfigured authorizer), or a tenant with
// no provisioned connection all return an error, never a fallback to
// some other tenant's connection or an arbitrarily-chosen default.
func (r *Registry) RunSQL(ctx context.Context, sql string) (*executor.Result, error) {
identity, ok := authz.IdentityFromContext(ctx)
if !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("chrunner: no authenticated identity in context, refusing to run query")
}
if identity.TenantID == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("chrunner: authenticated identity %q has no tenant, refusing to run query", identity.Role)
}
runner, ok := r.runners[identity.TenantID]
if !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("chrunner: tenant %q has no provisioned ClickHouse connection", identity.TenantID)
}
return runner.RunSQL(ctx, sql)
}