This is a large squashed commit covering two batches of prior uncommitted work plus a full security-audit remediation pass, kept together because go.mod/go.sum and several shared files (main.go, handler.go) were touched by both and splitting risked non-building intermediate commits. Features (built earlier, previously uncommitted): - Local username/password login for single-tenant deployments with no SSO configured (api/localauth, alerting/internal/sessioncheck, sentryctl users, web/src/routes/login, metadata migrations 0040/0041). - Remotely-editable additional log file paths for agents, on top of their existing primary source (api/agents, agent/sentry-agent extra-file-path diffing, web agent config UI). - IPv4/IPv6 addresses reported alongside other host system metrics. Security audit remediation (this pass, all live-verified in production): - Critical: block ClickHouse SSRF table functions (url/remote/file/s3/...) in the raw-SQL query escape hatch. - High: deny sensitive paths and require Admin to add agent extra_file_paths (Editor could previously point an agent at /etc/shadow or an SSH key); alerting webhook targets now validate against internal/metadata/loopback addresses, both at creation and send time; alerting's session middleware now enforces an Editor+ floor on mutating requests instead of "any authenticated session"; bumped goxmldsig to close a SAML signature-verification bypass (GO-2026-4753). - Medium: per-IP login rate limiting; security response headers (HSTS/CSP/nosniff/X-Frame-Options/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy) on web/nginx.conf; a DevCredentialWarnings check in every Go service's config loader, logging loudly at startup if a deployment is still on docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only credentials; dependency bumps (golang.org/x/text, grpc, x/net, quick-xml, h2) across every affected Go module and both Rust crates, including a previously-uncovered x/net vulnerability in deploy/operator; a new security-scan.yml CI workflow running cargo-deny/govulncheck/npm-audit, mirroring the existing license-compliance.yml matrix shape. - Low: removed sentryctl's plaintext --password flag (shell history/`ps` exposure) in favor of stdin and a --password-stdin flag for reset-password's optional specific-password path; a dummy bcrypt comparison closes a login response-time username-enumeration side-channel.
365 lines
14 KiB
Go
365 lines
14 KiB
Go
// Command enterprise-api is the multi-tenant-aware alternative to
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// api/cmd/api -- same POST /query and /dashboards surface (it reuses
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// api/queryapi and api/dashboards's actual Handler types unchanged), but
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// backed by a per-tenant ClickHouse connection registry
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// (enterprise/internal/chrunner), a per-tenant Tantivy search client
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// (enterprise/internal/searchclient), and a real audit logger
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// (enterprise/internal/audit.QueryAPILogger) instead of the single
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// shared connections and nil audit logger api/cmd/api's binary carries.
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//
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// Why a second binary, not a flag on api/cmd/api: api is AGPL core and
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// must never import enterprise/ (hack/check-tenant-boundary.sh enforces
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// this) -- there is no way for api's own binary to construct an
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// enterprise-supplied chrunner.Registry or audit.Store without that
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// import. enterprise/ importing api/ is the allowed direction, so this
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// binary lives here instead, wiring core's handler types together with
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// enterprise's tenant-aware implementations. A single-tenant deployment
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// keeps running plain api/cmd/api, unchanged; a real multi-tenant
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// deployment runs this one instead.
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//
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// Both Helm (deploy/helm/sentry/templates/api.yaml vs
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// enterprise-api.yaml) and docker-compose.yml (COMPOSE_PROFILES) now
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// make this the deployment-topology choice, not just a binary sitting
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// unused alongside api's -- see this repo's CLAUDE.md. `search`'s write
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// side (ingest, and by extension the Redpanda consumer search itself
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// runs) is still not tenant-aware -- see enterprise/internal/searchclient
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// and search/src/registry.rs's doc comments, and
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// /docs/security/threat-model.md.
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package main
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import (
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"context"
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"flag"
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"fmt"
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"log/slog"
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"net/http"
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"os"
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"os/signal"
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"strings"
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"syscall"
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"time"
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chdriver "github.com/ClickHouse/clickhouse-go/v2"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
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"github.com/sentry/sentry/api/agents"
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"github.com/sentry/sentry/api/ai/aiapi"
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"github.com/sentry/sentry/api/ai/provider/ollama"
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"github.com/sentry/sentry/api/ai/router"
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"github.com/sentry/sentry/api/authz"
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"github.com/sentry/sentry/api/dashboards"
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"github.com/sentry/sentry/api/httpserver"
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"github.com/sentry/sentry/api/queryapi"
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"github.com/sentry/sentry/enterprise/internal/apiconfig"
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"github.com/sentry/sentry/enterprise/internal/audit"
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"github.com/sentry/sentry/enterprise/internal/chrunner"
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"github.com/sentry/sentry/enterprise/internal/groundingregistry"
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"github.com/sentry/sentry/enterprise/internal/rbacstore"
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"github.com/sentry/sentry/enterprise/internal/searchclient"
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"github.com/sentry/sentry/enterprise/internal/tenantcrd"
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"github.com/sentry/sentry/enterprise/internal/tenantprovision"
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)
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// groundingRefreshInterval matches api/cmd/api's own constant of the
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// same name and reasoning -- see that file's doc comment.
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const groundingRefreshInterval = time.Minute
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func main() {
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logger := slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(os.Stdout, nil))
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cfg, err := apiconfig.Load()
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if err != nil {
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logger.Error("loading config", "error", err)
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os.Exit(1)
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}
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for _, w := range cfg.DevCredentialWarnings() {
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logger.Warn(w)
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}
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if len(os.Args) > 1 && os.Args[1] == "-healthcheck" {
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os.Exit(runHealthcheck(cfg.HTTPListenAddr))
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}
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provisionTenant := flag.String("provision-tenant", "", "provision ClickHouse for the named tenant id (creating it in rbacstore if needed) and exit")
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provisionDisplayName := flag.String("display-name", "", "display name for -provision-tenant, if the tenant doesn't already exist in rbacstore")
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flag.Parse()
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ctx, stop := signal.NotifyContext(context.Background(), syscall.SIGINT, syscall.SIGTERM)
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defer stop()
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pgDSN := fmt.Sprintf("postgres://%s:%s@%s/%s", cfg.Postgres.Username, cfg.Postgres.Password, cfg.Postgres.Addr, cfg.Postgres.Database)
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pgPool, err := pgxpool.New(ctx, pgDSN)
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if err != nil {
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logger.Error("opening postgres pool", "error", err)
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os.Exit(1)
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}
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defer pgPool.Close()
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if err := pgPool.Ping(ctx); err != nil {
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logger.Error("pinging postgres", "error", err)
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os.Exit(1)
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}
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rbac := rbacstore.NewStore(pgPool)
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if *provisionTenant != "" {
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os.Exit(runProvisionTenant(ctx, logger, cfg, rbac, *provisionTenant, *provisionDisplayName))
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}
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adminConn, err := chdriver.Open(&chdriver.Options{
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Addr: []string{cfg.ClickHouseAddr},
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Auth: chdriver.Auth{Database: "default", Username: cfg.ClickHouseAdmin.Username, Password: cfg.ClickHouseAdmin.Password},
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})
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if err != nil {
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logger.Error("opening clickhouse admin connection", "error", err)
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os.Exit(1)
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}
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defer adminConn.Close()
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sources, err := rbac.ListProvisionedDataSources(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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logger.Error("listing provisioned data sources", "error", err)
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os.Exit(1)
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}
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chrunnerSources := make([]chrunner.DataSource, 0, len(sources))
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for _, s := range sources {
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if s.ClickHouseUsername == nil || s.ClickHousePassword == nil {
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continue // ListProvisionedDataSources already filters these out; defensive only.
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}
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chrunnerSources = append(chrunnerSources, chrunner.DataSource{
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TenantID: s.TenantID, Database: s.ClickHouseDatabaseName,
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Username: *s.ClickHouseUsername, Password: *s.ClickHousePassword,
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})
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}
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logger.Info("loaded tenant data sources", "count", len(chrunnerSources))
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registry, err := chrunner.New(ctx, cfg.ClickHouseAddr, chrunnerSources)
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if err != nil {
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logger.Error("building tenant connection registry", "error", err)
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os.Exit(1)
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}
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defer registry.Close()
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search, err := searchclient.Dial(cfg.SearchGRPCAddr, rbac)
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if err != nil {
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logger.Error("dialing search service", "error", err)
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os.Exit(1)
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}
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defer search.Close()
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var authorizer authz.Authorizer
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if cfg.EnterpriseAuthURL != "" {
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authorizer = authz.NewHTTPAuthorizer(cfg.EnterpriseAuthURL)
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} else {
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logger.Warn("ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL is not set -- RBAC enforcement is a no-op, but tenant query routing still requires a resolved identity, so every /query request will be refused (see chrunner.Registry.RunSQL)")
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}
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auditWriterDSN := fmt.Sprintf("postgres://%s:%s@%s/%s", cfg.AuditWriter.Username, cfg.AuditWriter.Password, cfg.Postgres.Addr, cfg.Postgres.Database)
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auditPool, err := pgxpool.New(ctx, auditWriterDSN)
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if err != nil {
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logger.Error("opening audit_writer postgres pool", "error", err)
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os.Exit(1)
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}
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defer auditPool.Close()
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if err := auditPool.Ping(ctx); err != nil {
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logger.Error("pinging audit_writer postgres pool", "error", err)
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os.Exit(1)
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}
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auditLogger := audit.NewQueryAPILogger(audit.NewStore(auditPool), audit.SourceAPI)
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queryHandler := queryapi.NewHandler(logger, registry, search, cfg.QueryTimeout, auditLogger, authorizer)
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dashboardsHandler := dashboards.NewHandler(logger, dashboards.NewStore(pgPool), authorizer, rbacstore.NewDashboardPermissions(rbac))
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// Reuses the same audit_writer-role pool/store auditLogger above
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// writes through -- same append-only audit_log table, new
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// event_type (see metadata/migrations/0039).
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commandLogger := audit.NewAgentCommandLogger(audit.NewStore(auditPool), audit.SourceAPI)
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agentsHandler := agents.NewHandler(logger, agents.NewStore(pgPool), authorizer, commandLogger)
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mux := http.NewServeMux()
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queryHandler.RegisterRoutes(mux) // also registers GET /healthz
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dashboardsHandler.RegisterRoutes(mux)
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agentsHandler.RegisterRoutes(mux)
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// Same "off unless OLLAMA_BASE_URL is set" gate as api/cmd/api --
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// see that file's doc comment.
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if cfg.AI.OllamaBaseURL != "" {
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groundingReg := groundingregistry.New(registry)
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groundingReg.StartRefreshing(ctx, rbac.ListActiveTenantIDs, groundingRefreshInterval, logger)
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defaultProvider := ollama.New(cfg.AI.OllamaBaseURL, cfg.AI.OllamaModel)
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aiRouter := router.New(defaultProvider)
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if cfg.AI.OllamaFastModel != "" && cfg.AI.OllamaFastModel != cfg.AI.OllamaModel {
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aiRouter.SetOperation(router.OpComplete, ollama.New(cfg.AI.OllamaBaseURL, cfg.AI.OllamaFastModel))
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}
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// Reuses the same audit_writer-role pool/store auditLogger above
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// writes through -- same append-only audit_log table, new
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// event_type (see metadata/migrations/0036).
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interactionLogger := audit.NewAIInteractionLogger(audit.NewStore(auditPool), audit.SourceAPI)
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aiHandler := aiapi.NewHandler(logger, aiRouter, groundingReg, authorizer, interactionLogger)
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aiHandler.RegisterRoutes(mux)
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logger.Info("ai routes enabled", "ollama_base_url", cfg.AI.OllamaBaseURL, "model", cfg.AI.OllamaModel)
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}
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srv := &http.Server{
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Addr: cfg.HTTPListenAddr,
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Handler: httpserver.WithCORS(mux, cfg.CORSAllowedOrigin),
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}
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errCh := make(chan error, 1)
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go func() {
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logger.Info("enterprise-api listening", "addr", cfg.HTTPListenAddr)
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errCh <- srv.ListenAndServe()
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}()
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select {
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case <-ctx.Done():
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shutdownCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
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defer cancel()
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if err := srv.Shutdown(shutdownCtx); err != nil {
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logger.Error("graceful shutdown failed", "error", err)
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}
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case err := <-errCh:
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if err != nil && err != http.ErrServerClosed {
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logger.Error("server exited with error", "error", err)
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os.Exit(1)
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}
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}
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}
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// runProvisionTenant is the operator action that actually closes
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// /docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md's ordered provisioning gate: ensure
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// the tenant row exists, ensure a data_sources row exists, provision
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// ClickHouse (CREATE USER -> GRANT), persist the returned credentials,
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// and only then mark the tenant active. Same "offline operator action,
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// not a network-reachable endpoint" shape as enterprise-auth's
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// -mint-service-token.
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//
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// If cfg.TenantCRDNamespace is set, this also syncs the real result into
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// the Tenant CRD (enterprise/internal/tenantcrd) -- the "lightweight
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// unification" of this mechanism with deploy/operator's Tenant CRD (see
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// that package's doc comment). An already-active tenant no longer
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// refuses outright: ClickHouse (re-)provisioning is still refused (that
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// part is unchanged -- rotating a live credential would break every
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// open connection for no benefit), but CR sync alone is safe to retry
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// using the credentials already on file in rbacstore, which matters if
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// a previous run's CR sync failed (or TENANT_CRD_NAMESPACE is being
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// turned on for a tenant provisioned before this feature existed) and
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// needs to be retried without touching ClickHouse again.
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func runProvisionTenant(ctx context.Context, logger *slog.Logger, cfg apiconfig.Config, rbac *rbacstore.Store, tenantID, displayName string) int {
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adminConn, err := chdriver.Open(&chdriver.Options{
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Addr: []string{cfg.ClickHouseAddr},
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Auth: chdriver.Auth{Database: "default", Username: cfg.ClickHouseAdmin.Username, Password: cfg.ClickHouseAdmin.Password},
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})
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if err != nil {
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logger.Error("opening clickhouse admin connection", "error", err)
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return 1
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}
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defer adminConn.Close()
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tenant, err := rbac.GetTenant(ctx, tenantID)
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if err != nil {
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if err != rbacstore.ErrNotFound {
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logger.Error("getting tenant", "error", err)
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return 1
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}
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name := displayName
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if name == "" {
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name = tenantID
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}
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tenant, err = rbac.CreateTenant(ctx, tenantID, name)
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if err != nil {
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logger.Error("creating tenant", "error", err)
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return 1
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}
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logger.Info("created tenant row", "tenant_id", tenantID)
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}
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alreadyActive := tenant.Status == "active"
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if alreadyActive {
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logger.Info("tenant is already active -- skipping ClickHouse (re-)provisioning, will still sync the Tenant CRD if TENANT_CRD_NAMESPACE is set", "tenant_id", tenantID)
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}
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dataSource, err := rbac.GetDataSourceForTenant(ctx, tenantID)
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if err != nil {
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if err != rbacstore.ErrNotFound {
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logger.Error("getting data source", "error", err)
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return 1
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}
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if alreadyActive {
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// An active tenant with no data_sources row at all is
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// inconsistent state runProvisionTenant's own gate should
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// never have allowed -- fail loudly rather than silently
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// provisioning ClickHouse for a tenant already marked
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// active, which SetDataSourceClickHouseCredentials's own
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// doc comment says must never happen twice.
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logger.Error("tenant is active but has no data source row -- inconsistent state, refusing", "tenant_id", tenantID)
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return 1
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}
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dataSource, err = rbac.CreateDataSource(ctx, tenantID, "default", tenantID, "/var/lib/sentry-search/tenants/"+tenantID)
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if err != nil {
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logger.Error("creating data source", "error", err)
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return 1
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}
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}
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var creds tenantprovision.Credentials
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if alreadyActive {
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if dataSource.ClickHouseUsername == nil || dataSource.ClickHousePassword == nil {
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logger.Error("tenant is active but its data source has no ClickHouse credentials -- inconsistent state, refusing", "tenant_id", tenantID)
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return 1
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}
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creds = tenantprovision.Credentials{Username: *dataSource.ClickHouseUsername, Password: *dataSource.ClickHousePassword}
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} else {
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if dataSource.ClickHouseUsername != nil {
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logger.Error("data source already has ClickHouse credentials -- refusing to re-provision", "tenant_id", tenantID)
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return 1
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}
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creds, err = tenantprovision.New(adminConn).ProvisionClickHouse(ctx, tenantID)
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if err != nil {
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logger.Error("provisioning clickhouse", "error", err)
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return 1
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}
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if err := rbac.SetDataSourceClickHouseCredentials(ctx, dataSource.ID, creds.Username, creds.Password); err != nil {
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logger.Error("persisting clickhouse credentials", "error", err)
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return 1
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}
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if err := rbac.SetTenantStatus(ctx, tenantID, "active"); err != nil {
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logger.Error("activating tenant", "error", err)
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return 1
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}
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logger.Info("tenant provisioned and active", "tenant_id", tenantID, "clickhouse_database", tenantID, "clickhouse_username", creds.Username)
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}
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if cfg.TenantCRDNamespace != "" {
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syncer, err := tenantcrd.New(cfg.TenantCRDNamespace)
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if err != nil {
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logger.Error("building tenant CRD syncer", "error", err)
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return 1
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}
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if err := syncer.Sync(ctx, tenantID, tenant.DisplayName, dataSource.TantivyIndexPath, tenantcrd.Credentials{Username: creds.Username, Password: creds.Password}); err != nil {
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logger.Error("syncing tenant CRD", "error", err)
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return 1
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}
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logger.Info("synced tenant CRD", "tenant_id", tenantID, "namespace", cfg.TenantCRDNamespace)
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}
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return 0
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}
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func runHealthcheck(listenAddr string) int {
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addr := listenAddr
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if strings.HasPrefix(addr, ":") {
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addr = "localhost" + addr
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}
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client := http.Client{Timeout: 3 * time.Second}
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resp, err := client.Get("http://" + addr + "/healthz")
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if err != nil {
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return 1
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}
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
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return 1
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}
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return 0
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}
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