jcoffey-dev
4b5dae5879
This is a large squashed commit covering two batches of prior uncommitted work plus a full security-audit remediation pass, kept together because go.mod/go.sum and several shared files (main.go, handler.go) were touched by both and splitting risked non-building intermediate commits. Features (built earlier, previously uncommitted): - Local username/password login for single-tenant deployments with no SSO configured (api/localauth, alerting/internal/sessioncheck, sentryctl users, web/src/routes/login, metadata migrations 0040/0041). - Remotely-editable additional log file paths for agents, on top of their existing primary source (api/agents, agent/sentry-agent extra-file-path diffing, web agent config UI). - IPv4/IPv6 addresses reported alongside other host system metrics. Security audit remediation (this pass, all live-verified in production): - Critical: block ClickHouse SSRF table functions (url/remote/file/s3/...) in the raw-SQL query escape hatch. - High: deny sensitive paths and require Admin to add agent extra_file_paths (Editor could previously point an agent at /etc/shadow or an SSH key); alerting webhook targets now validate against internal/metadata/loopback addresses, both at creation and send time; alerting's session middleware now enforces an Editor+ floor on mutating requests instead of "any authenticated session"; bumped goxmldsig to close a SAML signature-verification bypass (GO-2026-4753). - Medium: per-IP login rate limiting; security response headers (HSTS/CSP/nosniff/X-Frame-Options/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy) on web/nginx.conf; a DevCredentialWarnings check in every Go service's config loader, logging loudly at startup if a deployment is still on docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only credentials; dependency bumps (golang.org/x/text, grpc, x/net, quick-xml, h2) across every affected Go module and both Rust crates, including a previously-uncovered x/net vulnerability in deploy/operator; a new security-scan.yml CI workflow running cargo-deny/govulncheck/npm-audit, mirroring the existing license-compliance.yml matrix shape. - Low: removed sentryctl's plaintext --password flag (shell history/`ps` exposure) in favor of stdin and a --password-stdin flag for reset-password's optional specific-password path; a dummy bcrypt comparison closes a login response-time username-enumeration side-channel.
49 lines
2.2 KiB
Go
49 lines
2.2 KiB
Go
// Package httpserver holds cross-handler HTTP concerns for /alerting.
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// Deliberately duplicated from api/internal/httpserver rather than
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// shared -- see /docs/phase-3-alerting-design.md's component-boundary
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// note: no shared Go store/HTTP code between api and alerting, the same
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// repo convention that only /proto is shared code.
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package httpserver
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import "net/http"
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// WithCORS is deliberately permissive by default, same posture and
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// reasoning as api's: no auth yet, the SvelteKit dev server runs on a
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// different origin. Tighten alongside adding real auth.
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func WithCORS(next http.Handler, allowedOrigin string) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", allowedOrigin)
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Methods", "GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, OPTIONS")
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Headers", "Content-Type")
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if r.Method == http.MethodOptions {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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return
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}
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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// WithCredentialedCORS is WithCORS's sibling for local login (see
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// /docs -- deployment runbook): once alerting requires a session
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// cookie/bearer token (sessioncheck.RequireSession), a browser calling
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// it cross-origin must send credentials, and browsers categorically
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// refuse to combine a credentialed request with
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// Access-Control-Allow-Origin: "*" -- allowedOrigin must be a real,
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// literal origin, not the wildcard WithCORS's own zero-config default
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// relies on. Deliberately duplicated from api/httpserver's identical
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// function rather than shared, same convention as WithCORS's own doc
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// comment above.
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func WithCredentialedCORS(next http.Handler, allowedOrigin string) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", allowedOrigin)
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Credentials", "true")
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Methods", "GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, OPTIONS")
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Headers", "Content-Type")
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if r.Method == http.MethodOptions {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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return
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}
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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