RBAC (api/internal/authz) is live on /query and /dashboards, backed by a new enterprise/ module (session issuance, audit logging, RBAC storage, OIDC/SAML protocol wiring) that core never imports -- only calls over HTTP. Found and fixed a real cross-tenant vulnerability in dashboards (no tenant_id filtering at all) while writing the threat model doc. Two things are explicitly NOT done, documented rather than hidden: tenant isolation for log data itself (/query still shares one ClickHouse connection and Tantivy index across every tenant -- RBAC controls who can query, not what a query can see), and human SSO login (protocol wiring exists, no HTTP handler calls it yet). See docs/security/threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md. Also adds deploy/ (Go Operator + Helm chart, validated offline only -- no cluster was reachable in this environment).
metadata
PostgreSQL schema and migration tooling for Sentry's control-plane
config: dashboards, alert rules, and everything else that isn't log data.
See /docs/phase-3-dashboard-design.md and
/docs/phase-3-alerting-design.md for why this is a separate database
from /storage (ClickHouse) rather than new ClickHouse tables — short
version: dashboards and alert state need real row-level locking and
transactional read-modify-write, which ClickHouse's MergeTree family
doesn't provide.
Schema
Seven tables across three features, one shared database (sentry_metadata):
dashboards,dashboard_panels— owned by/api(api/internal/dashboards)notification_targets,alert_rules,alert_state,delivery_log— owned by/alertingaudit_log— owned byenterprise/internal/audit(Phase 4). Unlike every other table here, this one is not written through the sharedsentryrole/pool — see "Theaudit_writerrole" below.
"Owned" here is a documentation convention, not a technical boundary —
both services connect to the same Postgres instance/database, each with
its own hand-written SQL for the tables it's responsible for. Nothing is
shared across service internal/ trees for this, matching the existing
repo convention that only /proto is shared code (and even that isn't
shared logic, just generated bindings).
The audit_writer role: a second, more restricted credential
audit_log is append-only by design (see
/docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md's audit-logging section) — a
compliance requirement, not just a convention, so it's backed by two
independent defenses, both verified against a live Postgres, not just
written:
- A dedicated
audit_writerPostgres role (migrations/0012-0014) with onlyINSERT/SELECTgrants onaudit_log— noUPDATE/DELETE/TRUNCATE, ever.enterprise/internal/audit.Storeconnects using this role's credentials via its ownpgxpool.Pool, never the sharedsentrypoolapi/alerting's other stores use — reusing the shared pool for audit writes would give audit_log's application-level credential the sameUPDATE/DELETEgrants every other metadata table has, silently defeating the whole point. - A
BEFORE UPDATE OR DELETEtrigger (migrations/0015-0016) that rejects the operation for any role, including the table owner (sentry) — confirmed live: evensentryneeds to explicitlyALTER TABLE audit_log DISABLE TRIGGER audit_log_immutable(a privileged, distinct-from-normal-access operation) before it can modify a row. This is redundant defense-in-depth independent of the grant, protecting against a future migration accidentally re-grantingUPDATEtoaudit_writer.
AUDIT_WRITER_PASSWORD (default audit-writer-dev-only, matching every
other dev-only credential in this repo) sets the role's password at
creation time via psql -v audit_writer_password=... substitution in
migrate.sh — not hardcoded in the migration SQL file itself. One
real gotcha found while building this: psql's :'var' substitution does
not apply inside a DO $$ ... $$ dollar-quoted block (by design, so
client-side substitution can't corrupt a function/procedure body) — the
role-creation migration is a plain CREATE ROLE, not wrapped in an
IF NOT EXISTS check, relying on schema_migrations tracking for
idempotency instead (the same pattern Phase 1's non-idempotent
ALTER TABLE ... ADD COLUMN migration in /storage already used).
Migration tooling: mirrors /storage/migrate.sh, not a framework
Same reasoning as /storage/README.md: pulling in golang-migrate for
what's currently six CREATE TABLE statements is premature machinery.
migrate.sh applies migrations/*.sql in filename order over psql,
tracking what's applied in a schema_migrations table, one DDL object
per file (kept for repo-wide consistency of what a migration "version"
means, even though Postgres itself supports multi-statement transactions
unlike ClickHouse's HTTP interface).
Running
docker compose up -d # starts a standalone Postgres for local work
POSTGRES_PASSWORD=sentry-dev-only ./migrate.sh # applies migrations/*.sql
Environment variables migrate.sh reads (all optional except
POSTGRES_PASSWORD, matching the root docker-compose.yml's
metadata-postgres service):
| Var | Default |
|---|---|
POSTGRES_HOST |
localhost |
POSTGRES_PORT |
5432 |
POSTGRES_USER |
sentry |
POSTGRES_PASSWORD |
(empty — must be set) |
POSTGRES_DATABASE |
sentry_metadata |
AUDIT_WRITER_PASSWORD |
audit-writer-dev-only |
The database itself isn't created by migrate.sh — the postgres:16-alpine
image auto-creates POSTGRES_DB on first startup, unlike ClickHouse where
migrate.sh has to issue CREATE DATABASE IF NOT EXISTS itself.
There's also a Dockerfile (bash + the postgresql16-client package
baked in, migrations/ copied in at build time) used by the root-level
docker-compose.yml as a one-shot init service (metadata-migrate) —
no runtime package install, no host volume mount needed.
Adding a migration
Add migrations/000N_description.sql with the next sequential number and
a single DDL statement. migrate.sh picks it up automatically — no
registration step.