jcoffey-dev
3eb0f4c589
RBAC (api/internal/authz) is live on /query and /dashboards, backed by a new enterprise/ module (session issuance, audit logging, RBAC storage, OIDC/SAML protocol wiring) that core never imports -- only calls over HTTP. Found and fixed a real cross-tenant vulnerability in dashboards (no tenant_id filtering at all) while writing the threat model doc. Two things are explicitly NOT done, documented rather than hidden: tenant isolation for log data itself (/query still shares one ClickHouse connection and Tantivy index across every tenant -- RBAC controls who can query, not what a query can see), and human SSO login (protocol wiring exists, no HTTP handler calls it yet). See docs/security/threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md. Also adds deploy/ (Go Operator + Helm chart, validated offline only -- no cluster was reachable in this environment).
38 lines
1000 B
Go
38 lines
1000 B
Go
package tenant
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import (
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"context"
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"testing"
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)
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func TestFromContextRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
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id := TrustFromValidatedSession("acme-corp")
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ctx := WithContext(context.Background(), id)
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got, ok := FromContext(ctx)
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if !ok {
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t.Fatalf("expected FromContext to find a tenant")
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}
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if got.String() != "acme-corp" {
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t.Fatalf("got %q, want %q", got.String(), "acme-corp")
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}
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}
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func TestFromContextMissing(t *testing.T) {
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_, ok := FromContext(context.Background())
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if ok {
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t.Fatalf("expected no tenant in a bare context")
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}
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}
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func TestFromContextDoesNotMatchUnrelatedStringKey(t *testing.T) {
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// The unexported contextKey type is what closes the "collision" gap
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// the design doc calls out -- a context.WithValue using a plain
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// string key must not be found by FromContext.
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ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), "tenant_id", "spoofed") //nolint:staticcheck
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_, ok := FromContext(ctx)
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if ok {
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t.Fatalf("FromContext must not find a value set under an unrelated key type")
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}
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}
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