Files
cairnobs/metadata
jcoffey-dev 17fdc212c2 Give ingest a real tenant identity (write-routing deferred, disclosed)
Ingest tenant-awareness was named "undesigned, not just unbuilt" across
CLAUDE.md/threat-model.md/the runbook since early Phase 4 -- the last
major standing gap. Scoping was agreed via AskUserQuestion: a
config-supplied tenant_id + shared-secret token ingest validates
(smaller real implementation, no new PKI), over per-tenant mTLS
certs. This change builds that identity mechanism end to end and
attaches it to every record at the point it enters the system; it
deliberately does NOT build per-tenant write-routing for ClickHouse or
Tantivy -- that's real, separately-scoped follow-up work, disclosed
explicitly everywhere this was previously called undesigned, not
silently left half-done.

New pieces:

- metadata/migrations/0034 + enterprise/internal/rbacstore/
  ingest_credentials.go: a per-tenant bearer credential, only its
  SHA-256 hash ever persisted (same reasoning a password gets hashed,
  not stored raw) -- CreateIngestCredential returns the plaintext
  exactly once, ValidateIngestCredential/RevokeIngestCredential/
  ListIngestCredentialsForTenant round it out.
- enterprise-auth gains -create-ingest-credential-tenant/
  -list-ingest-credentials-tenant/-revoke-ingest-credential (same
  offline-operator-flag shape as every other credential-minting flag in
  this binary) and a new POST /internal/authorize-ingest endpoint
  (internal/authhandler) validating a presented token and resolving its
  tenant -- a genuinely different credential type from session-backed
  /internal/authorize, so it doesn't touch session.Manager at all.
- ingest (AGPL core) gains an optional TenantResolver
  (internal/grpcserver, nil by default) and its HTTP client
  implementation (internal/tenantresolver.HTTPResolver) -- a plain HTTP
  call to enterprise-auth's new endpoint, never an enterprise/ import,
  same "network boundary, not import boundary" shape
  api/authz.HTTPAuthorizer already uses for the query path.
  PushBatch now requires an `authorization: Bearer <token>` gRPC
  metadata entry once a resolver is configured, fails the whole batch
  closed on a missing/invalid credential (never falls back to "no
  tenant"), and attaches the resolved tenant ID to every record as a
  `tenant_id` Kafka message header before producing it.

Verified with real round trips at every layer, no Docker needed:
rbacstore's credential CRUD (skip-gated on live Postgres, same as every
other rbacstore integration test this phase), authhandler's new
endpoint (real HTTP via httptest, including the regression test that a
session token must not validate as an ingest credential), tenantresolver
(real HTTP client against httptest, same pattern as
authz.HTTPAuthorizer's own tests), and grpcserver's PushBatch (fake
resolver/producer -- no resolver leaves messages unchanged, a configured
resolver attaches the right header or fails closed on a bad/missing
token).

Helm: ingest.requireTenantCredential (default false) is a deliberate,
separate opt-in from enterprise.enabled -- turning ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL
on for ingest requires every agent to already hold a credential or be
refused outright, so it must not default on just because
enterprise.enabled does (same reasoning api.yaml's ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL
isn't tied to enterprise.enabled directly either). docker-compose.yml
leaves it unset, same as ever.

Docs updated everywhere this was called "undesigned": CLAUDE.md,
docs/architecture.md, docs/security/threat-model.md (including its
summary table, now split into "identity: built" vs "write-routing: not
yet"), docs/phase-4-runbook.md (new §13), enterprise/README.md.
2026-08-14 15:21:55 -07:00
..
2026-08-13 17:29:38 -07:00

metadata

PostgreSQL schema and migration tooling for Sentry's control-plane config: dashboards, alert rules, and everything else that isn't log data. See /docs/phase-3-dashboard-design.md and /docs/phase-3-alerting-design.md for why this is a separate database from /storage (ClickHouse) rather than new ClickHouse tables — short version: dashboards and alert state need real row-level locking and transactional read-modify-write, which ClickHouse's MergeTree family doesn't provide.

Schema

Seven tables across three features, one shared database (sentry_metadata):

  • dashboards, dashboard_panels — owned by /api (api/internal/dashboards)
  • notification_targets, alert_rules, alert_state, delivery_log — owned by /alerting
  • audit_log — owned by enterprise/internal/audit (Phase 4). Unlike every other table here, this one is not written through the shared sentry role/pool — see "The audit_writer role" below.

"Owned" here is a documentation convention, not a technical boundary — both services connect to the same Postgres instance/database, each with its own hand-written SQL for the tables it's responsible for. Nothing is shared across service internal/ trees for this, matching the existing repo convention that only /proto is shared code (and even that isn't shared logic, just generated bindings).

The audit_writer role: a second, more restricted credential

audit_log is append-only by design (see /docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md's audit-logging section) — a compliance requirement, not just a convention, so it's backed by two independent defenses, both verified against a live Postgres, not just written:

  1. A dedicated audit_writer Postgres role (migrations/0012-0014) with only INSERT/SELECT grants on audit_log — no UPDATE/DELETE/TRUNCATE, ever. enterprise/internal/audit.Store connects using this role's credentials via its own pgxpool.Pool, never the shared sentry pool api/alerting's other stores use — reusing the shared pool for audit writes would give audit_log's application-level credential the same UPDATE/DELETE grants every other metadata table has, silently defeating the whole point.
  2. A BEFORE UPDATE OR DELETE trigger (migrations/0015-0016) that rejects the operation for any role, including the table owner (sentry) — confirmed live: even sentry needs to explicitly ALTER TABLE audit_log DISABLE TRIGGER audit_log_immutable (a privileged, distinct-from-normal-access operation) before it can modify a row. This is redundant defense-in-depth independent of the grant, protecting against a future migration accidentally re-granting UPDATE to audit_writer.

AUDIT_WRITER_PASSWORD (default audit-writer-dev-only, matching every other dev-only credential in this repo) sets the role's password at creation time via psql -v audit_writer_password=... substitution in migrate.shnot hardcoded in the migration SQL file itself. One real gotcha found while building this: psql's :'var' substitution does not apply inside a DO $$ ... $$ dollar-quoted block (by design, so client-side substitution can't corrupt a function/procedure body) — the role-creation migration is a plain CREATE ROLE, not wrapped in an IF NOT EXISTS check, relying on schema_migrations tracking for idempotency instead (the same pattern Phase 1's non-idempotent ALTER TABLE ... ADD COLUMN migration in /storage already used).

Migration tooling: mirrors /storage/migrate.sh, not a framework

Same reasoning as /storage/README.md: pulling in golang-migrate for what's currently six CREATE TABLE statements is premature machinery. migrate.sh applies migrations/*.sql in filename order over psql, tracking what's applied in a schema_migrations table, one DDL object per file (kept for repo-wide consistency of what a migration "version" means, even though Postgres itself supports multi-statement transactions unlike ClickHouse's HTTP interface).

Running

docker compose up -d                                   # starts a standalone Postgres for local work
POSTGRES_PASSWORD=sentry-dev-only ./migrate.sh          # applies migrations/*.sql

Environment variables migrate.sh reads (all optional except POSTGRES_PASSWORD, matching the root docker-compose.yml's metadata-postgres service):

Var Default
POSTGRES_HOST localhost
POSTGRES_PORT 5432
POSTGRES_USER sentry
POSTGRES_PASSWORD (empty — must be set)
POSTGRES_DATABASE sentry_metadata
AUDIT_WRITER_PASSWORD audit-writer-dev-only

The database itself isn't created by migrate.sh — the postgres:16-alpine image auto-creates POSTGRES_DB on first startup, unlike ClickHouse where migrate.sh has to issue CREATE DATABASE IF NOT EXISTS itself.

There's also a Dockerfile (bash + the postgresql16-client package baked in, migrations/ copied in at build time) used by the root-level docker-compose.yml as a one-shot init service (metadata-migrate) — no runtime package install, no host volume mount needed.

Adding a migration

Add migrations/000N_description.sql with the next sequential number and a single DDL statement. migrate.sh picks it up automatically — no registration step.