Files
cairnobs/metadata
jcoffey-dev 1d57e697b1 Phase 4: real per-tenant ClickHouse isolation via a new enterprise-api binary
Closes the threat model's headline finding for the SQL query path:
enterprise/internal/tenantprovision does real CREATE DATABASE/USER/GRANT
against ClickHouse, and enterprise/internal/chrunner is a per-tenant
connection registry implementing api's SQLRunner interface, resolving
the tenant from the authenticated request identity -- never a
caller-suppliable parameter. Both are wired into a new binary,
enterprise/cmd/enterprise-api, alongside the unchanged single-tenant
api/cmd/api, since AGPL core can never import enterprise/ and Go's own
internal/ package visibility rules meant enterprise/ couldn't implement
core's SQLRunner interface without importing the package that defines
it. That required moving api/internal/{authz,queryapi,dashboards,
querylang/executor,searchclient,httpserver} out of internal/ -- the
minimal set enterprise-api needs to import; querylang's compiler
internals (planner/lexer/parser/ast/ir) and api's own config stay
internal, since nothing outside api needs them directly.

Also finally wires enterprise/internal/audit into queryapi.AuditLogger
(nil since Phase 4 task 4) via a new adapter, and adds live-ClickHouse
integration tests for two of the four adversarial probes named in
docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md's verification plan.

Corrected several overclaims in the docs while writing this up: an
earlier claim that rbacstore's CRUD was "verified against a live
Postgres" was never actually true in this environment (only
internal/audit was, earlier in this phase, before Docker access was
lost) -- threat-model.md, phase-4-runbook.md, CLAUDE.md, and
enterprise/README.md all now distinguish "a real integration test
exists" from "this was confirmed against a live database."

Still not built: Tantivy/free-text tenant isolation
(enterprise/internal/searchclient), and any deployment-topology
mechanism that actually routes traffic to enterprise-api instead of
plain api -- both binaries exist side by side today with nothing
enforcing or flagging which one a deployment runs.
2026-08-13 22:48:38 -07:00
..
2026-08-13 17:29:38 -07:00

metadata

PostgreSQL schema and migration tooling for Sentry's control-plane config: dashboards, alert rules, and everything else that isn't log data. See /docs/phase-3-dashboard-design.md and /docs/phase-3-alerting-design.md for why this is a separate database from /storage (ClickHouse) rather than new ClickHouse tables — short version: dashboards and alert state need real row-level locking and transactional read-modify-write, which ClickHouse's MergeTree family doesn't provide.

Schema

Seven tables across three features, one shared database (sentry_metadata):

  • dashboards, dashboard_panels — owned by /api (api/internal/dashboards)
  • notification_targets, alert_rules, alert_state, delivery_log — owned by /alerting
  • audit_log — owned by enterprise/internal/audit (Phase 4). Unlike every other table here, this one is not written through the shared sentry role/pool — see "The audit_writer role" below.

"Owned" here is a documentation convention, not a technical boundary — both services connect to the same Postgres instance/database, each with its own hand-written SQL for the tables it's responsible for. Nothing is shared across service internal/ trees for this, matching the existing repo convention that only /proto is shared code (and even that isn't shared logic, just generated bindings).

The audit_writer role: a second, more restricted credential

audit_log is append-only by design (see /docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md's audit-logging section) — a compliance requirement, not just a convention, so it's backed by two independent defenses, both verified against a live Postgres, not just written:

  1. A dedicated audit_writer Postgres role (migrations/0012-0014) with only INSERT/SELECT grants on audit_log — no UPDATE/DELETE/TRUNCATE, ever. enterprise/internal/audit.Store connects using this role's credentials via its own pgxpool.Pool, never the shared sentry pool api/alerting's other stores use — reusing the shared pool for audit writes would give audit_log's application-level credential the same UPDATE/DELETE grants every other metadata table has, silently defeating the whole point.
  2. A BEFORE UPDATE OR DELETE trigger (migrations/0015-0016) that rejects the operation for any role, including the table owner (sentry) — confirmed live: even sentry needs to explicitly ALTER TABLE audit_log DISABLE TRIGGER audit_log_immutable (a privileged, distinct-from-normal-access operation) before it can modify a row. This is redundant defense-in-depth independent of the grant, protecting against a future migration accidentally re-granting UPDATE to audit_writer.

AUDIT_WRITER_PASSWORD (default audit-writer-dev-only, matching every other dev-only credential in this repo) sets the role's password at creation time via psql -v audit_writer_password=... substitution in migrate.shnot hardcoded in the migration SQL file itself. One real gotcha found while building this: psql's :'var' substitution does not apply inside a DO $$ ... $$ dollar-quoted block (by design, so client-side substitution can't corrupt a function/procedure body) — the role-creation migration is a plain CREATE ROLE, not wrapped in an IF NOT EXISTS check, relying on schema_migrations tracking for idempotency instead (the same pattern Phase 1's non-idempotent ALTER TABLE ... ADD COLUMN migration in /storage already used).

Migration tooling: mirrors /storage/migrate.sh, not a framework

Same reasoning as /storage/README.md: pulling in golang-migrate for what's currently six CREATE TABLE statements is premature machinery. migrate.sh applies migrations/*.sql in filename order over psql, tracking what's applied in a schema_migrations table, one DDL object per file (kept for repo-wide consistency of what a migration "version" means, even though Postgres itself supports multi-statement transactions unlike ClickHouse's HTTP interface).

Running

docker compose up -d                                   # starts a standalone Postgres for local work
POSTGRES_PASSWORD=sentry-dev-only ./migrate.sh          # applies migrations/*.sql

Environment variables migrate.sh reads (all optional except POSTGRES_PASSWORD, matching the root docker-compose.yml's metadata-postgres service):

Var Default
POSTGRES_HOST localhost
POSTGRES_PORT 5432
POSTGRES_USER sentry
POSTGRES_PASSWORD (empty — must be set)
POSTGRES_DATABASE sentry_metadata
AUDIT_WRITER_PASSWORD audit-writer-dev-only

The database itself isn't created by migrate.sh — the postgres:16-alpine image auto-creates POSTGRES_DB on first startup, unlike ClickHouse where migrate.sh has to issue CREATE DATABASE IF NOT EXISTS itself.

There's also a Dockerfile (bash + the postgresql16-client package baked in, migrations/ copied in at build time) used by the root-level docker-compose.yml as a one-shot init service (metadata-migrate) — no runtime package install, no host volume mount needed.

Adding a migration

Add migrations/000N_description.sql with the next sequential number and a single DDL statement. migrate.sh picks it up automatically — no registration step.