Files
cairnobs/deploy/helm/sentry/templates/alerting.yaml
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jcoffey-dev 3eb0f4c589 Phase 4: SSO scaffolding, RBAC enforcement, tenant-scoped dashboards, audit logging, K8s deployment
RBAC (api/internal/authz) is live on /query and /dashboards, backed by a
new enterprise/ module (session issuance, audit logging, RBAC storage,
OIDC/SAML protocol wiring) that core never imports -- only calls over
HTTP. Found and fixed a real cross-tenant vulnerability in dashboards
(no tenant_id filtering at all) while writing the threat model doc.

Two things are explicitly NOT done, documented rather than hidden:
tenant isolation for log data itself (/query still shares one ClickHouse
connection and Tantivy index across every tenant -- RBAC controls who
can query, not what a query can see), and human SSO login (protocol
wiring exists, no HTTP handler calls it yet). See
docs/security/threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md.

Also adds deploy/ (Go Operator + Helm chart, validated offline only --
no cluster was reachable in this environment).
2026-08-13 22:16:59 -07:00

82 lines
3.2 KiB
YAML

apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: {{ .Release.Name }}-alerting
labels:
{{- include "sentry.labels" . | nindent 4 }}
{{- include "sentry.selectorLabels" (list $ "alerting") | nindent 4 }}
spec:
# See values.yaml's comment: replicas is not a real knob here yet.
replicas: {{ .Values.alerting.replicas }}
selector:
matchLabels:
{{- include "sentry.selectorLabels" (list $ "alerting") | nindent 6 }}
template:
metadata:
labels:
{{- include "sentry.selectorLabels" (list $ "alerting") | nindent 8 }}
spec:
initContainers:
{{- include "sentry.waitForTCP" (list "postgres" (printf "%s-postgres" .Release.Name) "5432") | nindent 8 }}
{{- include "sentry.waitForTCP" (list "api" (printf "%s-api" .Release.Name) "8080") | nindent 8 }}
containers:
- name: alerting
image: "{{ .Values.alerting.image.repository }}:{{ .Values.alerting.image.tag }}"
imagePullPolicy: {{ .Values.global.imagePullPolicy }}
env:
- name: POSTGRES_ADDR
value: "{{ .Release.Name }}-postgres:5432"
- name: POSTGRES_DATABASE
value: sentry_metadata
- name: POSTGRES_USERNAME
value: sentry
- name: POSTGRES_PASSWORD
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: {{ .Release.Name }}-postgres
key: password
- name: API_QUERY_URL
value: "http://{{ .Release.Name }}-api:8080"
{{- if .Values.enterprise.enabled }}
# RoleService credential for POST /query, once api's
# ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL enforcement is on -- see
# /docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md's alerting<->api gap and
# alerting/internal/queryclient's doc comment. NOT generated
# by this chart: mint one with
# `enterprise-auth -mint-service-token=alerting` (see
# enterprise/README.md) and supply it via
# --set-string alerting.apiServiceToken=... or a values
# override backed by a Secret you manage -- a chart
# generating its own long-lived service credential and
# storing it in the same release's values would defeat the
# point of it being a distinct, revocable credential.
{{- if .Values.alerting.apiServiceToken }}
- name: API_SERVICE_TOKEN
value: {{ .Values.alerting.apiServiceToken | quote }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
ports:
- name: http
containerPort: 8081
readinessProbe:
exec:
command: ["/alerting", "-healthcheck"]
initialDelaySeconds: 5
periodSeconds: 5
resources:
{{- toYaml .Values.alerting.resources | nindent 12 }}
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: {{ .Release.Name }}-alerting
labels:
{{- include "sentry.labels" . | nindent 4 }}
{{- include "sentry.selectorLabels" (list $ "alerting") | nindent 4 }}
spec:
selector:
{{- include "sentry.selectorLabels" (list $ "alerting") | nindent 4 }}
ports:
- name: http
port: 8081