Files
cairnobs/ingest/internal/grpcserver/server.go
T
jcoffey-dev 17fdc212c2 Give ingest a real tenant identity (write-routing deferred, disclosed)
Ingest tenant-awareness was named "undesigned, not just unbuilt" across
CLAUDE.md/threat-model.md/the runbook since early Phase 4 -- the last
major standing gap. Scoping was agreed via AskUserQuestion: a
config-supplied tenant_id + shared-secret token ingest validates
(smaller real implementation, no new PKI), over per-tenant mTLS
certs. This change builds that identity mechanism end to end and
attaches it to every record at the point it enters the system; it
deliberately does NOT build per-tenant write-routing for ClickHouse or
Tantivy -- that's real, separately-scoped follow-up work, disclosed
explicitly everywhere this was previously called undesigned, not
silently left half-done.

New pieces:

- metadata/migrations/0034 + enterprise/internal/rbacstore/
  ingest_credentials.go: a per-tenant bearer credential, only its
  SHA-256 hash ever persisted (same reasoning a password gets hashed,
  not stored raw) -- CreateIngestCredential returns the plaintext
  exactly once, ValidateIngestCredential/RevokeIngestCredential/
  ListIngestCredentialsForTenant round it out.
- enterprise-auth gains -create-ingest-credential-tenant/
  -list-ingest-credentials-tenant/-revoke-ingest-credential (same
  offline-operator-flag shape as every other credential-minting flag in
  this binary) and a new POST /internal/authorize-ingest endpoint
  (internal/authhandler) validating a presented token and resolving its
  tenant -- a genuinely different credential type from session-backed
  /internal/authorize, so it doesn't touch session.Manager at all.
- ingest (AGPL core) gains an optional TenantResolver
  (internal/grpcserver, nil by default) and its HTTP client
  implementation (internal/tenantresolver.HTTPResolver) -- a plain HTTP
  call to enterprise-auth's new endpoint, never an enterprise/ import,
  same "network boundary, not import boundary" shape
  api/authz.HTTPAuthorizer already uses for the query path.
  PushBatch now requires an `authorization: Bearer <token>` gRPC
  metadata entry once a resolver is configured, fails the whole batch
  closed on a missing/invalid credential (never falls back to "no
  tenant"), and attaches the resolved tenant ID to every record as a
  `tenant_id` Kafka message header before producing it.

Verified with real round trips at every layer, no Docker needed:
rbacstore's credential CRUD (skip-gated on live Postgres, same as every
other rbacstore integration test this phase), authhandler's new
endpoint (real HTTP via httptest, including the regression test that a
session token must not validate as an ingest credential), tenantresolver
(real HTTP client against httptest, same pattern as
authz.HTTPAuthorizer's own tests), and grpcserver's PushBatch (fake
resolver/producer -- no resolver leaves messages unchanged, a configured
resolver attaches the right header or fails closed on a bad/missing
token).

Helm: ingest.requireTenantCredential (default false) is a deliberate,
separate opt-in from enterprise.enabled -- turning ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL
on for ingest requires every agent to already hold a credential or be
refused outright, so it must not default on just because
enterprise.enabled does (same reasoning api.yaml's ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL
isn't tied to enterprise.enabled directly either). docker-compose.yml
leaves it unset, same as ever.

Docs updated everywhere this was called "undesigned": CLAUDE.md,
docs/architecture.md, docs/security/threat-model.md (including its
summary table, now split into "identity: built" vs "write-routing: not
yet"), docs/phase-4-runbook.md (new §13), enterprise/README.md.
2026-08-14 15:21:55 -07:00

194 lines
7.3 KiB
Go

// Package grpcserver implements the agent-facing side of ingest: an mTLS
// gRPC server accepting LogIngest.PushBatch calls. It assigns each record
// a stable record_id (see the proto field comment for why this has to
// happen exactly once, here, rather than in either downstream consumer)
// and otherwise forwards records unchanged onto Redpanda — normalization
// into the ClickHouse row shape happens later, on the consumer side.
//
// If a TenantResolver is configured, PushBatch also resolves which
// tenant the call's bearer credential belongs to and attaches it as a
// "tenant_id" Kafka message header on every record produced -- the first
// step of Phase 4's ingest tenant-awareness (see
// /docs/phase-4-runbook.md and CLAUDE.md's "ingest itself has no tenant
// concept" gap). Deliberately scoped no further than that for now:
// nothing downstream (this package's own consumer, or `search`'s
// separate Redpanda consumer) reads that header yet to route a record's
// write into a per-tenant ClickHouse database/Tantivy index -- every
// record still lands in the one shared destination either way, tenant_id
// header or not. That's real, disclosed, deferred follow-up work, not
// silently incomplete: attaching a verifiable tenant identity as early
// as possible (right where the credential is actually presented) is a
// self-contained, independently valuable step on its own, and it's what
// any later per-tenant write-routing work will consume.
package grpcserver
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"net"
"strings"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/segmentio/kafka-go"
"google.golang.org/grpc"
"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials"
"google.golang.org/grpc/metadata"
"google.golang.org/grpc/status"
"google.golang.org/protobuf/proto"
"github.com/sentry/sentry/ingest/internal/config"
logsv1 "github.com/sentry/sentry/proto/sentry/logs/v1"
)
// TenantIDHeaderKey is the Kafka message header a resolved tenant ID is
// attached under -- exported so internal/consumer (or a future per-
// tenant write-routing consumer) can read it back by the same name
// without duplicating the literal.
const TenantIDHeaderKey = "tenant_id"
type Server struct {
logsv1.UnimplementedLogIngestServer
logger *slog.Logger
grpcCfg config.GRPCConfig
tlsCfg config.TLSConfig
producer batchProducer
resolver TenantResolver
}
// batchProducer is the subset of *producer.Producer this package depends
// on, so tests can substitute a fake without touching Redpanda.
type batchProducer interface {
WriteBatch(ctx context.Context, msgs []kafka.Message) error
}
// TenantResolver validates an ingest credential (a bearer token
// presented via gRPC metadata, `authorization: Bearer <token>`) and
// resolves which tenant it belongs to. nil is a deliberate no-op: every
// record's Kafka message gets no tenant_id header at all, matching every
// ingest deployment's behavior before per-tenant ingest credentials
// existed. The real implementation
// (ingest/internal/tenantresolver.HTTPResolver) is a plain HTTP client
// calling enterprise-auth's /internal/authorize-ingest -- never an
// enterprise/ import, since this package is AGPL core (same "network
// boundary, not import boundary" shape api/authz.Authorizer uses).
type TenantResolver interface {
ResolveTenant(ctx context.Context, token string) (tenantID string, err error)
}
func New(logger *slog.Logger, grpcCfg config.GRPCConfig, tlsCfg config.TLSConfig, p batchProducer, resolver TenantResolver) *Server {
return &Server{logger: logger, grpcCfg: grpcCfg, tlsCfg: tlsCfg, producer: p, resolver: resolver}
}
// Run blocks serving gRPC until ctx is canceled, then gracefully stops.
func (s *Server) Run(ctx context.Context) error {
tlsConf, err := loadServerTLSConfig(s.tlsCfg)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("loading TLS config: %w", err)
}
lis, err := net.Listen("tcp", s.grpcCfg.ListenAddr)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("listening on %s: %w", s.grpcCfg.ListenAddr, err)
}
grpcSrv := grpc.NewServer(grpc.Creds(credentials.NewTLS(tlsConf)))
logsv1.RegisterLogIngestServer(grpcSrv, s)
s.logger.Info("gRPC server listening", "addr", s.grpcCfg.ListenAddr)
errCh := make(chan error, 1)
go func() { errCh <- grpcSrv.Serve(lis) }()
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
grpcSrv.GracefulStop()
return nil
case err := <-errCh:
return err
}
}
func (s *Server) PushBatch(ctx context.Context, req *logsv1.PushBatchRequest) (*logsv1.PushBatchResponse, error) {
if len(req.GetRecords()) == 0 {
return &logsv1.PushBatchResponse{Accepted: 0}, nil
}
// tenantID stays empty (no header attached below) unless a resolver
// is actually configured -- single-tenant deployments never present
// a bearer credential and never need to. Once a resolver IS
// configured, a missing/invalid credential fails the whole batch
// closed rather than falling back to "no tenant" -- exactly the
// same fail-closed shape enterprise/internal/chrunner.Registry.RunSQL
// uses on the read side, applied here at the point data enters the
// system.
var tenantID string
if s.resolver != nil {
token, ok := bearerTokenFromContext(ctx)
if !ok {
return nil, status.Error(codes.Unauthenticated, "missing bearer credential")
}
resolved, err := s.resolver.ResolveTenant(ctx, token)
if err != nil {
s.logger.Error("resolving ingest tenant", "batch_id", req.GetBatchId(), "error", err)
return nil, status.Error(codes.Unauthenticated, "invalid ingest credential")
}
tenantID = resolved
}
msgs := make([]kafka.Message, 0, len(req.GetRecords()))
for _, rec := range req.GetRecords() {
// Assigned here, once, before this record is produced to
// Redpanda: the ClickHouse-writer consumer and the Tantivy-
// indexer consumer (Phase 1) both read the same Redpanda
// messages and need to agree on the same ID for the same
// record. Overwrites anything the agent sent (it always sends
// empty, per the proto comment, but this is authoritative
// regardless).
rec.RecordId = uuid.NewString()
val, err := proto.Marshal(rec)
if err != nil {
return nil, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "marshaling record: %v", err)
}
msg := kafka.Message{
Key: []byte(rec.GetHost()),
Value: val,
}
if tenantID != "" {
msg.Headers = []kafka.Header{{Key: TenantIDHeaderKey, Value: []byte(tenantID)}}
}
msgs = append(msgs, msg)
}
if err := s.producer.WriteBatch(ctx, msgs); err != nil {
s.logger.Error("failed to write batch to redpanda", "batch_id", req.GetBatchId(), "error", err)
return nil, status.Errorf(codes.Unavailable, "writing to transport: %v", err)
}
s.logger.Debug("batch produced to redpanda", "batch_id", req.GetBatchId(), "records", len(req.GetRecords()), "tenant_id", tenantID)
return &logsv1.PushBatchResponse{Accepted: uint32(len(req.GetRecords()))}, nil
}
// bearerTokenFromContext reads the same "authorization: Bearer <token>"
// gRPC metadata shape HTTP's Authorization header uses -- an agent sets
// this once per PushBatch call (see the agent's grpc.rs), not per
// record.
func bearerTokenFromContext(ctx context.Context) (string, bool) {
md, ok := metadata.FromIncomingContext(ctx)
if !ok {
return "", false
}
values := md.Get("authorization")
if len(values) == 0 {
return "", false
}
const prefix = "Bearer "
if !strings.HasPrefix(values[0], prefix) {
return "", false
}
return strings.TrimPrefix(values[0], prefix), true
}