Ingest tenant-awareness was named "undesigned, not just unbuilt" across CLAUDE.md/threat-model.md/the runbook since early Phase 4 -- the last major standing gap. Scoping was agreed via AskUserQuestion: a config-supplied tenant_id + shared-secret token ingest validates (smaller real implementation, no new PKI), over per-tenant mTLS certs. This change builds that identity mechanism end to end and attaches it to every record at the point it enters the system; it deliberately does NOT build per-tenant write-routing for ClickHouse or Tantivy -- that's real, separately-scoped follow-up work, disclosed explicitly everywhere this was previously called undesigned, not silently left half-done. New pieces: - metadata/migrations/0034 + enterprise/internal/rbacstore/ ingest_credentials.go: a per-tenant bearer credential, only its SHA-256 hash ever persisted (same reasoning a password gets hashed, not stored raw) -- CreateIngestCredential returns the plaintext exactly once, ValidateIngestCredential/RevokeIngestCredential/ ListIngestCredentialsForTenant round it out. - enterprise-auth gains -create-ingest-credential-tenant/ -list-ingest-credentials-tenant/-revoke-ingest-credential (same offline-operator-flag shape as every other credential-minting flag in this binary) and a new POST /internal/authorize-ingest endpoint (internal/authhandler) validating a presented token and resolving its tenant -- a genuinely different credential type from session-backed /internal/authorize, so it doesn't touch session.Manager at all. - ingest (AGPL core) gains an optional TenantResolver (internal/grpcserver, nil by default) and its HTTP client implementation (internal/tenantresolver.HTTPResolver) -- a plain HTTP call to enterprise-auth's new endpoint, never an enterprise/ import, same "network boundary, not import boundary" shape api/authz.HTTPAuthorizer already uses for the query path. PushBatch now requires an `authorization: Bearer <token>` gRPC metadata entry once a resolver is configured, fails the whole batch closed on a missing/invalid credential (never falls back to "no tenant"), and attaches the resolved tenant ID to every record as a `tenant_id` Kafka message header before producing it. Verified with real round trips at every layer, no Docker needed: rbacstore's credential CRUD (skip-gated on live Postgres, same as every other rbacstore integration test this phase), authhandler's new endpoint (real HTTP via httptest, including the regression test that a session token must not validate as an ingest credential), tenantresolver (real HTTP client against httptest, same pattern as authz.HTTPAuthorizer's own tests), and grpcserver's PushBatch (fake resolver/producer -- no resolver leaves messages unchanged, a configured resolver attaches the right header or fails closed on a bad/missing token). Helm: ingest.requireTenantCredential (default false) is a deliberate, separate opt-in from enterprise.enabled -- turning ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL on for ingest requires every agent to already hold a credential or be refused outright, so it must not default on just because enterprise.enabled does (same reasoning api.yaml's ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL isn't tied to enterprise.enabled directly either). docker-compose.yml leaves it unset, same as ever. Docs updated everywhere this was called "undesigned": CLAUDE.md, docs/architecture.md, docs/security/threat-model.md (including its summary table, now split into "identity: built" vs "write-routing: not yet"), docs/phase-4-runbook.md (new §13), enterprise/README.md.
194 lines
7.3 KiB
Go
194 lines
7.3 KiB
Go
// Package grpcserver implements the agent-facing side of ingest: an mTLS
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// gRPC server accepting LogIngest.PushBatch calls. It assigns each record
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// a stable record_id (see the proto field comment for why this has to
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// happen exactly once, here, rather than in either downstream consumer)
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// and otherwise forwards records unchanged onto Redpanda — normalization
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// into the ClickHouse row shape happens later, on the consumer side.
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//
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// If a TenantResolver is configured, PushBatch also resolves which
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// tenant the call's bearer credential belongs to and attaches it as a
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// "tenant_id" Kafka message header on every record produced -- the first
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// step of Phase 4's ingest tenant-awareness (see
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// /docs/phase-4-runbook.md and CLAUDE.md's "ingest itself has no tenant
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// concept" gap). Deliberately scoped no further than that for now:
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// nothing downstream (this package's own consumer, or `search`'s
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// separate Redpanda consumer) reads that header yet to route a record's
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// write into a per-tenant ClickHouse database/Tantivy index -- every
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// record still lands in the one shared destination either way, tenant_id
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// header or not. That's real, disclosed, deferred follow-up work, not
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// silently incomplete: attaching a verifiable tenant identity as early
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// as possible (right where the credential is actually presented) is a
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// self-contained, independently valuable step on its own, and it's what
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// any later per-tenant write-routing work will consume.
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package grpcserver
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import (
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"log/slog"
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"net"
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"strings"
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"github.com/google/uuid"
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"github.com/segmentio/kafka-go"
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"google.golang.org/grpc"
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"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
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"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials"
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"google.golang.org/grpc/metadata"
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"google.golang.org/grpc/status"
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"google.golang.org/protobuf/proto"
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"github.com/sentry/sentry/ingest/internal/config"
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logsv1 "github.com/sentry/sentry/proto/sentry/logs/v1"
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)
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// TenantIDHeaderKey is the Kafka message header a resolved tenant ID is
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// attached under -- exported so internal/consumer (or a future per-
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// tenant write-routing consumer) can read it back by the same name
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// without duplicating the literal.
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const TenantIDHeaderKey = "tenant_id"
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type Server struct {
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logsv1.UnimplementedLogIngestServer
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logger *slog.Logger
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grpcCfg config.GRPCConfig
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tlsCfg config.TLSConfig
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producer batchProducer
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resolver TenantResolver
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}
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// batchProducer is the subset of *producer.Producer this package depends
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// on, so tests can substitute a fake without touching Redpanda.
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type batchProducer interface {
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WriteBatch(ctx context.Context, msgs []kafka.Message) error
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}
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// TenantResolver validates an ingest credential (a bearer token
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// presented via gRPC metadata, `authorization: Bearer <token>`) and
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// resolves which tenant it belongs to. nil is a deliberate no-op: every
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// record's Kafka message gets no tenant_id header at all, matching every
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// ingest deployment's behavior before per-tenant ingest credentials
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// existed. The real implementation
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// (ingest/internal/tenantresolver.HTTPResolver) is a plain HTTP client
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// calling enterprise-auth's /internal/authorize-ingest -- never an
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// enterprise/ import, since this package is AGPL core (same "network
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// boundary, not import boundary" shape api/authz.Authorizer uses).
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type TenantResolver interface {
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ResolveTenant(ctx context.Context, token string) (tenantID string, err error)
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}
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func New(logger *slog.Logger, grpcCfg config.GRPCConfig, tlsCfg config.TLSConfig, p batchProducer, resolver TenantResolver) *Server {
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return &Server{logger: logger, grpcCfg: grpcCfg, tlsCfg: tlsCfg, producer: p, resolver: resolver}
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}
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// Run blocks serving gRPC until ctx is canceled, then gracefully stops.
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func (s *Server) Run(ctx context.Context) error {
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tlsConf, err := loadServerTLSConfig(s.tlsCfg)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("loading TLS config: %w", err)
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}
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lis, err := net.Listen("tcp", s.grpcCfg.ListenAddr)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("listening on %s: %w", s.grpcCfg.ListenAddr, err)
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}
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grpcSrv := grpc.NewServer(grpc.Creds(credentials.NewTLS(tlsConf)))
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logsv1.RegisterLogIngestServer(grpcSrv, s)
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s.logger.Info("gRPC server listening", "addr", s.grpcCfg.ListenAddr)
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errCh := make(chan error, 1)
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go func() { errCh <- grpcSrv.Serve(lis) }()
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select {
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case <-ctx.Done():
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grpcSrv.GracefulStop()
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return nil
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case err := <-errCh:
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return err
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}
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}
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func (s *Server) PushBatch(ctx context.Context, req *logsv1.PushBatchRequest) (*logsv1.PushBatchResponse, error) {
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if len(req.GetRecords()) == 0 {
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return &logsv1.PushBatchResponse{Accepted: 0}, nil
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}
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// tenantID stays empty (no header attached below) unless a resolver
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// is actually configured -- single-tenant deployments never present
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// a bearer credential and never need to. Once a resolver IS
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// configured, a missing/invalid credential fails the whole batch
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// closed rather than falling back to "no tenant" -- exactly the
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// same fail-closed shape enterprise/internal/chrunner.Registry.RunSQL
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// uses on the read side, applied here at the point data enters the
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// system.
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var tenantID string
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if s.resolver != nil {
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token, ok := bearerTokenFromContext(ctx)
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if !ok {
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return nil, status.Error(codes.Unauthenticated, "missing bearer credential")
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}
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resolved, err := s.resolver.ResolveTenant(ctx, token)
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if err != nil {
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s.logger.Error("resolving ingest tenant", "batch_id", req.GetBatchId(), "error", err)
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return nil, status.Error(codes.Unauthenticated, "invalid ingest credential")
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}
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tenantID = resolved
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}
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msgs := make([]kafka.Message, 0, len(req.GetRecords()))
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for _, rec := range req.GetRecords() {
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// Assigned here, once, before this record is produced to
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// Redpanda: the ClickHouse-writer consumer and the Tantivy-
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// indexer consumer (Phase 1) both read the same Redpanda
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// messages and need to agree on the same ID for the same
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// record. Overwrites anything the agent sent (it always sends
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// empty, per the proto comment, but this is authoritative
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// regardless).
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rec.RecordId = uuid.NewString()
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val, err := proto.Marshal(rec)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "marshaling record: %v", err)
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}
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msg := kafka.Message{
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Key: []byte(rec.GetHost()),
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Value: val,
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}
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if tenantID != "" {
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msg.Headers = []kafka.Header{{Key: TenantIDHeaderKey, Value: []byte(tenantID)}}
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}
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msgs = append(msgs, msg)
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}
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if err := s.producer.WriteBatch(ctx, msgs); err != nil {
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s.logger.Error("failed to write batch to redpanda", "batch_id", req.GetBatchId(), "error", err)
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return nil, status.Errorf(codes.Unavailable, "writing to transport: %v", err)
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}
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s.logger.Debug("batch produced to redpanda", "batch_id", req.GetBatchId(), "records", len(req.GetRecords()), "tenant_id", tenantID)
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return &logsv1.PushBatchResponse{Accepted: uint32(len(req.GetRecords()))}, nil
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}
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// bearerTokenFromContext reads the same "authorization: Bearer <token>"
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// gRPC metadata shape HTTP's Authorization header uses -- an agent sets
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// this once per PushBatch call (see the agent's grpc.rs), not per
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// record.
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func bearerTokenFromContext(ctx context.Context) (string, bool) {
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md, ok := metadata.FromIncomingContext(ctx)
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if !ok {
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return "", false
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}
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values := md.Get("authorization")
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if len(values) == 0 {
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return "", false
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}
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const prefix = "Bearer "
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if !strings.HasPrefix(values[0], prefix) {
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return "", false
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}
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return strings.TrimPrefix(values[0], prefix), true
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}
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