jcoffey-dev
4b5dae5879
This is a large squashed commit covering two batches of prior uncommitted work plus a full security-audit remediation pass, kept together because go.mod/go.sum and several shared files (main.go, handler.go) were touched by both and splitting risked non-building intermediate commits. Features (built earlier, previously uncommitted): - Local username/password login for single-tenant deployments with no SSO configured (api/localauth, alerting/internal/sessioncheck, sentryctl users, web/src/routes/login, metadata migrations 0040/0041). - Remotely-editable additional log file paths for agents, on top of their existing primary source (api/agents, agent/sentry-agent extra-file-path diffing, web agent config UI). - IPv4/IPv6 addresses reported alongside other host system metrics. Security audit remediation (this pass, all live-verified in production): - Critical: block ClickHouse SSRF table functions (url/remote/file/s3/...) in the raw-SQL query escape hatch. - High: deny sensitive paths and require Admin to add agent extra_file_paths (Editor could previously point an agent at /etc/shadow or an SSH key); alerting webhook targets now validate against internal/metadata/loopback addresses, both at creation and send time; alerting's session middleware now enforces an Editor+ floor on mutating requests instead of "any authenticated session"; bumped goxmldsig to close a SAML signature-verification bypass (GO-2026-4753). - Medium: per-IP login rate limiting; security response headers (HSTS/CSP/nosniff/X-Frame-Options/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy) on web/nginx.conf; a DevCredentialWarnings check in every Go service's config loader, logging loudly at startup if a deployment is still on docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only credentials; dependency bumps (golang.org/x/text, grpc, x/net, quick-xml, h2) across every affected Go module and both Rust crates, including a previously-uncovered x/net vulnerability in deploy/operator; a new security-scan.yml CI workflow running cargo-deny/govulncheck/npm-audit, mirroring the existing license-compliance.yml matrix shape. - Low: removed sentryctl's plaintext --password flag (shell history/`ps` exposure) in favor of stdin and a --password-stdin flag for reset-password's optional specific-password path; a dummy bcrypt comparison closes a login response-time username-enumeration side-channel.
30 lines
1.2 KiB
Go
30 lines
1.2 KiB
Go
package localauth
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import "golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
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// dummyPasswordHash is a precomputed bcrypt hash of an arbitrary,
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// never-used-as-a-real-password string -- handleLogin runs
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// ComparePassword against this on the "no such user" path purely to pay
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// the same bcrypt cost the "wrong password" path already pays, closing
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// a response-time side channel that would otherwise let a caller
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// distinguish the two despite their identical error message. There is
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// no real password behind this hash; it exists only to burn comparable
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// CPU time.
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const dummyPasswordHash = "$2a$10$fH9R3O6ViQ6c7bq0N7yyBO1JP2TOw/bZEopMyZKBYrBjgYBZO9rCa"
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// HashPassword and ComparePassword are the only two places this package
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// touches a raw password -- everywhere else, a user is identified by an
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// already-issued session token (see token.go), never by re-checking a
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// password on every request.
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func HashPassword(password string) (string, error) {
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hash, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(password), bcrypt.DefaultCost)
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if err != nil {
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return "", err
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}
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return string(hash), nil
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}
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func ComparePassword(hash, password string) bool {
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return bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(hash), []byte(password)) == nil
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}
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