jcoffey-dev
3eb0f4c589
RBAC (api/internal/authz) is live on /query and /dashboards, backed by a new enterprise/ module (session issuance, audit logging, RBAC storage, OIDC/SAML protocol wiring) that core never imports -- only calls over HTTP. Found and fixed a real cross-tenant vulnerability in dashboards (no tenant_id filtering at all) while writing the threat model doc. Two things are explicitly NOT done, documented rather than hidden: tenant isolation for log data itself (/query still shares one ClickHouse connection and Tantivy index across every tenant -- RBAC controls who can query, not what a query can see), and human SSO login (protocol wiring exists, no HTTP handler calls it yet). See docs/security/threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md. Also adds deploy/ (Go Operator + Helm chart, validated offline only -- no cluster was reachable in this environment).
14 lines
571 B
SQL
14 lines
571 B
SQL
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS users
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(
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id UUID PRIMARY KEY,
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email TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
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display_name TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
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-- Set on first successful SSO login (OIDC "sub" or SAML NameID) --
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-- nullable because a user row can exist before their first login in
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-- principle (e.g. pre-provisioned by an Admin), though Phase 4's
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-- baseline flow always creates the row and the SSO subject together.
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sso_subject TEXT,
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created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
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updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
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)
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