jcoffey-dev
4b5dae5879
This is a large squashed commit covering two batches of prior uncommitted work plus a full security-audit remediation pass, kept together because go.mod/go.sum and several shared files (main.go, handler.go) were touched by both and splitting risked non-building intermediate commits. Features (built earlier, previously uncommitted): - Local username/password login for single-tenant deployments with no SSO configured (api/localauth, alerting/internal/sessioncheck, sentryctl users, web/src/routes/login, metadata migrations 0040/0041). - Remotely-editable additional log file paths for agents, on top of their existing primary source (api/agents, agent/sentry-agent extra-file-path diffing, web agent config UI). - IPv4/IPv6 addresses reported alongside other host system metrics. Security audit remediation (this pass, all live-verified in production): - Critical: block ClickHouse SSRF table functions (url/remote/file/s3/...) in the raw-SQL query escape hatch. - High: deny sensitive paths and require Admin to add agent extra_file_paths (Editor could previously point an agent at /etc/shadow or an SSH key); alerting webhook targets now validate against internal/metadata/loopback addresses, both at creation and send time; alerting's session middleware now enforces an Editor+ floor on mutating requests instead of "any authenticated session"; bumped goxmldsig to close a SAML signature-verification bypass (GO-2026-4753). - Medium: per-IP login rate limiting; security response headers (HSTS/CSP/nosniff/X-Frame-Options/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy) on web/nginx.conf; a DevCredentialWarnings check in every Go service's config loader, logging loudly at startup if a deployment is still on docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only credentials; dependency bumps (golang.org/x/text, grpc, x/net, quick-xml, h2) across every affected Go module and both Rust crates, including a previously-uncovered x/net vulnerability in deploy/operator; a new security-scan.yml CI workflow running cargo-deny/govulncheck/npm-audit, mirroring the existing license-compliance.yml matrix shape. - Low: removed sentryctl's plaintext --password flag (shell history/`ps` exposure) in favor of stdin and a --password-stdin flag for reset-password's optional specific-password path; a dummy bcrypt comparison closes a login response-time username-enumeration side-channel.
38 lines
1.4 KiB
Go
38 lines
1.4 KiB
Go
package localauth
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import (
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"crypto/rand"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/hex"
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)
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// newOpaqueToken returns a fresh session credential: raw is what's set
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// in the cookie/returned to the caller (base64url, URL/cookie-safe),
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// hash is what's stored in local_sessions.token_hash. Only the hash is
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// ever persisted -- same reasoning 0034_create_ingest_credentials.sql
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// gives for hashing its own bearer tokens: the server only ever needs
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// to check "does the presented value match," never recover the raw
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// value.
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func newOpaqueToken() (raw, hash string, err error) {
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buf := make([]byte, 32)
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if _, err := rand.Read(buf); err != nil {
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return "", "", err
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}
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raw = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(buf)
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return raw, hashToken(raw), nil
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}
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// hashToken re-derives a token's hash from a raw value a caller
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// presents (Authorization header or cookie), for lookup against
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// local_sessions.token_hash. Plain SHA-256, not bcrypt: unlike a
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// password, a session token is already high-entropy random data, not
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// something an attacker could feasibly brute-force offline even from a
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// leaked hash, so there's no need for bcrypt's deliberate slowness here
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// -- alerting/internal/sessioncheck validates sessions on every request
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// and does the same plain hash, with no bcrypt dependency at all.
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func hashToken(raw string) string {
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sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(raw))
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return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
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}
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