jcoffey-dev
3eb0f4c589
RBAC (api/internal/authz) is live on /query and /dashboards, backed by a new enterprise/ module (session issuance, audit logging, RBAC storage, OIDC/SAML protocol wiring) that core never imports -- only calls over HTTP. Found and fixed a real cross-tenant vulnerability in dashboards (no tenant_id filtering at all) while writing the threat model doc. Two things are explicitly NOT done, documented rather than hidden: tenant isolation for log data itself (/query still shares one ClickHouse connection and Tantivy index across every tenant -- RBAC controls who can query, not what a query can see), and human SSO login (protocol wiring exists, no HTTP handler calls it yet). See docs/security/threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md. Also adds deploy/ (Go Operator + Helm chart, validated offline only -- no cluster was reachable in this environment).
15 lines
664 B
SQL
15 lines
664 B
SQL
-- Extension point named in /docs/phase-4-rbac-design.md: one row
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-- per-tenant today (each tenant has exactly one ClickHouse database +
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-- one Tantivy index), not pretending multiple sources per tenant exist
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-- yet -- that's real future work, this table just leaves room for it.
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS data_sources
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(
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id UUID PRIMARY KEY,
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tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES tenants(id),
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name TEXT NOT NULL,
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clickhouse_database_name TEXT NOT NULL,
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tantivy_index_path TEXT NOT NULL,
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created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
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UNIQUE (tenant_id, name)
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)
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