jcoffey-dev
3eb0f4c589
RBAC (api/internal/authz) is live on /query and /dashboards, backed by a new enterprise/ module (session issuance, audit logging, RBAC storage, OIDC/SAML protocol wiring) that core never imports -- only calls over HTTP. Found and fixed a real cross-tenant vulnerability in dashboards (no tenant_id filtering at all) while writing the threat model doc. Two things are explicitly NOT done, documented rather than hidden: tenant isolation for log data itself (/query still shares one ClickHouse connection and Tantivy index across every tenant -- RBAC controls who can query, not what a query can see), and human SSO login (protocol wiring exists, no HTTP handler calls it yet). See docs/security/threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md. Also adds deploy/ (Go Operator + Helm chart, validated offline only -- no cluster was reachable in this environment).
9 lines
427 B
SQL
9 lines
427 B
SQL
-- Every Phase 0-3 row (dashboards, alert_rules, notification_targets --
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-- see their tenant_id DEFAULT 'default' columns) belongs to this tenant.
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-- Marked 'active' immediately: this data already exists and is already
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-- being served, unlike a genuinely new tenant that must pass through
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-- provisioning first.
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INSERT INTO tenants (id, display_name, status)
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VALUES ('default', 'Default', 'active')
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ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING
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