jcoffey-dev
3eb0f4c589
RBAC (api/internal/authz) is live on /query and /dashboards, backed by a new enterprise/ module (session issuance, audit logging, RBAC storage, OIDC/SAML protocol wiring) that core never imports -- only calls over HTTP. Found and fixed a real cross-tenant vulnerability in dashboards (no tenant_id filtering at all) while writing the threat model doc. Two things are explicitly NOT done, documented rather than hidden: tenant isolation for log data itself (/query still shares one ClickHouse connection and Tantivy index across every tenant -- RBAC controls who can query, not what a query can see), and human SSO login (protocol wiring exists, no HTTP handler calls it yet). See docs/security/threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md. Also adds deploy/ (Go Operator + Helm chart, validated offline only -- no cluster was reachable in this environment).
18 lines
681 B
SQL
18 lines
681 B
SQL
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS audit_log
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(
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id BIGSERIAL PRIMARY KEY,
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tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
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user_id UUID,
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source TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (source IN ('api', 'web', 'cli', 'alerting')),
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event_type TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (event_type IN ('query', 'role_change', 'grant_change', 'sso_config_change', 'secret_reveal')),
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query_text TEXT,
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row_count INT,
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duration_ms INT,
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status TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (status IN ('success', 'error')),
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error_message TEXT,
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detail JSONB NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}',
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prev_hash TEXT,
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row_hash TEXT NOT NULL,
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created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
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)
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