Two Dependabot PRs are stuck behind the same number.
#35 raises the go directive to 1.26.0 in six modules, because
golang.org/x/crypto v0.56.0 requires it -- x/crypto tracks the two most
recent Go releases and 0.56 dropped 1.25. A module that says 1.26 cannot
be built by the 1.25 this repository pins in two places, so that PR
fails every Go job.
#29 raises actions/setup-go to v7, which sets GOTOOLCHAIN=local. With
that set, `go install golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@latest` cannot
quietly fetch a newer toolchain, and stops with
golang.org/x/[email protected] requires go >= 1.26.0 (running go 1.25.14)
Under setup-go v5 the same install succeeded by downloading 1.26 behind
our backs, which is its own reason to be on 1.26 deliberately instead.
So: security-scan's go-version and all eight Dockerfiles move together,
1.25 -> 1.26. Nothing else needs to. A newer toolchain builds an older
directive happily, so this stands on its own before #35 lands, and the
go.mod files stay where they are here.
Checked by building rather than by reading: the api and ingest images
both build on golang:1.26-alpine, and api, ingest and enterprise still
`go build ./...` clean against their existing 1.25 directives.
Two unrelated causes, plus one that hid the others.
govulncheck: setup-go used go-version-file, so it installed exactly what
each go.mod pins -- `go 1.25.0` -- and then reported 28 CVEs in that
release's standard library (crypto/x509 quadratic name-constraint
parsing, GO-2025-4007, and friends), all fixed in 1.25.3. None of it
described anything we ship: every Dockerfile builds FROM
golang:1.25-alpine, a floating tag that resolves to the newest 1.25.x,
so the binaries already had the fixes. The go directive is a minimum
language version, not a statement about which toolchain to audit with.
Track the floating 1.25 line instead, and the scan matches production.
Confirmed by running govulncheck against a patched toolchain locally:
deploy/operator reports 0 vulnerabilities and exits 0.
cargo-deny: RUSTSEC-2024-0384, `instant` is unmaintained. A maintenance
advisory rather than a vulnerability -- no CVE, nothing to patch -- and
it arrives transitively via tantivy 0.22.1 -> measure_time 0.8.3, so it
cannot be dropped without moving off the pinned Tantivy. The advisory's
substance does not apply here anyway: instant papers over
std::time::Instant being missing on wasm, and search builds native musl.
Ignored in search/deny.toml with that reasoning recorded and a note to
delete the entry at the next Tantivy upgrade rather than let it ossify.
Both matrices now set fail-fast: false. Only two of the twelve jobs
actually failed; the other nine were cancelled, which made a two-cause
failure look like a total collapse and hid every finding but the first.
This is a large squashed commit covering two batches of prior uncommitted
work plus a full security-audit remediation pass, kept together because
go.mod/go.sum and several shared files (main.go, handler.go) were touched
by both and splitting risked non-building intermediate commits.
Features (built earlier, previously uncommitted):
- Local username/password login for single-tenant deployments with no
SSO configured (api/localauth, alerting/internal/sessioncheck,
sentryctl users, web/src/routes/login, metadata migrations 0040/0041).
- Remotely-editable additional log file paths for agents, on top of
their existing primary source (api/agents, agent/sentry-agent
extra-file-path diffing, web agent config UI).
- IPv4/IPv6 addresses reported alongside other host system metrics.
Security audit remediation (this pass, all live-verified in production):
- Critical: block ClickHouse SSRF table functions (url/remote/file/s3/...)
in the raw-SQL query escape hatch.
- High: deny sensitive paths and require Admin to add agent
extra_file_paths (Editor could previously point an agent at /etc/shadow
or an SSH key); alerting webhook targets now validate against
internal/metadata/loopback addresses, both at creation and send time;
alerting's session middleware now enforces an Editor+ floor on
mutating requests instead of "any authenticated session"; bumped
goxmldsig to close a SAML signature-verification bypass (GO-2026-4753).
- Medium: per-IP login rate limiting; security response headers
(HSTS/CSP/nosniff/X-Frame-Options/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy)
on web/nginx.conf; a DevCredentialWarnings check in every Go service's
config loader, logging loudly at startup if a deployment is still on
docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only credentials; dependency bumps
(golang.org/x/text, grpc, x/net, quick-xml, h2) across every affected
Go module and both Rust crates, including a previously-uncovered x/net
vulnerability in deploy/operator; a new security-scan.yml CI workflow
running cargo-deny/govulncheck/npm-audit, mirroring the existing
license-compliance.yml matrix shape.
- Low: removed sentryctl's plaintext --password flag (shell
history/`ps` exposure) in favor of stdin and a --password-stdin flag
for reset-password's optional specific-password path; a dummy bcrypt
comparison closes a login response-time username-enumeration
side-channel.
dependabot[bot]
jcoffey-dev