93c160ec513236f8645640d77a3ecdcd87ed5273
16
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 jcoffey-dev
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93c160ec51 |
Add agent restart lifecycle command
Extends the existing CheckIn RPC with a one-shot AgentCommand (restart only -- stop/uninstall need real per-platform OS service-manager integration and stay deliberately out of scope), delivered at-most-once: cleared the instant it's handed to the agent in a response, since a restarting agent's process is gone before it could ever confirm receipt. On restart, the agent flushes whatever's buffered, aborts its source task, and exits cleanly, relying entirely on the host's own service manager to bring it back up. Issuing a command is gated at RoleAdmin (stricter than config editing's RoleEditor) and logged into the same audit_log table Phase 7's AI interactions use, via a new agent_command event type. A real bug was found and fixed during live verification: the first implementation tried to atomically read-and-clear pending_command in a single INSERT...ON CONFLICT statement using a sibling CTE referenced only from RETURNING, on the assumption that Postgres evaluates every part of a WITH query against one pre-statement snapshot. That's wrong specifically for FOR UPDATE, which always reads the latest row version including one written earlier in the same statement -- confirmed empirically (a restart command was always coming back empty even when genuinely pending, so the agent never received it). Fixed by splitting into two real, ordered statements inside one explicit transaction. See /docs/agent-management-design.md's "Lifecycle commands" section. |
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jcoffey-dev
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4f0da1ae5e |
Add agent inventory, management, and remote config
Extends the heartbeat mechanism with a second gRPC service on the same mTLS channel (AgentControl.CheckIn, agent-initiated on the existing heartbeat ticker -- still push-only, no inbound port on any agent) so an agent reports its running config and can pick up an operator-set override. A new web UI section (/agents) lists every agent that's checked in, shows its reported config, and lets an operator edit a narrow, deliberately-scoped subset remotely: batch/heartbeat tuning, and (journald sources only) the unit filter. TLS material and the ingest endpoint are never reportable or remotely editable, by proto shape rather than a validation rule -- a bad or malicious edit there could permanently strand an agent or redirect where its logs go, unlike every other editable field, which only degrades behavior. An override lives only in the agent's memory (agent.toml is never rewritten) and re-syncs on the agent's own schedule; changing the journald filter aborts and respawns the source task since there's no other way to change what's being tailed. Building the hot-reload path surfaced a real, independent, pre-existing bug: shutdown was using poll_timeout(), which only drains once flush_interval has elapsed, silently dropping anything buffered more recently on every graceful shutdown that landed between flushes -- fixed with a new unconditional Batcher::flush_all(), now used at both shutdown and hot-reload. Verified live end-to-end against a real stack: an edited heartbeat interval changed a running agent's actual send cadence within one check-in cycle (confirmed by the real timestamps landing in ClickHouse), and an edited journald filter triggered a real source restart, both reflected back in the next reported-config snapshot. See /docs/agent-management-design.md. |
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jcoffey-dev
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4df6931869 |
Add agent heartbeat monitoring and fix a query-language lexer bug
Agents now send an independent "still alive" record on a configurable schedule (seconds/minutes/hours, [heartbeat] in agent.toml), separate from real log traffic and tagged with a sentry.heartbeat attribute. No new wire protocol -- it's an ordinary record through the same PushBatch RPC/mTLS identity every log line already uses. Unavailability alerting reuses the existing absence-condition alert rule type unchanged; no new alerting code was needed. See /docs/agent-heartbeat-monitoring.md for the design and how to build the alert rule. While verifying the alert rule live, found that the query language's lexer never treated '-' as part of an identifier, so any unquoted hyphenated filter value -- including the reference doc's own canonical example, `host!=host-03` -- failed to parse at all. Fixed in api/internal/querylang/lexer/lexer.go with regression tests; a leading '-' still lexes as its own token so earliest=-1h/sort -count are unaffected. |
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jcoffey-dev
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7d316f92db |
Phase 7: AI-assisted query authoring (autocomplete, explain, fix, optimize, NL translation)
Adds a self-hosted (Ollama, qwen2.5-coder) model provider abstraction with a pluggable opt-in cloud adapter, schema grounding, and a shared cost/safety guard every AI-suggested query is assessed against -- compiling to and executing through the same unchanged Phase 2 IR/ compiler and Phase 4 tenant scoping as a hand-written query, no parallel execution path. Track A (built into the query bar): inline ghost-text autocomplete, "Explain this query", "Fix this query" with a diff view, and a rule-based "Optimize" suggestion. Track B: natural-language-to-query translation, always a separate review step from execution, with `sentryctl query --nl` requiring explicit confirmation to run. Every accepted/dismissed translate-fix-optimize interaction is logged into the same append-only audit_log table Phase 4 built. Two real product bugs were found and fixed via live browser verification (a Svelte effect re-running on every keystroke that silently cancelled the ghost-text debounce; a ghost-text widget positioned at document offset 0 instead of the cursor), and a real costguard logic bug (unbounded-aggregation vs. raw-row) was caught by its own test suite. New integration tests wire a real Ollama client through the real HTTP handler against a mock server matching Ollama's wire contract (hack/mock-ollama), keeping model-quality verification out of CI as a disclosed, periodic human-run check instead. See /docs/phase-7-ai-design.md and /docs/phase-7-runbook.md. |
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jcoffey-dev
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5e8b3d8edd |
Add a real charting layer and a heatmap panel type
Five chart types on ECharts (modular imports, not the full bundle):
TimeSeriesChart (multi-series, legend toggle), BarChart (incl.
stacked), SingleStat (big number + sparkline + trend), Heatmap, TopN.
Shared interactions: tooltips, dataZoom feeding the global time-range
picker, click-to-drill-into-query (drilldown.ts strips a panel's query
to its pre-stats filter and appends the clicked series/x-value as a
new filter term -- no backend change needed).
pivot.ts reshapes the query language's existing {columns, rows} tabular
output into per-series chart data client-side -- `stats count by
service, timestamp` already returns "long" rows, so multi-series
support needed zero query-language changes. theme.ts reads real
computed CSS custom properties so charts render in the active theme's
actual colors, with an SSR_FALLBACK for adapter-static's prerender pass
where `document` doesn't exist.
heatmap is the one narrow, justified backend change: a new VizType
needed to feed a new visualization, not a new query capability. Three
places had to change together, not two -- api/dashboards/types.go's
validator, web/src/lib/api.ts's union (previous commit), and the
dashboard_panels table's viz_type CHECK constraint
(migrations/0035_add_heatmap_viz_type.sql), which mirrors the Go
validator and doesn't update itself.
/dev/charts (unlisted, dev-only) is a synthetic fixture/perf-test route:
confirmed 50ms first-two-frames render time on a production build
against a 30,006-row/6-series stress case, and a 211,975-byte gzipped
chart chunk -- both real measurements behind the ECharts-over-
Observable-Plot-or-D3 choice, not estimates.
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jcoffey-dev
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5365c92ffa |
Validate panels in Store.AddPanel/UpdatePanel, not just at the handler
CreateDashboard's inline panel-creation path already called validatePanel before insert; AddPanel and UpdatePanel relied on the HTTP handler to validate first instead of enforcing it themselves. Found via a live Postgres integration test: calling store.AddPanel directly (bypassing the handler) hit a viz_config NOT NULL constraint violation instead of getting the same default-empty-JSON treatment every other panel-creation path gets. |
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jcoffey-dev
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abeee0076b |
Build and browser-verify the tenant-picker frontend page
web/src/routes/select-tenant now calls enterprise-auth's existing
GET /auth/memberships / POST /auth/select-tenant protocol (built earlier
this phase, previously called only from Go tests) via
fetch(..., {credentials: 'include'}) -- new listMemberships/selectTenant
functions in $lib/api.ts, using a dedicated request helper that reads
plain-text error bodies (loginhandler's http.Error responses), unlike
every other request helper in that file which expects JSON.
Credentialed cross-origin fetch needed CORS enterprise-auth didn't have:
api/httpserver.WithCORS's wildcard-friendly default can't be combined
with a credentialed request at all (browsers refuse to honor
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: "*" on one) -- added WithCredentialedCORS
(literal origin, Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true) alongside it,
wired into enterprise-auth via a new CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGIN config var
defaulting to POST_LOGIN_REDIRECT_URL (web's own origin, the same
default pattern SELECT_TENANT_REDIRECT_URL already used).
adapter-static's route crawler doesn't discover a page nothing links to
(this one is only ever reached via enterprise-auth's redirect) -- fixed
with select-tenant/+page.ts's `export const prerender = true`, the same
declaration every other route already has.
Genuinely verified in a real browser in this environment, not just
type-checked: a throwaway Node server standing in for enterprise-auth's
exact wire contract (including its plain-text error bodies), driven
through the full flow via mcp__claude-in-chrome -- cross-origin
pending-login cookie set, credentialed preflight + GET/POST round trip,
a real click choosing a tenant, the post-selection redirect, and the
missing/expired-cookie error path rendering the backend's actual
message. No Docker or live Postgres/IdP needed, since the point was
exercising web's own fetch/CORS/cookie wiring, not enterprise-auth's
internals (already covered by loginhandler's own tests).
This closes the tenant-picker as the last named gap in Phase 4. What's
left is the already-disclosed live-verification caveat shared by every
Postgres/ClickHouse-backed piece and both SSO protocols: none of this
has run against a real database, external IdP, or multi-container
deployment in this environment.
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jcoffey-dev
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2e698f5623 |
Close the last tenant-isolation adversarial probe (mid-provisioning tenants)
Phase 4 task 8's verification plan named four adversarial probes; three were closed earlier this phase, the fourth (an evaluator tick, or any other caller, hitting a tenant that exists but hasn't reached the active+credentialed gate yet -- must be refused, not served) was still an explicitly-skipped stub in api/queryapi/tenant_isolation_gap_test.go. Investigating it found the two storage engines needed genuinely different treatment: - ClickHouse (enterprise/internal/chrunner) already had this property structurally, for free: Registry is built once at startup from rbacstore.ListProvisionedDataSources, which already filters to active+credentialed tenants only, so a mid-provisioning tenant is simply absent from the connection map. New test TestRegistryRefusesMidProvisioningTenant proves this without Docker -- an empty DataSource list never dials ClickHouse, so this genuinely runs in this environment, unlike every other test in that file. - Tantivy (search/src/registry.rs's IndexRegistry) was a real, different gap, not just an unverified assumption: it opens-or-creates an index for any syntactically-valid tenant_id on first request, because it's a separate process with no Postgres access and structurally can't know which tenants are actually provisioned. A query against a mid-provisioning tenant would have silently succeeded with zero results from a freshly-created empty index -- "ambient success" indistinguishable from "no matching logs," exactly the failure mode this item was worried about. Fixed the Tantivy gap with a new enterprise/internal/searchclient. TenantChecker interface (backed by a new rbacstore.TenantIsActive, implemented structurally, no new import edge needed), consulted before every gRPC call: Client.Search now refuses a non-active tenant before it ever reaches `search`. Dial's signature gained a required TenantChecker parameter; enterprise-api's main.go passes its existing rbacstore.Store (already satisfies the interface). Verified Docker-free via searchclient's existing real-in-process-gRPC-server test harness (TestSearchRefusesMidProvisioningTenant, plus TestSearchPropagatesTenantCheckerError for the fail-closed-on-error case) -- both genuinely run in this environment, same bar as the rest of the Tantivy isolation work. rbacstore.TenantIsActive itself has two new skip-gated live-Postgres tests (TestTenantIsActive, TestTenantIsActiveNonexistentTenant) -- disclosed as not run against a live database here, same gap as the rest of this phase's Postgres-backed pieces. api/queryapi/tenant_isolation_gap_test.go rewritten from a checklist with one skipped stub to a full accounting of all four now-closed probes. Docs updated in lockstep: CLAUDE.md, threat-model.md, phase-4-isolation-design.md (implementation note added after its original sign-off), phase-4-runbook.md (§9), enterprise/README.md. |
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jcoffey-dev
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243f4dc2ab |
Enforce per-resource dashboard grants (RBAC matrix's own/granted qualifier)
api/dashboards' handler previously enforced only tenant-baseline role
(RoleEditor+), so any Editor could edit/delete any dashboard in their
tenant -- the matrix's "(own/granted)" qualifier was explicitly named
as unbuilt in this handler's own doc comment. This closes that gap.
New core interface api/dashboards.PermissionStore (nil-safe, same "not
wired == no-op" shape as authz.Authorizer) resolves a per-resource
dashboard_permissions grant. canEditDashboard now requires the
identity be Admin/Owner, the dashboard's creator, or hold a grant of at
least Editor; canManageGrants is deliberately stricter (creator or
Admin/Owner only, never grant-derived access) so a user who can edit a
dashboard only because of a grant can't extend or re-grant that access
to themselves or others. Wired handlers: PUT/DELETE
/dashboards/{id}/permissions/{userId}, GET .../permissions.
Two real bugs found and fixed while wiring this up, before any of it
touched a live database:
- handleCreate/handleImport never stamped created_by from the
authenticated identity, so every dashboard was owned by "anonymous"
regardless of who made it -- the ownership check would have been
meaningless. Also fixed: ImportDashboard trusted the exported JSON's
created_by verbatim, so re-importing someone else's export would
leave the actual importer unable to edit their own copy.
- metadata/migrations/0024_create_dashboard_permissions.sql's CHECK
constraint diverged from /docs/phase-4-rbac-design.md's schema
(allowed role='admin', nullable granted_by). Reconciled via
0033_restrict_dashboard_permissions_role.sql: Admin/Owner already
have tenant-wide access so a resource-level "admin" grant is
meaningless, and every real grant now always has an attributable
granter.
enterprise/internal/rbacstore gets the storage side: raw CRUD
(dashboard_permissions.go) plus DashboardPermissions
(dashboards_adapter.go), an adapter implementing
api/dashboards.PermissionStore -- same pattern as audit.QueryAPILogger
over queryapi.AuditLogger. Wired into enterprise/cmd/enterprise-api
only; plain api/cmd/api passes nil (ownership/Admin checks still work
via the nil-permissions fallback, just without the "granted" bonus).
Verified: the full own/granted/admin/creator matrix, including the
granted-editor-cannot-manage-grants regression, passes against a fake
PermissionStore (api/dashboards/handler_test.go, all existing tests
also still pass unmodified in behavior). Real integration tests exist
in enterprise/internal/rbacstore/rbacstore_test.go (skip-gated on
RBACSTORE_TEST_POSTGRES_ADDR, same convention as every other
Postgres-backed piece this phase) but have not run against a live
database in this environment -- disclosed in threat-model.md,
phase-4-runbook.md, and enterprise/README.md alongside every other
piece carrying the same gap. Also fixed a stale path in
phase-4-runbook.md's dashboards-tenant-scoping section
(./internal/dashboards/... -> ./dashboards/..., stale since that
package moved out of api/internal/ earlier in this phase).
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jcoffey-dev
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ba2276aa1a |
Phase 4: real Tantivy per-tenant isolation (search/src/registry.rs, enterprise/internal/searchclient)
Closes the last named "isolation mechanism" gap: search.proto gains a tenant_id field on SearchRequest; search/src/registry.rs's IndexRegistry resolves it to an on-demand-opened, per-tenant Tantivy index (empty tenant_id keeps today's single default index, so this is purely additive); enterprise/internal/searchclient sets that field from the authenticated request identity in ctx, mirroring chrunner's exact fail-closed "never a parameter" shape. Wired into enterprise-api in place of the shared api/searchclient. Unlike the ClickHouse pieces from the previous two commits, this one is genuinely verified end to end in this environment: Tantivy is an embedded library, not a networked service, so both the Rust index registry (cargo test, cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings, both clean) and the Go client (a real in-process gRPC server) could actually run. registry.rs's tenant_index_is_isolated_from_default_and_other_tenants seeds three real indices with the same term and confirms a tenant-scoped search returns only that tenant's document -- item 3 of the isolation design doc's verification plan, closed for real, not just written. With both ClickHouse and Tantivy isolation now built, the single largest remaining gap is no longer a missing mechanism: it's that nothing forces or flags whether a deployment actually runs enterprise-api instead of plain api, and that ingest itself has no tenant concept for either storage engine (every record still lands in the one shared database/ index no matter what -- undesigned, not just unbuilt). Updated the threat model, architecture doc, CLAUDE.md, and both READMEs accordingly. |
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jcoffey-dev
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1d57e697b1 |
Phase 4: real per-tenant ClickHouse isolation via a new enterprise-api binary
Closes the threat model's headline finding for the SQL query path:
enterprise/internal/tenantprovision does real CREATE DATABASE/USER/GRANT
against ClickHouse, and enterprise/internal/chrunner is a per-tenant
connection registry implementing api's SQLRunner interface, resolving
the tenant from the authenticated request identity -- never a
caller-suppliable parameter. Both are wired into a new binary,
enterprise/cmd/enterprise-api, alongside the unchanged single-tenant
api/cmd/api, since AGPL core can never import enterprise/ and Go's own
internal/ package visibility rules meant enterprise/ couldn't implement
core's SQLRunner interface without importing the package that defines
it. That required moving api/internal/{authz,queryapi,dashboards,
querylang/executor,searchclient,httpserver} out of internal/ -- the
minimal set enterprise-api needs to import; querylang's compiler
internals (planner/lexer/parser/ast/ir) and api's own config stay
internal, since nothing outside api needs them directly.
Also finally wires enterprise/internal/audit into queryapi.AuditLogger
(nil since Phase 4 task 4) via a new adapter, and adds live-ClickHouse
integration tests for two of the four adversarial probes named in
docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md's verification plan.
Corrected several overclaims in the docs while writing this up: an
earlier claim that rbacstore's CRUD was "verified against a live
Postgres" was never actually true in this environment (only
internal/audit was, earlier in this phase, before Docker access was
lost) -- threat-model.md, phase-4-runbook.md, CLAUDE.md, and
enterprise/README.md all now distinguish "a real integration test
exists" from "this was confirmed against a live database."
Still not built: Tantivy/free-text tenant isolation
(enterprise/internal/searchclient), and any deployment-topology
mechanism that actually routes traffic to enterprise-api instead of
plain api -- both binaries exist side by side today with nothing
enforcing or flagging which one a deployment runs.
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jcoffey-dev
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3eb0f4c589 |
Phase 4: SSO scaffolding, RBAC enforcement, tenant-scoped dashboards, audit logging, K8s deployment
RBAC (api/internal/authz) is live on /query and /dashboards, backed by a new enterprise/ module (session issuance, audit logging, RBAC storage, OIDC/SAML protocol wiring) that core never imports -- only calls over HTTP. Found and fixed a real cross-tenant vulnerability in dashboards (no tenant_id filtering at all) while writing the threat model doc. Two things are explicitly NOT done, documented rather than hidden: tenant isolation for log data itself (/query still shares one ClickHouse connection and Tantivy index across every tenant -- RBAC controls who can query, not what a query can see), and human SSO login (protocol wiring exists, no HTTP handler calls it yet). See docs/security/threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md. Also adds deploy/ (Go Operator + Helm chart, validated offline only -- no cluster was reachable in this environment). |
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jcoffey-dev
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9435115ab7 |
Phase 3: dashboards and alerting
Saved, shareable multi-panel dashboards (table/line/bar/single-stat panels via gridstack + uPlot, global + per-panel time range, JSON export/import) and threshold/absence alert rules with an ok/pending/firing evaluator and webhook/Slack/PagerDuty delivery. - New /metadata component: Postgres control-plane store for dashboards, panels, notification targets, alert rules/state, and delivery log -- see docs/phase-3-dashboard-design.md for why ClickHouse's MergeTree family isn't a fit for this access pattern (needs real row-level locking and read-your-writes consistency). - api/internal/dashboards: dashboard/panel CRUD, pure -- panel query execution stays client-side, reusing the existing /query endpoint. - New /alerting service: rule/target CRUD, a ticker-driven evaluator (claim-then-evaluate concurrency control, transactional-outbox delivery, query errors and threshold zero-rows never coerced into a false transition) and webhook/Slack/PagerDuty delivery with retry/backoff. See docs/phase-3-alerting-design.md for the full state-machine design and the four correctness properties it implements. - web: /dashboards and /alerts UIs; cli: sentryctl dashboards/alerts list/get/apply, seeding a future Terraform provider's JSON contract. - hack/alert-load-test: 500 rules against real ClickHouse data, real measured results in docs/phase-3-runbook.md. Five real bugs found by actually running this against a live stack (documented in the runbook, not just fixed silently): a latent Phase 2 bug where ClickHouse rejected the timestamp format used for earliest=/latest= queries; a "now" literal token injected into query text; a GridStack/uPlot layout-timing race; JS's Date.parse being too lenient to use as a timestamp-detection heuristic; a rule's "enabled" field silently defaulting to false when omitted; and the evaluator's claim-batch-size and worker-pool-concurrency defaulting to the same value, causing 500 concurrently-due rules to take 125s to cycle through instead of the configured 60s. |
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jcoffey-dev
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fb5049a747 |
Phase 2: unified query language spanning ClickHouse and Tantivy
Replaces the separate SQL-only /query and text-only /search endpoints with one pipe-syntax query language (plus raw SQL escape hatch) that compiles to a single IR and execution plan across both backends, so a query like `message:"connection refused" | stats count by host` runs as one request instead of two disjoint tools. - api/internal/querylang: lexer -> ast -> parser -> ir -> planner -> executor, each layer independently tested. - Execution generalizes Phase 1's proven Tantivy-prefilter pattern into a 4-way routing table (pure ClickHouse / text-only / text + aggregation / raw SQL passthrough). - Unified web query page and `sentryctl query`, both hitting the same POST /query endpoint. - Benchmarked against a real 1,022,000-row dataset (hack/benchmark-fixture); caught and fixed a real bug where the Tantivy prefilter cap (10,000) produced an IN-clause exceeding ClickHouse's default max_query_size -- lowered to 5,000, documented in docs/query-language-design.md and docs/phase-2-runbook.md. - docs/query-language-reference.md: customer-facing syntax reference. |
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jcoffey-dev
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cd8aa290ca |
Phase 1: Windows log collection + full-text search
Extends the agent, ingest, storage, api, and web with Windows Event Log/ETW sourcing and Tantivy-backed free-text search, per the approved Phase 1 plan. - CLAUDE.md: materialized on disk (never existed as a file before) with a new Phase 1 "done looks like" section. - agent: Windows Event Log (EvtSubscribe) and ETW sources, Windows service wrapper (install/uninstall/run-service), both feature- and target_os-gated so Linux builds/tests/clippy stay unaffected. Also fixed two pre-existing Phase 0 clippy gaps (dead-code on default-features-only builds, a type-inference edge case) found while testing every feature combination properly for the first time. UNVERIFIED on real Windows -- no Windows toolchain existed anywhere in the build environment; flagged prominently in three places. - proto/ingest: new record_id field, assigned once server-side in ingest's gRPC front end so ClickHouse and Tantivy agree on the same ID for the same record. - storage: record_id column + bloom filter index, verified against a live ClickHouse. - search: new service, Tantivy index, rskafka consumer as an independent second consumer group on the same Redpanda topic ingest already reads. - api/web: new /search endpoint and page, sharing the query page's result-table shape and component. - hack/windows-fixture: sends realistic Windows-shaped data straight to ingest, so the pipeline's handling of it is verifiable without a Windows host. Verified end-to-end on the live docker-compose stack: the same record_id comes back from both /query and /search for the same log line, including for windows-fixture's synthetic Windows Event Log data. Real bugs found and fixed along the way: api/Dockerfile missing proto/ in its build context, search's logs being completely silent (RUST_LOG gap), and search/target/ missing from .gitignore/.dockerignore. |
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jcoffey-dev
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b6b092c912 |
Scaffold Phase 0: agent -> Redpanda -> ingest -> ClickHouse -> api -> web
End-to-end log pipeline for Linux hosts, per /docs/architecture.md: - proto: shared gRPC contract (agent <-> ingest), Go bindings checked in - agent: Rust, musl-targeted, journald/file sourcing, RFC5424 parser, mTLS gRPC client, no required config for the common case - ingest: Go, single binary with --mode server|consumer|all; gRPC front end forwards to Redpanda unchanged, consumer normalizes and batch-writes to ClickHouse with at-least-once delivery - storage: ClickHouse schema + a plain SQL-file migration runner - api: minimal SELECT-only query endpoint, plain REST (not gRPC+gateway yet -- see api/README.md) - web: SvelteKit static SPA, one query page - transport: Redpanda compose + topic provisioning - cli: sentryctl ping stub - hack/dev-certs: throwaway CA + cert generation for local mTLS - root docker-compose.yml + docs/phase-0-runbook.md tie it together Not yet run end-to-end against real Docker/ClickHouse/Redpanda -- see the runbook's caveats section before relying on this working as-is. |