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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 jcoffey-dev
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200f801e2c |
Clear the Dependabot findings
Dependabot alerts were switched on for this repo today and reported 12 open findings. Ten are fixed here; the other two are addressed below. gRPC 1.83.0 -> 1.83.1, in all nine modules that require it. This is GHSA-vp52-pcj8-j9qc / CVE-2026-84304, heap memory exhaustion via HTTP/2 DATA frame fragmentation, affecting <= 1.83.0. It matters more than the version delta suggests: ingest/ is a gRPC listener deliberately exposed to the internet on :4317, so a remote OOM is reachable. mTLS narrows that to holders of a client certificate, which is why this was not an emergency, but the fix is one patch release away and there is no reason to carry it. golang.org/x/oauth2 0.21.0 -> 0.27.0 in deploy/operator, an indirect dependency (GHSA-6v2p-p543-phr9). enterprise/ was already past it at 0.36.0. npm cookie 0.6.0 -> 0.7.2, via an overrides entry rather than a dependency bump. @sveltejs/kit requires ^0.6.0 and still does at 2.70.3, the latest release, so there is no version of kit that resolves this on its own -- an override is the only route that does not involve waiting on upstream. Three incidental changes came out of `go mod tidy` and are not mine: genproto/googleapis/rpc moved forward as a transitive of the new grpc; pgx/v5 was reclassified from indirect to direct in enterprise/, which is simply correct, since audit.go and cmd/enterprise-auth import it; and the proto replace directive shuffled between require blocks at the same version. The twelfth finding, lru (GHSA-rhfx-m35p-ff5j), is not fixed and is not fixable here -- see the note in the pull request. It is CVSS 0, a Stacked Borrows soundness issue in IterMut, and reaching a patched version means tantivy 0.22 -> 0.26, which is a search engine migration rather than a dependency bump. Verified: all ten Go modules build, 40 test packages pass, the web app builds and svelte-check reports 0 errors across 288 files. |
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jcoffey-dev
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4b5dae5879 |
Add local login, agent extra log paths, IPv4/IPv6 metrics; remediate security audit findings
This is a large squashed commit covering two batches of prior uncommitted work plus a full security-audit remediation pass, kept together because go.mod/go.sum and several shared files (main.go, handler.go) were touched by both and splitting risked non-building intermediate commits. Features (built earlier, previously uncommitted): - Local username/password login for single-tenant deployments with no SSO configured (api/localauth, alerting/internal/sessioncheck, sentryctl users, web/src/routes/login, metadata migrations 0040/0041). - Remotely-editable additional log file paths for agents, on top of their existing primary source (api/agents, agent/sentry-agent extra-file-path diffing, web agent config UI). - IPv4/IPv6 addresses reported alongside other host system metrics. Security audit remediation (this pass, all live-verified in production): - Critical: block ClickHouse SSRF table functions (url/remote/file/s3/...) in the raw-SQL query escape hatch. - High: deny sensitive paths and require Admin to add agent extra_file_paths (Editor could previously point an agent at /etc/shadow or an SSH key); alerting webhook targets now validate against internal/metadata/loopback addresses, both at creation and send time; alerting's session middleware now enforces an Editor+ floor on mutating requests instead of "any authenticated session"; bumped goxmldsig to close a SAML signature-verification bypass (GO-2026-4753). - Medium: per-IP login rate limiting; security response headers (HSTS/CSP/nosniff/X-Frame-Options/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy) on web/nginx.conf; a DevCredentialWarnings check in every Go service's config loader, logging loudly at startup if a deployment is still on docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only credentials; dependency bumps (golang.org/x/text, grpc, x/net, quick-xml, h2) across every affected Go module and both Rust crates, including a previously-uncovered x/net vulnerability in deploy/operator; a new security-scan.yml CI workflow running cargo-deny/govulncheck/npm-audit, mirroring the existing license-compliance.yml matrix shape. - Low: removed sentryctl's plaintext --password flag (shell history/`ps` exposure) in favor of stdin and a --password-stdin flag for reset-password's optional specific-password path; a dummy bcrypt comparison closes a login response-time username-enumeration side-channel. |
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jcoffey-dev
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49dd050689 |
Start the Terraform provider: sentry_dashboard, the first resource
CLAUDE.md names the Terraform provider a first-class deliverable
alongside sentryctl ("CLI and Terraform provider are first-class, not
afterthoughts"), but no phase before this one had actually built any of
it -- no terraform/ directory existed. This is a first slice, not a
finished provider: one resource, scoped and confirmed with the project
owner before starting (a new pinned external dependency and an
architectural decision not covered in /docs/architecture.md are both
things CLAUDE.md's own "When in doubt" section says to ask about).
New Go module (terraform/, github.com/sentry/sentry/terraform) built on
HashiCorp's terraform-plugin-framework -- the actively-developed
library, not the legacy SDKv2, since there's no existing provider code
to migrate and no reason to start new on the framework HashiCorp itself
steers people away from.
internal/provider/client.go talks the exact same JSON contract
sentryctl's "dashboards apply" and web's Export JSON button already use
against api/dashboards.Handler (POST/GET/PUT/DELETE /dashboards[/{id}]) --
cli/README.md already named this "the seed of a future Terraform
provider: one JSON contract, multiple callers," this is that third
caller, not a new contract invented for Terraform's sake.
sentry_dashboard's schema deliberately leaves default_earliest/
default_latest Optional+Computed with no Terraform-side static default,
even though the API defaults them to "-1h"/"now" when empty -- letting
the API stay the one source of truth for what "unset" means rather than
duplicating that default in two places that could drift. tenant_id is
Computed-only, matching api/dashboards.Handler's own tenantID() doc
comment that a client-supplied value is always overridden server-side.
Panels are not modeled by this resource -- a genuinely separate resource
shape (own lifecycle, own endpoints, own validation needs), scoped out
deliberately, not an oversight. Alert rules, notification targets, and
tenant/RBAC resources are the same: real, disclosed future work, not
attempted in this pass. See terraform/README.md for the full accounting.
Verified: client_test.go runs real HTTP round trips against httptest.
Server (request construction, response parsing, the 404-vs-other-error
distinction Read/Delete need for Terraform's out-of-band-deletion
convention) -- same pattern cli/cmd/sentryctl's own tests already use
against the same api/dashboards endpoints. provider_test.go validates
both schemas are internally well-formed without needing a Terraform
binary. dashboard_resource_test.go's TestAccDashboardResource_basic is a
real acceptance test (terraform-plugin-testing), skip-gated by TF_ACC=1
per that framework's own convention -- even with TF_ACC set it would
still need a live api service (Postgres+ClickHouse) to apply against,
which this environment has no Docker access to bring up, so it has not
actually run here, same disclosed gap as every other live-infra test in
this repo.
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