Adds a self-hosted (Ollama, qwen2.5-coder) model provider abstraction
with a pluggable opt-in cloud adapter, schema grounding, and a shared
cost/safety guard every AI-suggested query is assessed against --
compiling to and executing through the same unchanged Phase 2 IR/
compiler and Phase 4 tenant scoping as a hand-written query, no
parallel execution path.
Track A (built into the query bar): inline ghost-text autocomplete,
"Explain this query", "Fix this query" with a diff view, and a
rule-based "Optimize" suggestion. Track B: natural-language-to-query
translation, always a separate review step from execution, with
`sentryctl query --nl` requiring explicit confirmation to run.
Every accepted/dismissed translate-fix-optimize interaction is logged
into the same append-only audit_log table Phase 4 built.
Two real product bugs were found and fixed via live browser
verification (a Svelte effect re-running on every keystroke that
silently cancelled the ghost-text debounce; a ghost-text widget
positioned at document offset 0 instead of the cursor), and a real
costguard logic bug (unbounded-aggregation vs. raw-row) was caught by
its own test suite. New integration tests wire a real Ollama client
through the real HTTP handler against a mock server matching Ollama's
wire contract (hack/mock-ollama), keeping model-quality verification
out of CI as a disclosed, periodic human-run check instead.
See /docs/phase-7-ai-design.md and /docs/phase-7-runbook.md.
RBAC (api/internal/authz) is live on /query and /dashboards, backed by a
new enterprise/ module (session issuance, audit logging, RBAC storage,
OIDC/SAML protocol wiring) that core never imports -- only calls over
HTTP. Found and fixed a real cross-tenant vulnerability in dashboards
(no tenant_id filtering at all) while writing the threat model doc.
Two things are explicitly NOT done, documented rather than hidden:
tenant isolation for log data itself (/query still shares one ClickHouse
connection and Tantivy index across every tenant -- RBAC controls who
can query, not what a query can see), and human SSO login (protocol
wiring exists, no HTTP handler calls it yet). See
docs/security/threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md.
Also adds deploy/ (Go Operator + Helm chart, validated offline only --
no cluster was reachable in this environment).