Commit Graph
3 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
jcoffey-dev 7d316f92db Phase 7: AI-assisted query authoring (autocomplete, explain, fix, optimize, NL translation)
Adds a self-hosted (Ollama, qwen2.5-coder) model provider abstraction
with a pluggable opt-in cloud adapter, schema grounding, and a shared
cost/safety guard every AI-suggested query is assessed against --
compiling to and executing through the same unchanged Phase 2 IR/
compiler and Phase 4 tenant scoping as a hand-written query, no
parallel execution path.

Track A (built into the query bar): inline ghost-text autocomplete,
"Explain this query", "Fix this query" with a diff view, and a
rule-based "Optimize" suggestion. Track B: natural-language-to-query
translation, always a separate review step from execution, with
`sentryctl query --nl` requiring explicit confirmation to run.
Every accepted/dismissed translate-fix-optimize interaction is logged
into the same append-only audit_log table Phase 4 built.

Two real product bugs were found and fixed via live browser
verification (a Svelte effect re-running on every keystroke that
silently cancelled the ghost-text debounce; a ghost-text widget
positioned at document offset 0 instead of the cursor), and a real
costguard logic bug (unbounded-aggregation vs. raw-row) was caught by
its own test suite. New integration tests wire a real Ollama client
through the real HTTP handler against a mock server matching Ollama's
wire contract (hack/mock-ollama), keeping model-quality verification
out of CI as a disclosed, periodic human-run check instead.

See /docs/phase-7-ai-design.md and /docs/phase-7-runbook.md.
2026-08-16 18:06:27 -07:00
jcoffey-dev 3eb0f4c589 Phase 4: SSO scaffolding, RBAC enforcement, tenant-scoped dashboards, audit logging, K8s deployment
RBAC (api/internal/authz) is live on /query and /dashboards, backed by a
new enterprise/ module (session issuance, audit logging, RBAC storage,
OIDC/SAML protocol wiring) that core never imports -- only calls over
HTTP. Found and fixed a real cross-tenant vulnerability in dashboards
(no tenant_id filtering at all) while writing the threat model doc.

Two things are explicitly NOT done, documented rather than hidden:
tenant isolation for log data itself (/query still shares one ClickHouse
connection and Tantivy index across every tenant -- RBAC controls who
can query, not what a query can see), and human SSO login (protocol
wiring exists, no HTTP handler calls it yet). See
docs/security/threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md.

Also adds deploy/ (Go Operator + Helm chart, validated offline only --
no cluster was reachable in this environment).
2026-08-13 22:16:59 -07:00
jcoffey-dev 9435115ab7 Phase 3: dashboards and alerting
Saved, shareable multi-panel dashboards (table/line/bar/single-stat
panels via gridstack + uPlot, global + per-panel time range, JSON
export/import) and threshold/absence alert rules with an
ok/pending/firing evaluator and webhook/Slack/PagerDuty delivery.

- New /metadata component: Postgres control-plane store for dashboards,
  panels, notification targets, alert rules/state, and delivery log --
  see docs/phase-3-dashboard-design.md for why ClickHouse's MergeTree
  family isn't a fit for this access pattern (needs real row-level
  locking and read-your-writes consistency).
- api/internal/dashboards: dashboard/panel CRUD, pure -- panel query
  execution stays client-side, reusing the existing /query endpoint.
- New /alerting service: rule/target CRUD, a ticker-driven evaluator
  (claim-then-evaluate concurrency control, transactional-outbox
  delivery, query errors and threshold zero-rows never coerced into a
  false transition) and webhook/Slack/PagerDuty delivery with
  retry/backoff. See docs/phase-3-alerting-design.md for the full
  state-machine design and the four correctness properties it
  implements.
- web: /dashboards and /alerts UIs; cli: sentryctl dashboards/alerts
  list/get/apply, seeding a future Terraform provider's JSON contract.
- hack/alert-load-test: 500 rules against real ClickHouse data, real
  measured results in docs/phase-3-runbook.md.

Five real bugs found by actually running this against a live stack
(documented in the runbook, not just fixed silently): a latent Phase 2
bug where ClickHouse rejected the timestamp format used for
earliest=/latest= queries; a "now" literal token injected into query
text; a GridStack/uPlot layout-timing race; JS's Date.parse being too
lenient to use as a timestamp-detection heuristic; a rule's "enabled"
field silently defaulting to false when omitted; and the evaluator's
claim-batch-size and worker-pool-concurrency defaulting to the same
value, causing 500 concurrently-due rules to take 125s to cycle through
instead of the configured 60s.
2026-08-13 17:29:38 -07:00