Full rebrand across cosmetic branding, code identifiers, and
infrastructure/data-plane naming, using the supplied Cairn OBS logo
package. Cosmetic: favicon/logo swap (also closes a stale license-audit
finding -- the old favicon was SvelteKit's unreplaced scaffold logo),
new centered welcome landing page, larger/legible sidebar logo, page
titles, CLAUDE.md/README/docs prose.
Code identifiers: Go module path github.com/sentry/sentry ->
github.com/cairnobs/cairnobs across all 13 modules and ~91 files (protoc
regenerated); Rust crates sentry-agent/sentry-parser/sentry-search ->
cairnobs-*; CLI sentryctl -> cairnobsctl; Terraform provider fully
renamed (sentry_dashboard etc. -> cairnobs_dashboard, provider type,
env vars); every session/auth cookie name; agent config paths and
Windows service identity.
Deliberately preserved: the gRPC wire protocol's protobuf packages
(sentry.logs.v1, sentry.agent.v1) and their Go import directory
(proto/sentry/...) -- renaming the wire-level package would break every
currently-deployed agent binary (confirmed two real hosts, including
mail.inbuxa.com, are actively streaming through this exact contract)
until rebuilt and redeployed in lockstep with an ingest cutover. Only
the Go module path wrapping the generated code changes.
Infrastructure: every docker-compose container name (root and three
component-level compose files); the Helm chart (directory, Chart.yaml,
named-template helpers, all templates, values.yaml image repos);
Kubernetes Operator (CRD group sentry.io -> cairnobs.io, both CRD YAML
files, Go identifiers, RBAC markers); the coupled enterprise/tenantcrd
package. Caught and fixed real path-coupling bugs along the way: the
Helm chart's search/ingest volume mounts and the dev-only-credential
detection constant vs. docker-compose.yml's literal values had to move
together or a security warning would have silently stopped firing.
Data plane: Postgres database sentry_metadata -> cairnobs_metadata and
role sentry -> cairnobs; ClickHouse database sentry -> cairnobs; Kafka
topic sentry.logs.raw -> cairnobs.logs.raw and its consumer groups.
Source-level defaults, docker-compose.yml, and every migrate.sh/
provision script default updated together; already-applied migration
files left untouched per this repo's immutable-migration convention.
Verified at every layer: all 13 Go modules build/vet/test clean, both
Rust workspaces (agent, search) build/clippy/test clean, npm run check/
build clean, docker compose config validates on all four compose files.
Live-verified against a real docker stack multiple times through this
work, including a final fresh-volume run confirming the actual renamed
Postgres database/role, ClickHouse database, and Kafka topic all work
end to end with a real login and query, zero console errors.
This is a large squashed commit covering two batches of prior uncommitted
work plus a full security-audit remediation pass, kept together because
go.mod/go.sum and several shared files (main.go, handler.go) were touched
by both and splitting risked non-building intermediate commits.
Features (built earlier, previously uncommitted):
- Local username/password login for single-tenant deployments with no
SSO configured (api/localauth, alerting/internal/sessioncheck,
sentryctl users, web/src/routes/login, metadata migrations 0040/0041).
- Remotely-editable additional log file paths for agents, on top of
their existing primary source (api/agents, agent/sentry-agent
extra-file-path diffing, web agent config UI).
- IPv4/IPv6 addresses reported alongside other host system metrics.
Security audit remediation (this pass, all live-verified in production):
- Critical: block ClickHouse SSRF table functions (url/remote/file/s3/...)
in the raw-SQL query escape hatch.
- High: deny sensitive paths and require Admin to add agent
extra_file_paths (Editor could previously point an agent at /etc/shadow
or an SSH key); alerting webhook targets now validate against
internal/metadata/loopback addresses, both at creation and send time;
alerting's session middleware now enforces an Editor+ floor on
mutating requests instead of "any authenticated session"; bumped
goxmldsig to close a SAML signature-verification bypass (GO-2026-4753).
- Medium: per-IP login rate limiting; security response headers
(HSTS/CSP/nosniff/X-Frame-Options/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy)
on web/nginx.conf; a DevCredentialWarnings check in every Go service's
config loader, logging loudly at startup if a deployment is still on
docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only credentials; dependency bumps
(golang.org/x/text, grpc, x/net, quick-xml, h2) across every affected
Go module and both Rust crates, including a previously-uncovered x/net
vulnerability in deploy/operator; a new security-scan.yml CI workflow
running cargo-deny/govulncheck/npm-audit, mirroring the existing
license-compliance.yml matrix shape.
- Low: removed sentryctl's plaintext --password flag (shell
history/`ps` exposure) in favor of stdin and a --password-stdin flag
for reset-password's optional specific-password path; a dummy bcrypt
comparison closes a login response-time username-enumeration
side-channel.
Only VITE_API_BASE_URL had a matching ARG/ENV pair; docker-compose.yml's
build args for VITE_ALERTING_API_BASE_URL and
VITE_ENTERPRISE_AUTH_BASE_URL were silently dropped by Docker (an
undeclared --build-arg is dropped, not an error). enterpriseAuthBase
came out undefined in the built bundle, so the tenant-picker page threw
"enterprise-auth is not configured" against a real running container
even though docker-compose.yml looked correct. The other two vars masked
this because web/src/lib/api.ts's apiBase/alertingBase both have
hardcoded fallbacks that happen to match the intended values.
Found while wiring a real Auth0 developer tenant into enterprise-auth to
close §3a/§12's remaining "real external IdP" gap. Also gitignores
docker-compose.override.yml, since that's where such real credentials
belong for local testing -- never committed.
End-to-end log pipeline for Linux hosts, per /docs/architecture.md:
- proto: shared gRPC contract (agent <-> ingest), Go bindings checked in
- agent: Rust, musl-targeted, journald/file sourcing, RFC5424 parser,
mTLS gRPC client, no required config for the common case
- ingest: Go, single binary with --mode server|consumer|all; gRPC front
end forwards to Redpanda unchanged, consumer normalizes and
batch-writes to ClickHouse with at-least-once delivery
- storage: ClickHouse schema + a plain SQL-file migration runner
- api: minimal SELECT-only query endpoint, plain REST (not gRPC+gateway
yet -- see api/README.md)
- web: SvelteKit static SPA, one query page
- transport: Redpanda compose + topic provisioning
- cli: sentryctl ping stub
- hack/dev-certs: throwaway CA + cert generation for local mTLS
- root docker-compose.yml + docs/phase-0-runbook.md tie it together
Not yet run end-to-end against real Docker/ClickHouse/Redpanda -- see the
runbook's caveats section before relying on this working as-is.
jcoffey-dev