Dependabot alerts were switched on for this repo today and reported 12 open
findings. Ten are fixed here; the other two are addressed below.
gRPC 1.83.0 -> 1.83.1, in all nine modules that require it. This is
GHSA-vp52-pcj8-j9qc / CVE-2026-84304, heap memory exhaustion via HTTP/2 DATA
frame fragmentation, affecting <= 1.83.0. It matters more than the version
delta suggests: ingest/ is a gRPC listener deliberately exposed to the internet
on :4317, so a remote OOM is reachable. mTLS narrows that to holders of a
client certificate, which is why this was not an emergency, but the fix is one
patch release away and there is no reason to carry it.
golang.org/x/oauth2 0.21.0 -> 0.27.0 in deploy/operator, an indirect
dependency (GHSA-6v2p-p543-phr9). enterprise/ was already past it at 0.36.0.
npm cookie 0.6.0 -> 0.7.2, via an overrides entry rather than a dependency
bump. @sveltejs/kit requires ^0.6.0 and still does at 2.70.3, the latest
release, so there is no version of kit that resolves this on its own -- an
override is the only route that does not involve waiting on upstream.
Three incidental changes came out of `go mod tidy` and are not mine:
genproto/googleapis/rpc moved forward as a transitive of the new grpc; pgx/v5
was reclassified from indirect to direct in enterprise/, which is simply
correct, since audit.go and cmd/enterprise-auth import it; and the proto
replace directive shuffled between require blocks at the same version.
The twelfth finding, lru (GHSA-rhfx-m35p-ff5j), is not fixed and is not
fixable here -- see the note in the pull request. It is CVSS 0, a Stacked
Borrows soundness issue in IterMut, and reaching a patched version means
tantivy 0.22 -> 0.26, which is a search engine migration rather than a
dependency bump.
Verified: all ten Go modules build, 40 test packages pass, the web app builds
and svelte-check reports 0 errors across 288 files.
This is a large squashed commit covering two batches of prior uncommitted
work plus a full security-audit remediation pass, kept together because
go.mod/go.sum and several shared files (main.go, handler.go) were touched
by both and splitting risked non-building intermediate commits.
Features (built earlier, previously uncommitted):
- Local username/password login for single-tenant deployments with no
SSO configured (api/localauth, alerting/internal/sessioncheck,
sentryctl users, web/src/routes/login, metadata migrations 0040/0041).
- Remotely-editable additional log file paths for agents, on top of
their existing primary source (api/agents, agent/sentry-agent
extra-file-path diffing, web agent config UI).
- IPv4/IPv6 addresses reported alongside other host system metrics.
Security audit remediation (this pass, all live-verified in production):
- Critical: block ClickHouse SSRF table functions (url/remote/file/s3/...)
in the raw-SQL query escape hatch.
- High: deny sensitive paths and require Admin to add agent
extra_file_paths (Editor could previously point an agent at /etc/shadow
or an SSH key); alerting webhook targets now validate against
internal/metadata/loopback addresses, both at creation and send time;
alerting's session middleware now enforces an Editor+ floor on
mutating requests instead of "any authenticated session"; bumped
goxmldsig to close a SAML signature-verification bypass (GO-2026-4753).
- Medium: per-IP login rate limiting; security response headers
(HSTS/CSP/nosniff/X-Frame-Options/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy)
on web/nginx.conf; a DevCredentialWarnings check in every Go service's
config loader, logging loudly at startup if a deployment is still on
docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only credentials; dependency bumps
(golang.org/x/text, grpc, x/net, quick-xml, h2) across every affected
Go module and both Rust crates, including a previously-uncovered x/net
vulnerability in deploy/operator; a new security-scan.yml CI workflow
running cargo-deny/govulncheck/npm-audit, mirroring the existing
license-compliance.yml matrix shape.
- Low: removed sentryctl's plaintext --password flag (shell
history/`ps` exposure) in favor of stdin and a --password-stdin flag
for reset-password's optional specific-password path; a dummy bcrypt
comparison closes a login response-time username-enumeration
side-channel.
RBAC (api/internal/authz) is live on /query and /dashboards, backed by a
new enterprise/ module (session issuance, audit logging, RBAC storage,
OIDC/SAML protocol wiring) that core never imports -- only calls over
HTTP. Found and fixed a real cross-tenant vulnerability in dashboards
(no tenant_id filtering at all) while writing the threat model doc.
Two things are explicitly NOT done, documented rather than hidden:
tenant isolation for log data itself (/query still shares one ClickHouse
connection and Tantivy index across every tenant -- RBAC controls who
can query, not what a query can see), and human SSO login (protocol
wiring exists, no HTTP handler calls it yet). See
docs/security/threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md.
Also adds deploy/ (Go Operator + Helm chart, validated offline only --
no cluster was reachable in this environment).
jcoffey-dev