Two Dependabot PRs are stuck behind the same number.
#35 raises the go directive to 1.26.0 in six modules, because
golang.org/x/crypto v0.56.0 requires it -- x/crypto tracks the two most
recent Go releases and 0.56 dropped 1.25. A module that says 1.26 cannot
be built by the 1.25 this repository pins in two places, so that PR
fails every Go job.
#29 raises actions/setup-go to v7, which sets GOTOOLCHAIN=local. With
that set, `go install golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@latest` cannot
quietly fetch a newer toolchain, and stops with
golang.org/x/[email protected] requires go >= 1.26.0 (running go 1.25.14)
Under setup-go v5 the same install succeeded by downloading 1.26 behind
our backs, which is its own reason to be on 1.26 deliberately instead.
So: security-scan's go-version and all eight Dockerfiles move together,
1.25 -> 1.26. Nothing else needs to. A newer toolchain builds an older
directive happily, so this stands on its own before #35 lands, and the
go.mod files stay where they are here.
Checked by building rather than by reading: the api and ingest images
both build on golang:1.26-alpine, and api, ingest and enterprise still
`go build ./...` clean against their existing 1.25 directives.
The rename commit before this one covered module paths and the obvious
user-facing strings; this is the rest of it -- the places where "sentry"
was a default value, a filename, or a picture rather than a word in a
sentence.
Defaults that changed: CLICKHOUSE_DATABASE (sentry -> cairnobs),
POSTGRES_DATABASE (sentry_metadata -> cairnobs_metadata), and
POSTGRES_USERNAME (sentry -> cairnobs), across api/alerting/ingest and
the enterprise binaries, plus the compose files and migrate scripts that
create those objects. These are *defaults*, so a deployment that sets
them explicitly is unaffected -- but any deployment relying on the old
defaults must have its environment updated before it picks this up, or
it will come up pointing at a database that doesn't exist.
Also: the light-mode logo variants (the dark ones existed alone, so the
landing page and sidebar rendered a dark mark on a light background),
regenerated favicons, and the docs/README/threat-model prose that still
said Sentry.
ingest tags every record with a tenant_id Kafka header (built previously),
but nothing consumed it to actually route the write. This closes that for
ClickHouse: enterprise/cmd/enterprise-ingest (a second binary, mirroring
enterprise-api) reuses ingest/consumer's own flush loop unchanged, with
enterprise/internal/chwriter.Registry -- a per-tenant clickhousewriter.Writer
registry -- swapped in as the writer. A batch pulled from the single shared
Redpanda topic can mix records from many tenants, so WriteBatch groups by
TenantID and dispatches each group to its own tenant's connection, fail-
closed on an empty or unrecognized tenant_id.
ingest/consumer and ingest/clickhousewriter move out of internal/ (same
reason api/internal/* moved earlier this phase: enterprise/ can't import
anything under another module's internal/). Their New() constructors now
take small local Config structs instead of ingest/internal/config types,
so enterprise/ doesn't need that import either.
Building this surfaced a real bug: tenantprovision.ProvisionClickHouse
only granted SELECT on a tenant's ClickHouse user, correct for chrunner's
read-only use but not enough for chwriter reusing the same credential to
write -- every real per-tenant write would have failed closed with a
permission error. Fixed by widening the grant to SELECT, INSERT; no
cross-tenant boundary is crossed by also allowing INSERT within a
tenant's own database.
Helm gates enterprise-ingest's Deployment on the same
ingest.requireTenantCredential flag that already gates tag validation --
write-routing is meaningless without tagging already being required, so
they're one decision, not two. docker-compose.yml's version is a
disclosed, weaker approximation: it can't achieve Helm's genuine
-mode=server/-mode=consumer split, so with the enterprise profile active
both ingest and enterprise-ingest independently consume every message
via different consumer groups -- harmless duplication for local
verification only.
Not built: Tantivy's independent Redpanda consumer (search/src/consumer.rs)
still doesn't read the tenant_id header at all -- every record still lands
in the one shared index regardless of tenant. Not run: the live-ClickHouse-
gated tests (chwriter's cross-tenant routing test, tenantprovision's INSERT
regression test) -- no Docker/database access in this environment; they're
correct Go that has never executed, disclosed as such in docs/security/
threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md §14.
jcoffey-dev