The charter file carried a tool-specific name while being the repository's own
document: mission, non-negotiable constraints, the pinned stack, repo
conventions and phase status, cited as authority by thirty files across the
agent, api, deploy, docs, search and terraform trees.
PROJECT-SPEC.md says what it is. All 42 references are updated in the same
commit, including the relative link in docs/status.md, so nothing points at a
filename that no longer exists.
Full dependency inventory across Rust/Go/npm plus Docker base images
and vendored assets (776 rows, 502 unique deps), classified against
AGPLv3 compatibility with real citations rather than assumptions.
enterprise/ relicensed from its commercial-license stub to AGPLv3,
matching core -- the one real flag (Redpanda's BSL 1.1) was evaluated
against primary sources and accepted as-is rather than triggering a
broker swap. CI enforcement wired up (.github/workflows/license-
compliance.yml, this repo's first CI workflow), a root LICENSE file
added, and every doc/comment referencing the old commercial-license
boundary updated to describe it as architectural only.
See /docs/compliance/ for the full report, inventory, and policy.
Phase 4 task 8's verification plan named four adversarial probes;
three were closed earlier this phase, the fourth (an evaluator tick,
or any other caller, hitting a tenant that exists but hasn't reached
the active+credentialed gate yet -- must be refused, not served) was
still an explicitly-skipped stub in
api/queryapi/tenant_isolation_gap_test.go.
Investigating it found the two storage engines needed genuinely
different treatment:
- ClickHouse (enterprise/internal/chrunner) already had this property
structurally, for free: Registry is built once at startup from
rbacstore.ListProvisionedDataSources, which already filters to
active+credentialed tenants only, so a mid-provisioning tenant is
simply absent from the connection map. New test
TestRegistryRefusesMidProvisioningTenant proves this without Docker
-- an empty DataSource list never dials ClickHouse, so this genuinely
runs in this environment, unlike every other test in that file.
- Tantivy (search/src/registry.rs's IndexRegistry) was a real, different
gap, not just an unverified assumption: it opens-or-creates an index
for any syntactically-valid tenant_id on first request, because it's
a separate process with no Postgres access and structurally can't
know which tenants are actually provisioned. A query against a
mid-provisioning tenant would have silently succeeded with zero
results from a freshly-created empty index -- "ambient success"
indistinguishable from "no matching logs," exactly the failure mode
this item was worried about.
Fixed the Tantivy gap with a new enterprise/internal/searchclient.
TenantChecker interface (backed by a new rbacstore.TenantIsActive,
implemented structurally, no new import edge needed), consulted before
every gRPC call: Client.Search now refuses a non-active tenant before
it ever reaches `search`. Dial's signature gained a required
TenantChecker parameter; enterprise-api's main.go passes its existing
rbacstore.Store (already satisfies the interface). Verified Docker-free
via searchclient's existing real-in-process-gRPC-server test harness
(TestSearchRefusesMidProvisioningTenant, plus
TestSearchPropagatesTenantCheckerError for the fail-closed-on-error
case) -- both genuinely run in this environment, same bar as the rest
of the Tantivy isolation work.
rbacstore.TenantIsActive itself has two new skip-gated live-Postgres
tests (TestTenantIsActive, TestTenantIsActiveNonexistentTenant) --
disclosed as not run against a live database here, same gap as the
rest of this phase's Postgres-backed pieces.
api/queryapi/tenant_isolation_gap_test.go rewritten from a checklist
with one skipped stub to a full accounting of all four now-closed
probes. Docs updated in lockstep: CLAUDE.md, threat-model.md,
phase-4-isolation-design.md (implementation note added after its
original sign-off), phase-4-runbook.md (§9), enterprise/README.md.
RBAC (api/internal/authz) is live on /query and /dashboards, backed by a
new enterprise/ module (session issuance, audit logging, RBAC storage,
OIDC/SAML protocol wiring) that core never imports -- only calls over
HTTP. Found and fixed a real cross-tenant vulnerability in dashboards
(no tenant_id filtering at all) while writing the threat model doc.
Two things are explicitly NOT done, documented rather than hidden:
tenant isolation for log data itself (/query still shares one ClickHouse
connection and Tantivy index across every tenant -- RBAC controls who
can query, not what a query can see), and human SSO login (protocol
wiring exists, no HTTP handler calls it yet). See
docs/security/threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md.
Also adds deploy/ (Go Operator + Helm chart, validated offline only --
no cluster was reachable in this environment).
jcoffey-dev