Scaffold Phase 0: agent -> Redpanda -> ingest -> ClickHouse -> api -> web
End-to-end log pipeline for Linux hosts, per /docs/architecture.md: - proto: shared gRPC contract (agent <-> ingest), Go bindings checked in - agent: Rust, musl-targeted, journald/file sourcing, RFC5424 parser, mTLS gRPC client, no required config for the common case - ingest: Go, single binary with --mode server|consumer|all; gRPC front end forwards to Redpanda unchanged, consumer normalizes and batch-writes to ClickHouse with at-least-once delivery - storage: ClickHouse schema + a plain SQL-file migration runner - api: minimal SELECT-only query endpoint, plain REST (not gRPC+gateway yet -- see api/README.md) - web: SvelteKit static SPA, one query page - transport: Redpanda compose + topic provisioning - cli: sentryctl ping stub - hack/dev-certs: throwaway CA + cert generation for local mTLS - root docker-compose.yml + docs/phase-0-runbook.md tie it together Not yet run end-to-end against real Docker/ClickHouse/Redpanda -- see the runbook's caveats section before relying on this working as-is.
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@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
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package queryapi
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import (
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"errors"
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"regexp"
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"strings"
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)
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// disallowedKeyword is defense-in-depth on top of the SELECT-only gate: it
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// catches mutating/administrative statements appearing anywhere in the
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// query (e.g. smuggled into a subquery), not just at the start. This is
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// word-boundary matching, not a real SQL parser.
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var disallowedKeyword = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\b(insert|update|delete|alter|drop|truncate|create|grant|revoke|attach|detach|rename|kill|optimize|system|set|exchange|watch)\b`)
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// validateSelectOnly enforces the Phase 0 query API contract: exactly one
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// SELECT statement and nothing else. This is "basic injection guarding" as
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// specced, not a SQL parser: it will reject some unusual-but-valid SELECTs
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// (e.g. one that references a column literally named "delete") and will
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// not catch every possible abuse (e.g. a syntactically pure SELECT that's
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// simply expensive to run). Both are acceptable for a Phase 0 placeholder
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// that's explicitly superseded by a real query layer in Phase 2 — see
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// /docs/architecture.md.
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func validateSelectOnly(sql string) error {
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trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(sql)
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if trimmed == "" {
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return errors.New("query must not be empty")
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}
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trimmed = strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimSuffix(trimmed, ";"))
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if trimmed == "" {
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return errors.New("query must not be empty")
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}
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if strings.Contains(trimmed, ";") {
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return errors.New("only a single statement is allowed")
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}
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firstWord := strings.ToUpper(strings.Fields(trimmed)[0])
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if firstWord != "SELECT" {
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return errors.New("only SELECT queries are allowed")
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}
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if disallowedKeyword.MatchString(trimmed) {
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return errors.New("query contains a disallowed keyword")
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}
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return nil
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}
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