Add local login, agent extra log paths, IPv4/IPv6 metrics; remediate security audit findings
This is a large squashed commit covering two batches of prior uncommitted work plus a full security-audit remediation pass, kept together because go.mod/go.sum and several shared files (main.go, handler.go) were touched by both and splitting risked non-building intermediate commits. Features (built earlier, previously uncommitted): - Local username/password login for single-tenant deployments with no SSO configured (api/localauth, alerting/internal/sessioncheck, sentryctl users, web/src/routes/login, metadata migrations 0040/0041). - Remotely-editable additional log file paths for agents, on top of their existing primary source (api/agents, agent/sentry-agent extra-file-path diffing, web agent config UI). - IPv4/IPv6 addresses reported alongside other host system metrics. Security audit remediation (this pass, all live-verified in production): - Critical: block ClickHouse SSRF table functions (url/remote/file/s3/...) in the raw-SQL query escape hatch. - High: deny sensitive paths and require Admin to add agent extra_file_paths (Editor could previously point an agent at /etc/shadow or an SSH key); alerting webhook targets now validate against internal/metadata/loopback addresses, both at creation and send time; alerting's session middleware now enforces an Editor+ floor on mutating requests instead of "any authenticated session"; bumped goxmldsig to close a SAML signature-verification bypass (GO-2026-4753). - Medium: per-IP login rate limiting; security response headers (HSTS/CSP/nosniff/X-Frame-Options/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy) on web/nginx.conf; a DevCredentialWarnings check in every Go service's config loader, logging loudly at startup if a deployment is still on docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only credentials; dependency bumps (golang.org/x/text, grpc, x/net, quick-xml, h2) across every affected Go module and both Rust crates, including a previously-uncovered x/net vulnerability in deploy/operator; a new security-scan.yml CI workflow running cargo-deny/govulncheck/npm-audit, mirroring the existing license-compliance.yml matrix shape. - Low: removed sentryctl's plaintext --password flag (shell history/`ps` exposure) in favor of stdin and a --password-stdin flag for reset-password's optional specific-password path; a dummy bcrypt comparison closes a login response-time username-enumeration side-channel.
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@@ -272,9 +272,20 @@ type DesiredOverride struct {
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// agent's only obligation is to echo it back as
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// CheckInRequest.applied_override_version once applied -- it never
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// interprets the value itself.
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Version string `protobuf:"bytes,6,opt,name=version,proto3" json:"version,omitempty"`
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unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFields
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sizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache
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Version string `protobuf:"bytes,6,opt,name=version,proto3" json:"version,omitempty"`
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// Extra file paths this agent should tail in addition to whatever its
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// local [source] already is -- never a replacement for the primary
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// source (an agent whose local source is journald can still be told
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// to also tail a file, and vice versa). Unlike every field above,
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// there's no real "unset" state for a list: the web UI/CLI always
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// resubmit the complete desired list on every edit (same "PUT
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// replaces the whole override" convention every other field already
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// follows -- see api/agents/handler.go's handleSetConfig), so an
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// empty list unambiguously means "no extra paths right now," not
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// "don't touch this."
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ExtraFilePaths []string `protobuf:"bytes,7,rep,name=extra_file_paths,json=extraFilePaths,proto3" json:"extra_file_paths,omitempty"`
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unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFields
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sizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache
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}
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func (x *DesiredOverride) Reset() {
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@@ -349,6 +360,13 @@ func (x *DesiredOverride) GetVersion() string {
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return ""
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}
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func (x *DesiredOverride) GetExtraFilePaths() []string {
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if x != nil {
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return x.ExtraFilePaths
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}
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return nil
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}
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type CheckInResponse struct {
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state protoimpl.MessageState `protogen:"open.v1"`
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// False when no override has ever been set for this agent -- it
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@@ -442,14 +460,15 @@ const file_sentry_agent_v1_agent_control_proto_rawDesc = "" +
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"\x04host\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x04host\x12\x18\n" +
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"\aservice\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\aservice\x12F\n" +
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"\x0ecurrent_config\x18\x03 \x01(\v2\x1f.sentry.agent.v1.ReportedConfigR\rcurrentConfig\x128\n" +
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"\x18applied_override_version\x18\x04 \x01(\tR\x16appliedOverrideVersion\"\x98\x03\n" +
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"\x18applied_override_version\x18\x04 \x01(\tR\x16appliedOverrideVersion\"\xc2\x03\n" +
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"\x0fDesiredOverride\x12)\n" +
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"\x0ebatch_max_size\x18\x01 \x01(\x04H\x00R\fbatchMaxSize\x88\x01\x01\x12:\n" +
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"\x17batch_flush_interval_ms\x18\x02 \x01(\x04H\x01R\x14batchFlushIntervalMs\x88\x01\x01\x120\n" +
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"\x11heartbeat_enabled\x18\x03 \x01(\bH\x02R\x10heartbeatEnabled\x88\x01\x01\x127\n" +
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"\x15heartbeat_interval_ms\x18\x04 \x01(\x04H\x03R\x13heartbeatIntervalMs\x88\x01\x01\x12(\n" +
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"\rjournald_unit\x18\x05 \x01(\tH\x04R\fjournaldUnit\x88\x01\x01\x12\x18\n" +
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"\aversion\x18\x06 \x01(\tR\aversionB\x11\n" +
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"\aversion\x18\x06 \x01(\tR\aversion\x12(\n" +
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"\x10extra_file_paths\x18\a \x03(\tR\x0eextraFilePathsB\x11\n" +
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"\x0f_batch_max_sizeB\x1a\n" +
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"\x18_batch_flush_interval_msB\x14\n" +
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"\x12_heartbeat_enabledB\x18\n" +
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