Add local login, agent extra log paths, IPv4/IPv6 metrics; remediate security audit findings

This is a large squashed commit covering two batches of prior uncommitted work plus a full security-audit remediation pass, kept together because go.mod/go.sum and several shared files (main.go, handler.go) were touched by both and splitting risked non-building intermediate commits. Features (built earlier, previously uncommitted): - Local username/password login for single-tenant deployments with no SSO configured (api/localauth, alerting/internal/sessioncheck, sentryctl users, web/src/routes/login, metadata migrations 0040/0041). - Remotely-editable additional log file paths for agents, on top of their existing primary source (api/agents, agent/sentry-agent extra-file-path diffing, web agent config UI). - IPv4/IPv6 addresses reported alongside other host system metrics. Security audit remediation (this pass, all live-verified in production): - Critical: block ClickHouse SSRF table functions (url/remote/file/s3/...) in the raw-SQL query escape hatch. - High: deny sensitive paths and require Admin to add agent extra_file_paths (Editor could previously point an agent at /etc/shadow or an SSH key); alerting webhook targets now validate against internal/metadata/loopback addresses, both at creation and send time; alerting's session middleware now enforces an Editor+ floor on mutating requests instead of "any authenticated session"; bumped goxmldsig to close a SAML signature-verification bypass (GO-2026-4753). - Medium: per-IP login rate limiting; security response headers (HSTS/CSP/nosniff/X-Frame-Options/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy) on web/nginx.conf; a DevCredentialWarnings check in every Go service's config loader, logging loudly at startup if a deployment is still on docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only credentials; dependency bumps (golang.org/x/text, grpc, x/net, quick-xml, h2) across every affected Go module and both Rust crates, including a previously-uncovered x/net vulnerability in deploy/operator; a new security-scan.yml CI workflow running cargo-deny/govulncheck/npm-audit, mirroring the existing license-compliance.yml matrix shape. - Low: removed sentryctl's plaintext --password flag (shell history/`ps` exposure) in favor of stdin and a --password-stdin flag for reset-password's optional specific-password path; a dummy bcrypt comparison closes a login response-time username-enumeration side-channel.
2026-08-18 23:53:20 -07:00
parent d2bb9de245
commit 4b5dae5879
87 changed files with 5095 additions and 164 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestCmdUsersMissingSubcommand(t *testing.T) {
+	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
+	code := cmdUsers(nil, strings.NewReader(""), &stdout, &stderr)
+	if code != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 1", code)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCmdUsersLoginPrintsOnlyTheToken(t *testing.T) {
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		if r.Method != http.MethodPost || r.URL.Path != "/auth/login" {
+			t.Errorf("unexpected request: %s %s", r.Method, r.URL.Path)
+		}
+		var body loginRequestBody
+		_ = json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&body)
+		if body.Username != "admin" || body.Password != "s3cret!!" {
+			t.Errorf("unexpected credentials: %+v", body)
+		}
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		w.Write([]byte(`{"token":"abc123","user_id":"u1","username":"admin","role":"owner"}`))
+	}))
+	defer srv.Close()
+
+	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
+	code := cmdUsers([]string{"login", "admin", "--api", srv.URL}, strings.NewReader("s3cret!!\n"), &stdout, &stderr)
+	if code != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 0; stderr=%s", code, stderr.String())
+	}
+	if got := strings.TrimSpace(stdout.String()); got != "abc123" {
+		t.Fatalf("stdout = %q, want exactly the raw token (pipeable into SENTRYCTL_TOKEN)", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCmdUsersLoginFailure(t *testing.T) {
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
+		w.Write([]byte(`{"error":"invalid username or password"}`))
+	}))
+	defer srv.Close()
+
+	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
+	code := cmdUsers([]string{"login", "admin", "--api", srv.URL}, strings.NewReader("wrong\n"), &stdout, &stderr)
+	if code != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 1", code)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "invalid username or password") {
+		t.Fatalf("stderr = %q, want it to surface the server's error message", stderr.String())
+	}
+	if stdout.String() != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("stdout = %q, want empty on failure (nothing pipeable into SENTRYCTL_TOKEN)", stdout.String())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCmdUsersCreateSuccess(t *testing.T) {
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		if r.Method != http.MethodPost || r.URL.Path != "/auth/users" {
+			t.Errorf("unexpected request: %s %s", r.Method, r.URL.Path)
+		}
+		var body struct {
+			Username string `json:"username"`
+			Password string `json:"password"`
+			Role     string `json:"role"`
+		}
+		_ = json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&body)
+		if body.Role != "viewer" {
+			t.Errorf("role = %q, want viewer (from --role)", body.Role)
+		}
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
+		w.Write([]byte(`{"id":"u2","username":"bob","role":"viewer"}`))
+	}))
+	defer srv.Close()
+
+	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
+	code := cmdUsers([]string{"create", "bob", "--role", "viewer", "--api", srv.URL}, strings.NewReader("bobspassword\n"), &stdout, &stderr)
+	if code != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 0; stderr=%s", code, stderr.String())
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "bob") {
+		t.Fatalf("stdout = %q, want it to contain the created user", stdout.String())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCmdUsersCreateDefaultsRoleToEditor(t *testing.T) {
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		var body struct {
+			Role string `json:"role"`
+		}
+		_ = json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&body)
+		if body.Role != "editor" {
+			t.Errorf("role = %q, want editor (the default when --role is omitted)", body.Role)
+		}
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
+		w.Write([]byte(`{"id":"u2","username":"bob","role":"editor"}`))
+	}))
+	defer srv.Close()
+
+	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
+	code := cmdUsers([]string{"create", "bob", "--api", srv.URL}, strings.NewReader("bobspassword\n"), &stdout, &stderr)
+	if code != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 0; stderr=%s", code, stderr.String())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCmdUsersDeleteMissingID(t *testing.T) {
+	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
+	code := cmdUsers([]string{"delete"}, strings.NewReader(""), &stdout, &stderr)
+	if code != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 1", code)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCmdUsersDeleteSuccess(t *testing.T) {
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		if r.Method != http.MethodDelete || r.URL.Path != "/auth/users/u2" {
+			t.Errorf("unexpected request: %s %s", r.Method, r.URL.Path)
+		}
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
+	}))
+	defer srv.Close()
+
+	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
+	code := cmdUsers([]string{"delete", "u2", "--api", srv.URL}, strings.NewReader(""), &stdout, &stderr)
+	if code != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 0; stderr=%s", code, stderr.String())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCmdUsersResetPasswordWithGeneratedPassword(t *testing.T) {
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		if r.URL.Path != "/auth/users/u2/reset-password" {
+			t.Errorf("unexpected path: %s", r.URL.Path)
+		}
+		body, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
+		if strings.TrimSpace(string(body)) != "{}" {
+			t.Errorf("body = %q, want {} (no --password-stdin supplied)", body)
+		}
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		w.Write([]byte(`{"password":"generated-abc"}`))
+	}))
+	defer srv.Close()
+
+	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
+	code := cmdUsers([]string{"reset-password", "u2", "--api", srv.URL}, strings.NewReader(""), &stdout, &stderr)
+	if code != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 0; stderr=%s", code, stderr.String())
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "generated-abc") {
+		t.Fatalf("stdout = %q, want it to contain the generated password", stdout.String())
+	}
+}
+
+// TestCmdUsersResetPasswordWithStdinPassword is the regression test for
+// the security-audit finding that this CLI accepted a plaintext
+// --password <value> flag (visible via `ps`/shell history). Setting a
+// specific password must go through --password-stdin plus piped input
+// instead, never a bare argument.
+func TestCmdUsersResetPasswordWithStdinPassword(t *testing.T) {
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		var body struct {
+			Password string `json:"password"`
+		}
+		_ = json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&body)
+		if body.Password != "a-specific-password" {
+			t.Errorf("password = %q, want the value piped via stdin", body.Password)
+		}
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		w.Write([]byte(`{}`))
+	}))
+	defer srv.Close()
+
+	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
+	code := cmdUsers([]string{"reset-password", "u2", "--password-stdin", "--api", srv.URL}, strings.NewReader("a-specific-password\n"), &stdout, &stderr)
+	if code != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 0; stderr=%s", code, stderr.String())
+	}
+}